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Abstract 
Abstract 1 
 
  
South: A Psychometric Text Adventure is an artist’s book and a set of software 
programs. The South project re-conceptualises the artist’s book and wider book-
forms, encouraging models of interaction that are aware of specific locations and 
individual subjects. These alternatives are a response to what this thesis frames as 
two rapidly stagnating forms. The thesis argues that both the artist’s book and 
electronic literature (see the glossary on page 343 for definitions of the key terms 
used throughout this thesis) have not made a significant impact on the cultural 
landscape of the early 21st century. Nor have they made a significant use of the key 
technological changes that have occurred since the first electronic literature 
emerged in the late 1970s (in the form of interactive fictions, sometimes called ‘Text 
Adventures’, such as Colossal Cave Adventure (Crowther, 1976)). 
 
 In order to move forward from the increasingly problematic, disembodied, 
computational models used in these early digital works (discussed in chapters two, 
five and six) this thesis specifically recommends the formation of temporally specific, 
contextualised, relationships between readers and digital texts. The South project 
presents a multi-linear, situated and embodied form of intra-activity (see glossary) as 
an alternative to more linear forms of interaction. These ideas and their implications 
for electronic literature and artist’s books will be clarified and outlined throughout 
this thesis, as will the rationale for framing them as valid models for moving 
electronic literature and artist’s books into a position of cultural and technological 
relevance.…...……………………………………………………………
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 1 
 
Figure 1 Above the South book and ‘egg’. The egg is an interim object that connects the South 
software to the South book. The egg object is an LCD digital photo viewer, readers can click its 
backward and forwards buttons to access the bespoke content generated for them by the South 
software. When connected to a computer via USB users can load the images generated by the 
software into their egg (they can also be loaded into a mobile phone or laptop). Readers can then 
experience a unique set of instructions that guide them through both the South Bank location and the 
South book. Eggs can be purchased from this site: 
http://www.hardwaresphere.com/2008/06/09/egg-shaped-digital-photo-frame/  
 
 
 
 South, a Psychometric Text Adventure is an artist’s book and a set of software 
programs that re-conceptualise the artist’s book form. The South project represents 
a significant overlap between the artist’s book and literary works, hence the allusion 
to both forms throughout this thesis. In relation to both artistic and literary forms 
the project fosters a creative sensitivity to the temporally and socially entangled 
agencies that are always at play, but often subsumed, in complex systems of human-
computer communication. South in both its analogue and digital book forms is 
designed to work with a physical location, the South Bank area of South London, but 
it is also designed to work with the subjectivity and ‘personality traits’ of individual 
readers, and with wider situating forces.  
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Figure 1a 1 
Figure 1a, Outline of the South system. 
 
The South system: 
 
1. The South software 
Scrapes the web to get data. It analyses the data to try and  
understand contexts and situations. The software also asks readers questions to 
 try and understand them. It then generates unique content in 
the form of image files. The image files contain instructions for readers. 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. The South ‘egg’  
Is an off-the-shelf device for displaying images. Readers 
can load up the egg with images generated by the software and take it with  
them to the South Bank. The egg is also a motif that runs  
throughout the South Book. 
------------------------ 
 
3. The South book 
Is an analogue book that can be used with or without the 
 software-generated content. The software-generated content  
provides unique pathways through both the book and the South Bank  
location. The book includes fictional stories about the  
avian scientist and spiritual guru Ivan Dâr. 
------------------------------- 
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The South software and book represent a practice-based hypothesis that subjectively 
and environmentally situated intra-active software can enliven electronic literature 
and artist’s books while significantly developing previous notions of ‘the interactive’. 
Intra-activity posits a situated and dynamic form of inter (or intra) action that unfolds 
between or rather within the moment of connection between a range of actors, or 
agents, both human and non-human. The software also presents the case for 
bespoke works while acknowledging and nurturing collective meanings and shared 
experiences, the book contains collective content generated by multiple readers but 
it also engages with readers as specific and situated individuals. Such an approach 
challenges linear, humanist conceptions of agency that might characterise the 
‘bespoke’ as a solipsistic construction. The conclusion (beginning on page 296) to 
this thesis outlines a number of projects, peer reviewed (published) papers, 
installations and performances that have been made possible by my PhD practice and 
methodology, supporting the proposal that the South system – consisting of the 
analogue book, software and digital egg (or image viewer) are viable alternatives to 
previous models of digital interactivity. 
 The South project evolved in relation to the continuum of my practice as a writer 
and fine artist engaged with making artist’s books. The project was also developed in 
the context of a critical examination of previous digital literary works. Throughout 
this thesis I propose that such works have not lead to the death of the book and that 
electronic literature has not met the hyped expectations proclaimed by some 
commentators in the late 1980s and 1990s.  Similarly, within the fine arts the artist’s 
book has, with a few exceptions, failed to engage significantly with computation. This 
thesis argues the case for these statements and for a material engagement with 
digital technology, and more specifically, for an engagement with interactive 
programming that extends the philosophical and critical involvement many artists 
have historically exercised in relation to the book form.   
 This thesis links the absence of significantly computational artist’s books to the 
putative ‘failure’ of electronic literary works (again, acknowledging some important 
exceptions). The terms I use in referring to digital forms of text are fluid and subtle,  
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hence the need for a glossary and a degree of flexibility in referring to the South 
project, which encompasses aspects of broad terms such as digital literature and more 
specific terms such as Interactive Fiction, these terms are all defined in the glossary.  
Within this thesis the lack of significant material or processual impact on literary and 
artist’s books by computation is linked to a lack of critical engagement with both the 
philosophical meaning and material capacities of computers and ‘interactivity’. The 
rationale for my approach is rooted in a critical evaluation of key historic and 
contemporary electronic literary works, for example, Talan Memmott’s From Lexia to 
Perplexia (2000). This work is notable for its engagement with computation beyond, 
as Hayles puts it, reducing computers to a matter of ‘hardware and software’ 
(Hayles, 2000). However, there is little sense of this work, and of so many other 
such works, engaging with the significant paradigm shifts of recent (early 21st 
Century) computing. My research indicates that there are few examples of notable 
electronic literary works that successfully deploy the strengths of contemporary 
computation, such as its networked, locative nature and the ability of computers to 
learn from users. The genre of IF (or interactive fiction, see the glossary) is a form that 
epitomises the stagnation of electronic literature, with no significant material changes 
to it’s core computational processes since the earliest IF works of the late 1970s. 
This lack of material-technological evolution has a high degree of significance upon 
the works such systems produce. These works and the systems which they are 
written with appear oblivious to such key contemporary cognitive and computational 
concepts as embodiment, situatedness, enactivism, locative technology or real world 
interaction (see glossary).  
This thesis proposes that many electronic literature systems (such as Eastgate 
Systems and TADS) and the works that result from them are stuck in problematic 
and anachronistic computational paradigms. Even fewer works draw upon the 
embodied and situated presence of human readers.  I support this statement by also 
pointing to the ‘showcase’ of the ‘Electronic Literature Organisation1 (or ELO, one 
of the most high-profile organisations for the promotion of electronic literary 
works.). There are few contemporary works on show within the ELO site that seem 
                                                 
1The Electronic Literature Organisation available here: http://www.eliterature.org/showcase-index 
(Accessed 02/04/2011). 
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to have advanced beyond the computational paradigms of 1970s artificial intelligence 
(characterised by rigidly pre-determined rules and a disembodied framing of human 
intelligence). The most up-to-date works on show at the ELO site include Zuzana 
Husarova’s round@bout (2011) and the prize-wining Quadrego by Stefan Maskiewicz 
(2001). These are both engaging works, but offer little in terms of significant 
technological innovation as outlined above. Indeed, it is significant that the ELO site 
does not have many new works, reflecting, I would argue, a genre that peaked in the 
late 1990s. Similarly the genre of Interactive Fiction has very few contemporary 
works on offer. The Wikipedia entry for Interactive Fiction2 has no works listed in 
its ‘notable works’ section that are newer than eight years old, pointing to a form of 
electronic literature that is rapidly losing cultural and technological relevance. 
Eastgate Systems, which advertises itself as 'the primary source for serious hypertext' 
and which also still produces anachronistic technology for generating hypertext 
fiction3 has a webpage that is filled with works from the 1990s. The works it lists on 
its front page include Afternoon a Story (Joyce, 1987, 1990), Patchwork Girl (Jackson, 
1995) and Victory Garden (Moulthrop, 1992). I cannot find any significant 
contemporary works listed on this site.  
It is also significant that a proselytiser of electronic literature such as Nick Montfort 
(2003) acknowledges it as a form that has not gained a wide-spread readership.  Even 
computer literate people, Montfort states, are resistant to the ‘idea of computer 
literature’ (Montfort, 2003: 232), I would also point to the lack of prominent works 
of electronic literature (Montfort uses the term ‘computer literature’ in the same 
sense that I refer to ‘electronic literature’, see glossary), and argue that it has failed 
to reach the consciousness of readers in the same way that analogue literature has. 
What and where are the great works of electronic literature that might refute my 
argument for its failure to reach readers in the same way that analogue books have? 
What are the names of these works and who has read them?  
                                                 
2Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactive_fiction accessed 10/04/2011. 
3 Available at http://www.eastgate.com/catalog/Fiction.html, accessed 10/04/2011. 
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While games and blogs are reaching mass audiences, it is still unclear that the ELO 
definition of Electronic literature (which encompasses interactive fiction, computer 
literature, and digital fiction) can in any way be described as having a significant 
cultural presence. If it were a significant cultural force, than, one might argue, the 
names of important works would readily spring to mind. But the reality is that the 
few electronic literary works that do spring to mind were written in the 1990s (such 
as Jackson’s Patchwork Girl (1995) and Moulthrop’s Victory Garden (1992), and even 
then, these works have arguably made a small impact on the larger literary landscape. 
While e-books, particularly in Kindle format, are increasingly prevalent (In 2010 
Amazon sold more Kindle editions of books than hard-cover books4), I would make 
the point that these works do not represent a significant difference in kind from 
analogue books – rather they are re-mediated versions of traditional book-forms. E-
books in Kindle format do not deploy any of the significant computational structures 
and processes I discuss throughout this thesis5.  
This thesis argues the case for a more nuanced understanding of human-computer 
relationships, one that accommodates new understandings of HCI but does not 
presuppose a discontinuity in the conceptual foundations of programming and 
computers from other cultural and philosophical artefacts. My thesis frames 
computational constructions within a historical continuum, in which both the subject 
and the subject’s generation of knowledge are linked to enlightenment and positivist 
philosophical positions, and therefore to wider cultural and historical movements. At 
the same time I have sought to confront or re-frame the separation between 
computers and humans, or indeed the ready made separations that we project 
between subjects and objects (including readers and books).  An important aspect of 
                                                 
4 See Wired, July 2010, available at  http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/07/amazon-more-e-books-
than-hardcovers/# accessed 08/04/11. 
5 E-books do not learn from readers, transform the text in response to them or understand 
the situations and feelings of readers, but this is not to suppose that this will always be the 
case, Kindle-readers have the potential to use computation in far more challenging ways, for 
example by dint of their ability to be networked via web access and the potential for 
dynamic, locative, content. 
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 my work has been to identify significant features of computational knowledge 
generation, while acknowledging that computers are not clearly separable from 
ourselves, but, like all human artefacts, are of us. This methodological position is 
supported by writers such as Donna Haraway (1991), Henri Bergson (1896, 1907), 
Rosi Braidotti (2006), Karen Barad (2007) and Lucy Suchman (1987, 2005, 2006). 
These writers shore up the proposition that human beings are entangled with their 
technologies and with complex, relational and temporally bound systems of agency. 
Throughout the three years of my PhD practice I have also written an online 
research journal entitled Automatic Writing. The journal documents and reflects upon 
my practices and processes and has had a significant impact upon my methodology 
and thesis. This is reflected in my commitment to a subjectively articulated practice, 
particularly in regard to programming. Such a practice acknowledges the presence of 
a non-neutral programming practitioner, one who is embodied, gendered and 
culturally situated. The research journal therefore supports my core methodological 
position in regards to a subjectively and environmentally situated practice. Chapter 
three contains more information about the significance of the research journal.  
My research journal is available here: http://www.dareinteractive.com/blog2.html. 
The South software can be downloaded from this address: 
http://www.doc.gold.ac.uk/~ma501ed/south/south_Download.html 
The full, commented, code and Java documentation for the South software is also 
available at the above address. 
The South book can be downloaded as an e-book or purchased as a paper-back from 
this address: 
http://stores.lulu.com/ma501ed 
The development and testing of the code is described in the appendices to this 
thesis, beginning on page 318. Also submitted with this thesis is a DVD that contains 
the South software, this thesis in electronic format, the South book and a film about 
the project. ………………………
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1.1 Purpose of the research 
Purpose of the research 1 
This research was conducted in order to support the generation of significant new 
forms of digital and artist’s books. It was funded by a full studentship from the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. The research critically evaluates 
and examines the status and role of electronic literature, artist’s books and the 
broader area of digital interactivity. My research explores the extent to which a priori 
structures should define computational literary works and wider conceptions of the 
interactive. Both the benefits and the drawbacks of using the subjectivity and 
situatedness of individual readers are also investigated. Likewise the expectations and 
opinions of potential readers in relation to interactive works were also solicited and 
constructively embedded within the research design. The research specifically 
highlights the importance of engaging with the cultural and philosophical significance 
of programming practices. Such an engagement enables us to recognise significant 
differences of kind between computational and analogue forms as well as meaningful 
differences in degree. This recognition can help us to focus on the strengths 
computation has to offer as well as protecting practitioners and theorists from 
making exaggerated claims for digital works. The results of this research are likely to 
benefit both the producers of interactive works and their users. This claim is 
supported by a number of new projects and collaborations I am involved in. These 
individual projects and collaborations deploy the methodological and technical 
strengths generated by this project, encompassing diverse areas from presenting 
academic papers, to film-making, site specific performance, online curation6, website 
design, teaching and collaborative fiction writing. 
Research questions and goals Although my questions have evolved and changed 
throughout the three years of this research, the main questions I have addressed are 
essentially those listed below, my primary question is:
                                                 
6 The online curating project, with Lee Weinberg, involves a customisable and personalised art 
viewing experience, see the conclusion for more information about this project or visit the VAINS 
site here: http://www.wix.com/Vains_Pro/VAINS   
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• How can subjectivity be reconfigured within software that generates dynamic, 
intra-active, artist’s books? 
 
The research has also addressed the following sub questions: 
 
 Can the artist’s book be meaningfully re-mediated within a computational 
framework? 
 Can computers understand their readers and generate worthwhile insights 
into them? 
 To what extent must computer programs depend upon a priori rules and how 
rigid do those rules need to be? 
 Is it possible to create a computational artist’s book that reacts to people 
dynamically and in an interesting way? 
 
These questions were then focused into the following core aims or research goals: 
 
 Create dynamic relationships between humans and books. 
 Produce a digital and analogue book that tries to understand human subjects, 
even if that understanding is flawed by asymmetries of comprehension 
between computers and humans. 
 Make the software and book as reflexive, situated and transparent as 
possible. 
As a result of these questions and their attendant aims I assert, as explained below, 
that the research was justified and has resulted in an original and significant 
contribution to the field of artist’s books and interactive literature. 
Justification for research and contribution 
The thesis presents the case for works that are subjectively and environmentally 
situated, arguing that intra-active, as opposed to interactive works can enliven 
electronic literature and artist’s books, making a significant contribution to furthering 
computational arts. The research has highlighted reasons for the failure of interactive 
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digital literary works to make a significant impact upon our relationship to books.  
This thesis links these causes to wider problems within the domain of Artificial 
Intelligence and computing. Specifically this research and thesis contributes an 
alternative accommodation and conception of agency within computer-human-
interactions. This conception of agency acknowledges (and indeed deploys) the 
deeply entangled nature of subject-object and human-computer relations, framing 
them as productive tensions, paradoxes and performances within a complex 
network of evolving actions and meanings. This thesis supports the proposal that the 
South project is a viable and original form of subjectively and environmentally situated 
artist’s book and literary experience. 
 
1.2 Detailed thesis outline 
Detailed Thesis Outline 1 
Chapter 2: The literature review  
The literature review represents a critical appraisal of my research context and 
materials. The review was formed in light of my thesis questions and by means of a 
disciplined strategy aimed at clarifying the core themes and frames of reference that 
relate to those questions. The review analyses and evaluates core source materials, 
assessing and comparing claims, and gathering evidence to generate and support my  
own arguments and strategies. The review is organised thematically. These 
themes mirror many of the central concerns of my main chapters and are 
in brief: 
• Subjectivity, embodiment, interactivity, and situated knowledge. 
• Artist’s books, readers and writers, hypertext theories, digital literature. Site 
specificity and pervasive games. 
• Chatbots, Agents and agency and agent-based literary works. 
• Technical review: computational narrative systems, personality testing.
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My aim has been to investigate the relevant historical and chronological 
developments of theories and practices for each area, summarising the contribution 
of each work referenced. The literature review highlights the tensions and 
connections between the works and ideas cited, clarifying their relationship to my 
own practice. This approach has enabled me to assess the validity of generalisations 
made about my core subjects and to compare the positions taken by a range of 
relevant theorists and practitioners.  I have also identified areas in which there is 
very little documentation, such as the subject of computationally engaged artist’s 
books. The paucity of relevant works and writings about artist’s books and 
computation has led me to seek information from unorthodox sources, such as 
online forums and Twitter sites. These alternative resources enabled me to both 
join and instigate debates on book artists and digital media. The lack of formal 
documentation in this area has been a noteworthy discovery in its own right, 
indicative of the lack of significant engagement between book artists and 
computation. 
 The review offers appropriate and credible evidence for my methodology, while 
avoiding simplistic generalisations. This evidence supports a consistent and logically 
coherent argument for my research practices and their outcomes, and for the 
conception of a situated and intra-active artist’s book. 
 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
Chapter three explains and situates my methodology. It describes my approach to 
undertaking research, in particular, how and why my methodology has been 
embedded with a commitment to highlighting partiality of perspective. Liz Stanley 
uses the term ‘alienated knowledge’ (Stanley, 1990: 3) to describe a form of 
knowledge production that is not critically engaged with its own social and historical 
conditions of production. Through the use of my Kavad (a conceptual tool for 
defining and refining my methodology), or mobile methodology box, I explain my 
own relationship to such a subjective self-articulation, highlighting its impact upon 
and through my practice. This chapter also draws upon the writings of Sullivan 
(2005), Bolt (2006) and Carter (2004). These writers address issues of reflexivity,  
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epistemology and the relationship between arts practice and theory. I show how and 
why my own methodology has evolved and mention art works and practices that 
have been influential such as Dunne, Gaver and Pacenti’s (1999) Cultural Probes and 
other key examples of practice based research methodologies from analogue, digital 
and hybrid disciplines. The chapter explores the implications of what Paul Carter 
(2004) has called material-thinking and the generation of knowledge through practice, 
which Barbara Bolt describes as ‘a particular understanding that is realised through 
our dealings with the tools and materials of production’7 (Bolt, 2006). I will explore 
how and why this still represents a radical form of knowledge production within the 
wider context of the Western academy.  I also outline the ethical challenges I have 
faced in undertaking my PhD practice. 
Chapter 4: The South book 
Chapter four grounds this thesis in the actual processes and artefacts engendered by 
my practice. The chapter looks in detail at the construction and content of the South 
book. It explains how the book relates to the other elements of the South project 
while elucidating its theoretical and cultural contexts. The chapter also cites relevant 
examples of other artists who work with the book form, explaining the historical  
provenance of such books.  The chapter reflexively contextualises the rationale for 
the South book, exploring the relationship between my practice and my own 
historical and cultural background.  I reflect upon the wider social forces that have 
played subtle yet profound roles in my own family history, defining and constricting, 
for example, the languages spoken by two of my grandparents. The chapter 
concludes with an illustrated case study in which a reader engages with the South 
book and egg. The case study shows how the reader interacts with the project, 
following her as she explores the South Bank area of South London.  
 
Chapter 5: Subjectivity, interactivity and embodiment 
 
                                                 
7 Bolt, B. (2006) Materializing pedagogies. Working Papers in Art and Design 4 
Retrieved <03/01/09> from URL 
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/papers/wpades/vol4/bbfull.html 
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 South is a book and a computational system that appears to ‘know’ the individual 
readers who engage with it, but how can a book or a software system acquire any 
understanding of complex individuals? What are the problems inherent in this quest? 
This chapter will show how the South system has dealt practically and theoretically 
with notions of the subject and the subject’s interaction with a computational system 
for generating personalised narrative experiences. 
 
 Subjectivity and interactivity are the two key areas that inform my research and 
practice. The theoretical discourses around subjectivity that I have researched 
identify many problematic aspects in relation to the very notion of a subject, 
subjectivity and the supposedly diametrical construction, objectivity. This chapter 
outlines these critiques and shows how they relate to my practice. It shows how the 
notion of a unitary, rational and essentially disembodied subject has informed many 
of the assumptions embedded in software structures and notions of interactivity. 
This chapter explains and contextualises alternative ideas such as those proposed by 
Elizabeth Grosz (1994), in relation to embodiment, and also Donna Haraway (1991), 
Lucy Suchman (1987, 2005, 2006) and Karen Barad (2007) in relation to ideas about 
intra-activity and expanded notions of agency. I show how these ideas relate to the 
design of the South software, particularly in connection to its use of psychometric 
testing and situating data. 
 
Chapter 6:  Chatbots, agents and agency 
 
Chapter six elaborates upon the historical and intellectual context for digital systems 
based on agent technology. The chapter goes into some detail about intelligent 
agents and chatbots (software agents that engage in ‘conversations’) explaining how 
and why the South  system critically differs from many previous works and in what 
ways my goals might be different from those of earlier projects. The chapter also 
asks what the designers of agent architectures such as Luck, Ashri, d’Inverno (2004) 
and Woolridge (2002) mean when they describe their agents as embodied and 
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situated. Do they refer to the same epistemological frameworks described by Donna 
Haraway (1991), Lucy Suchman (1986, 2005, and 2006) and Elizabeth Grosz (1994)?     
 
With these questions in mind chapter six discusses how I have produced a system 
that incorporates alternative notions of embodied and situated knowledge. The 
chapter explains why I am committed to constructing such a system, expanding upon 
my theoretical, practical and ethical reasons for that commitment. I explain in detail 
the problematic issues connected to agent architectures, identified, for example, by 
Phoebe Sengers and Michael Mateas (2003). The chapter concludes that a contingent, 
culturally situated and loosely rule-based system is a more apposite model for 
embedding subjectivity into my own agent architectures. The chapter goes into some 
detail about the creative aspects of programming my own agent-based software, 
detailing the sometimes provocative functions of the agents embedded within the 
South system. 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This short chapter summarises my results and their implications. It also explores 
wider applications for a subjectively articulated and situated software model. The 
conclusion includes a discussion of ways in which my core findings and practices can 
be applied to other areas, including teaching methodologies, film-making, fiction 
writing, digital curating and the generation of heuristics for a wide range of research 
processes. The thesis conclusion summarises how I have dealt with the research 
questions outlined in this introduction while also acknowledging the inevitable gaps  
and contradictions embedded in aspects of the knowledge I have generated. Chapter 
seven synthesises the key terms and concepts represented in this thesis, articulating 
the re-conceptualisations that the thesis proposes and framing them as significant 
contributions to the field of both electronic literature, arts computing, and HCI 
(Human-Computer-Interaction). The conclusion summarises a number of papers I 
have written and presented about the South project and its associated collaborations, 
including papers presented in London, Copenhagen, Berlin and Stockholm. These 
papers support the claim that my PhD practice has generated viable solutions, and  
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valid methodologies, and that these have been acknowledged within a broad 
community of practitioners and researchers. 
 
Appendix 
This appendix contains information and results relating to the evaluation and usability 
surveys that were undertaken between 2009 and 2010. The appendix also describes 
other tests that the South software was subjected to, such as acceptance, regression 
and recovery testing, as well information about obtaining and installing the programs, 
and the software development methodology that was deployed in their making. The 
appendix briefly introduces the three core classes of the South system which are fully 
documented on the South site. The South site also provides the full code, ready for 
download and installation:  
http://www.doc.gold.ac.uk/~ma501ed/south/south_Download.html 
 
At the end of the appendix there is a glossary that explains the key terms used 
throughout this thesis, such as electronic literature, intra-activity, agency, situatedness, 
and performativity, see page 343. 
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 Every good book needs a protagonist and luckily you’ve come along just in time to 
fulfil that role. According to How to Write a Blockbuster ‘characters provide readers 
with the emotional key, the route into your story’. This principle seems equally 
applicable to any decent guidebook or gazetteer, but the authors of this book also 
warn: ‘if your characters are flat and lifeless, no one will want to read it’.  
 Are you feeling flat and lifeless? You’re in for a pretty boring read if you are.  Your 
job is ‘come alive’ so that I can just sit back and type. You should expertly discover 
who you ‘really’ are and help the rest of us to get to know you. You might of course 
be shy or introverted and reveal yourself just a little bit at a time, facet by facet as it 
were, or you might, on the other hand, just burst into life like a New Years Eve 
firework display over the South Bank. It’s up to you. 
 
 
 
Figure 2a 1 
Figure 2a the opening page from South, a Psychometric Text Adventure.
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Figure 2 The South book and egg, which displays  
image files generated by the South software. 
 
Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
Literature Review 1 
 
 
My PhD practice is concerned with generating subject and site specific writing and 
experiences relating to the South Bank area of South London. This writing is 
generated by my software and an artist’s book, which I refer to collectively as ‘the 
South system’. The software gudies readers through the analogue book and the 
South Bank location. The writing the South system generates is both fictional and 
factual; it is disseminated in the form of an analogue book and also through 
computational content generated in reaction to individual subjects and to specific 
moments in time. 
 
This chapter will establish the contextual framework for the practice outlined above 
and for the theoretical background to my research.  It will pinpoint relevant 
contemporary and past projects and investigate research into subjectivity, artist’s 
books and computationally generated literature. The area of computational literature 
is intricate and entangled, drawing on a particularly broad range of interdisciplinary  
references and practices. This chapter is necessarily selective across this domain.  I 
have selected research projects and theorists whose work is of direct relevance to 
my own practice. This practice is significantly concerned with situatedness and 
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subjectivity and with theories and projects relating to agency. Throughout this 
review I have focused upon projects and references that are relevant to my own 
practice while articulating a comprehensive degree of background coverage. 
 
The structure of this chapter: 
 
 
• Section 1: Subjectivity, embodiment, interactivity, and situated knowledge. 
• Section 2: Digital fiction systems and agent based works. 
• Section 3: Readers and writers, hypertext theories, site-specific art works, 
pervasive games and artist’s books. 
• Section 4: Technical review. This section focuses upon 
computational narrative systems and personality testing. 
 
 The themed sections in this review will focus on the concerns of my core chapters 
(four, five and six). Section four of this chapter consists of a technical review. These 
sections all delineate the issues that my work addresses; they establish the key 
projects, frames of reference, vocabularies, conflicts and agreements (where they 
exist) that are significant to each area. This approach will make it clear how my work 
fits into the larger context of digital literary systems and interactive programs, as 
well as to issues of subjectivity, epistemology and agency.  Questions of agency arise 
in relation to the readers engaging with my work and in relation to my own 
presence and to the wider agencies operating upon the systems I create.  The issue 
of subjectivity is embedded in the notion of a system that relates specifically to the 
individuals who engage with it. My practice asks what we mean when we refer to a 
subject or work with the notion of subjectivity, and how technology can articulate 
and accommodate more challenging notions of the subject.  My practice aims to 
operate critically with forms of knowledge production and agency, positioning 
computational technologies as sites of practitioner-based investigation while 
articulating a meaningful and productive interplay between practice and theory. 
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2.1: Subjectivity, embodiment, interactivity, and situated 
knowledge: Subjectivity 1 
 
 The central goal of my PhD practice has been to produce a new type of analogue 
and digital artist’s book, one that attempts to understand and respond to individual 
subjects in a specific and situated moment in time. The following review aims to 
establish a theoretical framework for my research into producing this book. This 
section of the review investigates the historical development of subjectivity and 
agency while also connecting them to recent re-conceptualisations of the interactive. 
This section will also clarify the salient terms and definitions arising from theories of 
subjectivity. The writings covered by this review represent a coherent critical 
challenge to Western orthodoxies around individuality, individualism and the nature 
of our knowledge about, and as, individuals. These writings establish the historical 
grounds for their critique of past and present ideas around subjectivity. The material 
also suggests new methodologies and practices that emanate from re-theorising 
subjectivity and the nature and extent of our knowledge about our selves and other 
people. More radically perhaps, they present coherent challenges to orthodox 
notions of subject-object boundaries. 
 
 To clarify these issues this part of the review is divided in two. The first part will 
establish what a ‘subject’ has meant historically. It will ask how these notions have 
emerged and why they have been criticised. The second part of the review will 
discuss alternative methodologies for producing subjectivity, how they relate to my 
research questions and to notions of agency and interactivity and their further 
implications for my research. 
 
Part 1: Who is a subject and what is the problem?
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In order to examine the philosophical and critical origins of subjectivity this review 
will look in detail at Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and Walkerdine (1984) and 
also at the contextual definitions presented in Alcoff and Potter, (1993). Feminist 
Epistemologies, approaches subjectivity as concomitant to its central theme of 
epistemology or the way in which knowledge is produced. The book is concerned 
with asking who is engaged in knowing, and uncovering the social origins of that 
‘knower’.   
  
 Despite their differing approaches it would be fair to say that both books formally 
trace the problematic origins of subjectivity back to the early seventeenth century, 
to the emergent idea of the individual as a pre-given, innately rational ‘knower’. This 
knower is frequently referred to in Changing the Subject (Henriques et al, 1984: 93, 
128, 133, 275) as the ‘Cogito’.  Although Descartes is not the originator of the 
rigidly empirical, positivist outlook that emerged from this period, (and is a more 
complex figure than this description implies), he is certainly framed as a central force 
in the emergence of a rationalist, unitary and essentially solipsistic paradigm for 
knowledge production. Changing the Subject deals with this paradigm at great length, 
exploring the philosophical and logical difficulty of the pre-given knower, whose 
innately rational interpretation of the world necessitates an infinite regress of 
internal knowers. In this model each knower acts as an agent of rational knowing, 
paradoxically explaining the knowledge they are supposed to embody by referring to 
a regress of internal knowers or homunculi8. Such homunculi are tiny fully formed 
people (or men) who can observe and rationalise but must each in turn logically 
contain their own internal knower or homunculus. This figure establishes an 
unbridgeable gap between himself and the external world, a regress of infinite mind-
body dualisms, and, as the book so vigorously emphasises, a society-individual 
dualism that has enshrined  ‘psychology’s individualistic concept of the subject’ (11). 
Such a disembodied and abstract form of knowing is characterised by Elizabeth 
Grosz as the historical privileging of the ‘purely conceptual over the corporeal’  
                                                 
8 See Ryle, Gilbert, (1984) [1949]. The Concept of Mind. University of Chicago Press. 
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9(Alcoff, Potter, 1993: 187).  In her paper ‘Bodies and Knowledge: Feminism and the 
Crisis of Reason’, the root of the crisis is characterised as both the individualism of 
traditional Western epistemology and the disembodiment of the knowledge 
produced by that individual. It is a crisis that appears to revert back to the 
homunculus problem, to ‘reason’s inability to come outside of itself, to enclose and 
know itself from the outside: ‘the inadequation of the subject and its other’ (189). 
 
 Grosz also identifies the paradox of applying ‘scientific’ approaches to the study of 
subjectivity; approaches that negate the specificity of the subject.  Perhaps more 
radically than any other writer referred to in this review, Grosz does not seek to 
ameliorate the crisis, which she would characterise as a crisis of masculine reason. 
Grosz suggests that the crisis10 is an opportunity to reformulate our understanding 
of what knowledge is and who produces it. It is an opportunity to integrate the body 
into new epistemologies and methodological approaches. As Grosz states in the 
introduction to Volatile Bodies (1994), the crisis represents an opportunity to 
‘displace the centrality of the mind, the psyche, interior or consciousness (and even 
the unconscious) in conceptions of the subject through a reconfiguration of the 
body’ (v ii).  The dualism of mind and body is symptomatic of other binary terms and 
oppositional pairings, both Feminist Epistemologies and Changing the Subject recognise 
the centrality of problematic dualisms in traditional epistemic schemas.  
                                                 
9 Mind-body dualisms are generally identified by the authors of these two books as being linked to the 
enlightenment. However In Volatile Bodies (1994) Elizabeth Grosz writes of somatophobia being present 
in pre-Platonic writings. Here the ‘body has been regarded as a source of interference in, and a 
danger to, the operations of reason’ (Grosz, 1994: 5). 
10
 The so-called crisis of reason (identified in particular by Jean-François Lyotard (1979 )) has been a 
necessary outcome of recognising the situated, contextual and specific nature of knowledge generated 
in particular by late twentieth century theories around gender and race, or ‘identity politics’. The 
crisis is linked to the demise (at least in the West) of our faith in ‘grand’ or universal ‘narratives’, such 
as Marxism freeing the proletariat. Elizabeth Grosz describes the crisis of reason as ‘a consequence of 
the historical privileging of the purely conceptual or mental over the corporeal’ (Alcoff , Potter, 1993: 
187) 
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Figure 3 Above, subject specific content generated by the South software and by a South reader. 
When users interact with the software they create icons that represent themselves. The above icon 
represents the despair and exhaustion of a user called Anna. The software overlays Anna’s icon with 
words she used earlier in her interaction with the software. 
 
Society-individual dualisms 
 
Section one of Changing the Subject illustrates the means by which developmental 
psychology has adopted and reinforced an epistemological and existential schism 
between the knower and society, framing them as antithetical entities. One example 
of this process is the way in which a child might be characterised as being socialised 
or conditioned by its social context.  The individual is constructed as ‘existing within a 
symbolic state of opposition to society’, establishing a biological-social dualism 
between ‘a biological organism with biological propensities and organization who 
becomes social through his encounters with social adults’ (Henriques et al, 1984: 14). 
In this way even supposedly ‘radical’ humanist accounts of subjectivity reinforce a 
dualist scenario, in which the individual is cast as a ‘passive recipient of moulding 
forces: either reinforcement schedules or adult socialisers’ (19). 
 
 Other theorists such as H. Weinrich (1978) have proposed information processing 
paradigms, in which the external world is processed as data, a notion that echoes 
computational models of mind that have been the subject of theoretical criticism 
from, among others, Hayles (Hayles, 1999) and  Haraway (Haraway,1991), not least 
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of all for their reinforcement of mind-body dualisms. Changing the Subject highlights 
the external-internal dualism of the information processing paradigm and also, its 
recurring theme, the construction of a split between the individual and society. The 
book emphasises the relationality and complex interplay of biological and social 
factors, seeking to denaturalise views of reality that have reinforced either/or 
determinants.   
 
  My practice aims to establish an inquiry into the tensions between collective 
epistemological frameworks that allow for contextual notions of subjectivity, and the 
inherent difficulty of establishing universal systems of meaning. It is a tension I have 
also observed in the context of other computational artworks, for example Hugo 
Liu’s and Pattie Maes’s Aesthetiscope (2005) which is described as a system for 
‘visualizing aesthetic readings of text in color space’ (2005). An interesting aspect of 
the Aesthetiscope project was the recognition of its own cultural specificities (the 
project draws upon the Jungian concept of Modes of Interpretation, implementing an 
aesthetic reading that movs away from a purely objective interpretation of colour, 
allowing individuals to attribute meanings to colours) and the centrality it placed 
upon emotional meanings, though unlike my own project, it did not overtly or 
consciously locate the specificity of its models and embedded structures. Neither did 
the Aesthetiscope project concern itself with unconscious or supposedly accidental 
‘errors’ of cognition (discussed below). The Aesthetiscope project was designed to 
eschew ‘singular objective meanings implied by text’ (Liu, Maes, 2005: 1), and to 
encompass collective, ‘culturised’ meanings that might also be personal and 
emotional, in other words to generate a form of both specific and collective 
subjectivity. This was achieved visually by generating grids of colours in collective 
reaction to poetic texts.  The project was computationally underpinned by Liu and 
Singh’s  ‘commonsense reasoning system’ (2004), the name of this system suffices, 
perhaps, to pinpoint the rational, positivist framework that informs the project and 
the constitutional difficulty of using one particular form of logical reasoning alone to 
construct subjective epistemologies.   
 
 The Aesthetiscope project has some key themes in common with my own work, such 
as the construction of a computational framework for subjective interpretation, 
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including what Liu and Maes describe as ‘affective’, communal and contextual 
meanings. The project is a useful case study in the context of my own research, both 
for its laudable ambitions and for what I am interpreting as its (perhaps inevitable)  
failures. As mentioned above, unlike the Aesthetiscope project, my own work is also 
interested in accidental meanings and misunderstandings. 
 
 
 
  In Social Psychology and the Politics of Racism (Henriques et al, 1984) Julian Henriques 
discusses the significance of ‘errors of cognition’ that are suppressed or discounted 
in traditional epistemic frameworks. Henriques cites George Kelly, originator of the 
repertory grid system, a psychological assessment methodology that I have been using 
in my own software and written texts to obtain subjective ‘profiles’ (the 
methodology is discussed at length in chapter five of this thesis). Kelly’s Personal 
Construct Theory (1955) overtly characterises individuals as ‘capable of making and 
testing hypotheses – a model which is based on an exclusively rational idea of ‘man 
the scientist’.  In many ways this is (at least at first glance) a socially inclusive, 
democratic methodology, but it takes no account, writes Henriques, ‘of the 
‘experimenter effect’’, nor does psychological practice to any great extent (according 
to Henriques) acknowledge the irrational aspects of human psychology outlined by 
Freud (among others). In fact, Henriques claims the non-rational subject is ‘denied 
altogether in its own accounts’ (Henriques et al, 1984: 80). Section two of this 
review will look at Lorraine Code’s ideas for an alternative form of knowledge 
production. This alternative epistemology claims to avoid both the rationalist 
context-free assumptions of propositional knowledge production and the 
abandonment of all realist epistemic commitment represented by relativism. Like 
Code, the authors of Changing the Subject also identify the problematic assumptions 
underlying radical humanism. Radical humanism ultimately falls back on the originary 
notion of a pre-given, rational subject that stems from the very tradition they oppose 
(represented for example by John Shotter (1989)) and, on the other hand the 
positivist excision of emotion and context from idealised epistemic processes.  
Wendy Hollway expands upon the theme of the non-rational, non-unitary individual.  
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Such an individual is complex and contradictory and represents a critique of 
Foucauldian genealogies, which Hollway interprets as framing subjectivities ‘as merely 
the sum total of positions occupied in discourses by a person’ (231).  Hollway also 
criticises socio-biological accounts of sex differences, which produce rigid and 
unchangeable accounts of gender. Hollway asks why some people choose to take up 
certain positions over others, even if those positions might be viewed as restrictive  
or oppressive. Hollway concurs with her fellow writers in Changing the Subject by 
challenging the notion of ‘choice’, which implies a rational, voluntarist motivation. 
Instead she returns to the Freudian term ‘investment’, a term that accommodates 
the complexity and contradiction informing our choices, which may be unconsciously 
motivated. The choices we make, Hollway suggests, are neither wholly biological, 
Oedipal, socially or economically determined (239). Instead she argues for fluidity 
and complexity, the recognition that our choices are often formed by competing 
discourses, bearing both socially constituted and suppressed meanings.  
 
Psychometric testing of ‘personality’ 
 
The South system (consisting of a book and a set of computer programs) asks 
readers to engage with a series of psychometric testing methodologies. These 
methodologies are designed to aid the computer in generating subject-specific 
writings, but they are also designed to generate a form of investigation into 
subjectivity that is grounded in material practices.  These practices are generated 
through actions and physical sensations. My work therefore is highly engaged with 
issues of psychological evaluation and its relationship to subjectivity.    
 
 Wendy Hollway (1984) expands upon the theme of what constitutes a subject in 
her paper, ‘Fitting Work: Psychological Assessment in Organizations’. Hollway 
approaches the topic of psychometric testing as a ‘technology of the social’; a 
Foucauldian approach that establishes the ‘relations between power and knowledge’ 
(26). The concept of psychological testing, Hollway suggests, is predicated on the 
belief that its methods are scientific and therefore what they produce are related to  
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‘the truth’. It assumes that there are such things as individuals and that it is ‘just a 
matter of developing methods to assess them’ (27), but this testing, Hollway reports, 
is based on a dualism between society and individuals that enables the ‘science’ of 
psychometric testing to function but also weakens its insights: 
 
one effect of that power of psychology is to privilege the 
individual as the focus of activities which are in fact specific 
characteristics of corporate organisations. 
(56). 
 
  Psychometric testing in an occupational context has been used to ‘evaluate, predict 
and regulate employees’ (56). Psychologists who use these assessment 
methodologies do not theorise themselves or the organisations they might be 
working for. ‘Social and power relations are left out in this approach’ (57), 
maintaining what Hollway defines as an illusion of neutrality.  ‘To deny the power of 
hierarchy, or of the technologies of assessment is not to make them go away’ (57) 
Hollway observes. These limitations mean that psychometric testing cannot 
ultimately succeed in defining an individual because individuals do not exist in 
isolation and are not fixed. Claims for the efficacy of personality tests such as the 
16PF, (a test of ‘general personality’) are rigid and essentialist, constructing ideas of 
personality that have no interaction or inter-relationship with contexts and temporal 
changes. Its formulations of personality are based on categorised, unambiguous 
responses to questions. Social or gender-based differences in response are not 
accounted for.  
 
 Hollway points out that the inextricable links between value and language are also 
overlooked by these tests, that psychometrics are based ‘on the belief that words 
were transparent, only designating the ‘things’ or facts’ to which they referred’ (49). 
The belief in an essential, unambiguous meaning in words replicates the similarly 
naive belief in a core, rational and ‘true’ self.  
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Figure 4 below, a repertory grid test within the South book. Readers are invited to construct 
‘hypotheses’ about their relationship to the South Bank environment. Many of these 
processes require physical engagement with the location, such as touch and movement. 
Users respond to the words indicated by the arrows. 
 
 
 
Hollway qualifies her criticisms of personality tests by saying that within the terms 
defined by organisations psychometric tests may succeed, in the same sense that 
intelligence tests successfully define intelligence as the thing that intelligence tests 
determine. She concludes her chapter by stating that the accommodation of the 
complex socio-cultural relationality of subjectivity ‘does not result in an inevitable 
lack of agency. On the contrary, it can make change more possible when it analyses 
the real relations and thus devises methods, which do not conceal them’ (57). 
Hollway is calling for the recognition that the construction of the subject is never 
neutral, and, like Code, she sees this recognition as an opportunity that, in 
conjunction with methodologies that recognise their own specificity, can expand and 
fortify epistemic practices.  Indeed the core of Hollway’s argument seems to be that 
personality testing methodologies should be recognised as the product of specific 
and locatable value systems and that these should be acknowledged.
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My own practice hinges around the tensions inherent in the construction of 
subjectivity, but, as many of the writers I have referenced maintain, we cannot easily 
reach a consensus as to what a subject is or even if such an entity really exists. This 
ambiguity and fluidity is an instrumental presence within my practice, to quote  
Barbara Bolt, it is a practice in which ‘the materials are not just passive objects to be 
used instrumentally by the artist, but rather the materials and processes of 
production have their own intelligence that comes into play’ (Bolt, 2006: 1). 
 
Changing the Subject and Feminist Epistemologies both present consistent arguments 
against unitary constructions of the subject that ignore the agency and fluidity of 
boundaries between social and political forces and individuals. The authors of these 
two works also question the neutrality of empirical scientific observers, or indeed 
the privileging of observation over practice.  Both books emphasise the provenance 
of the supposedly neutral observer/practitioner as central to the production of 
subjectivity, but there is some tension around the degree to which empirical 
standards can and should be established. Interestingly it is Feminist Epistemologies that 
is most forceful in establishing a need for pragmatic, workable agreement within 
epistemological communities. These agreements may be fluid and culturally specific 
but without them there is no pragmatic resolution to the crisis of reason, and no 
means for generating change, for moving from a Marxist position11 which might 
characterise individuals as either the victims or the benefactors of socio-politically 
agential forces, or a relativist position in which no epistemic commitments can be 
made. The following section explores some of the workable solutions that emerge 
from these texts. 
 
New approaches to subjectivity 
 
In her paper ‘Taking Subjectivity into Account’ (Alcoff, Potter, 1993), Code 
emphasises the need for a ‘realist orientation’ that prevents what she describes as a 
humanist ‘slide into subjectivism’ (20). Code talks of ‘remapping the epistemic 
terrain’ (20); this is a task that necessitates the fundamental recognition that there is 
                                                 
11
 See Balibar, 1995, The Philosophy of Marx, chapter 2, ‘Changing the World, from Praxis to 
Production’. 
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no such thing as a neutral observer or a ‘view from nowhere’. The erroneous 
presumption of gender neutrality is a particular target for Code’s attack on Anglo-
American epistemological traditions. At the same time, Code is wary of the 
homogenising dangers of making gender a closed category, and of all universalist  
approaches (particularly those of radical humanism) that essentially return to 
individualistic, rational and unitary conceptions of the subject. Code proposes that 
claims for objectivity in research should be supported by a situated analysis. Such an 
analysis would attempt to take its own subjectivity into account, to construct self-
critical genealogies of enquiry. Code compares positivist epistemic paradigms, which 
are propositional, context-free and static, with the paradigm of inter-subjective 
interaction in which people are acknowledged to have certain qualities but are also 
recognised as never being fully fixed or complete.  
   
 The difficulty of negotiating the production of knowledge about individuals that is 
modelled on neither scientifically rationalist or entirely relativist schemas is 
particularly apparent in the context of my own work around generating and defining 
subjectivities. Harding’s paper ‘Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is “Strong 
Objectivity”?’ (49 - 82) presents an engaging yet theoretically problematic case for 
socially situated epistemological practices. Harding claims that standpoint 
epistemology (an epistemology that acknowledges and privileges certain positions as 
the point of epistemic reference) offers a more rigorous framework than 
‘spontaneous feminist empiricism’, which, according to Harding, seems to wait for 
epistemic breakthroughs or shifts in thinking to occur within the orthodox contexts 
of empirical science (51). Standpoint epistemology characterises all knowledge as 
socially situated and particularly emphasises the importance of presenting 
marginalised perspectives as the ‘ground’ of new knowledge claims. (56). These 
claims according to Harding will have a maximum degree of objectivity while 
transforming socially situated knowledge into a ‘systematically available scientific 
resource’ (58). Harding insists, however, that standpoint theory is not a relativist 
theory; it is a theory that recognises ‘certain situations are scientifically better than 
others as places from which to start off knowledge projects’ (61). The subjects of 
such knowledge are embodied, multiple and contradictory, presenting a ‘causal 
symmetry that reflects the sense that ‘the same kinds of social forces that shape 
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objects of knowledge also shape (but do not determine) knowers and their scientific 
projects’ (64). Harding presents reflexivity as a transformative resource, she is 
pragmatically concerned with the possibility of generating change. However, her  
notion that there are certain situations that can be scientifically privileged (on ethical 
grounds) over others, is not easy to justify. 
 
 
  
Like Elizabeth Potter and Sandra Harding, Lynn Nelson stresses the epistemological 
agency of communities. Knowledge, according to Nelson, is connected to larger 
systems of theories and notions of evidence: 
 
Standards of evidence and knowledge are historically 
relative and dynamic and of our own making. They are 
inherently and necessarily communal.  
(142). 
 
In stating this, Lynn Nelson is not arguing for a relativist position, but presenting a 
credible and topical argument for the recognition of what might also be thought of in 
computational or artificial intelligence terms as distributed or ambient intelligences, 
bottom-up models of knowledge production that are relational and fluid, rather than 
top-down a priori, rule-based systems of thought. As such Lynn Nelson’s model of 
epistemological communities is one that appears to have some relevance within the 
context of my own practice. In placing communities as primary epistemological 
agents, Nelson is providing a pragmatic model for sourcing subjective meanings 
within a computational system, such a system would recognise and indeed be fuelled 
by what Lynn Nelson describes as an ‘inherent circularity’ or relational flux12.
                                                 
12
 Nelson writes of an embedded concentricity: ‘what I have called the radical interdependence, 
between an epistemology and other knowledge undertakings [As I have argued elsewhere, we view 
the circularity here as vicious only if we assume (or demand) that epistemology justify what we know; 
a naturalized epistemology makes no pretence to be doing this]. The interdependence referred to is 
real, for in undertaking a project to understand the knowledge and standards accepted by another 
community or those of our own communities (and many of us belong to more than one), we may find 
that we need to alter the assumptions with which we began-to abandon some of the standards of 
evidence and/or revise our views of what we know’ (Alcoff, Potter, 1993: 126). My practice is 
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One of my goals has been to create a reflexive computational system that can 
accommodate the type of epistemological shifts discussed in this review. Such a 
system should be able to reconfigure some of its own standards or presumptions if  
the agents that monitor it indicate the need for such an adjustment. Through my 
practice I have aimed to develop a form of contingent meaning making that is also 
emphasised, albeit in different terms, in the theoretical writings of Barad (2007).   
 
 The physicist and writer Karen Barad is concerned with discourses of causality and 
subjectivity. Her book Meeting the Universe Halfway, Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (2007) follows what she calls a ‘diffractive’ 
methodology (according to Barad, diffraction, unlike reflection, implies the generation 
of new meanings beyond mirror images or reactions). Barad emphasises 
interdisciplinarity and considers specialised views from social and scientific fields 
across a broad range of areas, including quantum physics, feminism and post-
structuralism. The idea of differential intelligibility is considered in light of Haraway’s 
(1991) ideas about reflexivity, difference and diffraction13. In Barad’s terms meaning 
emerges though embodied, temporally and materially specific, intra-actions, relational 
moments of meaning in which outcomes are not pre-determined or fixed. Barad 
examines and acknowledges the contribution of Niels Bohr but she also develops 
ideas that extend Bohr’s attack on Cartesian subject-object boundaries through her 
notion of agential-realism, a form of knowledge production that is grounded in actions 
and a belief in material realities. Barad considers agential realism in light of specific 
considerations, including feminist ideas of performativity and the ‘production of 
bodies, identities and subjectivities’ (35). Barad applies her notion of causal 
entanglements to ‘unresolved interpretational difficulties that have plagued quantum 
mechanics since its founding three-quarters of a century ago’ (35). Barad is keen to 
emphasise that her ideas around agential realism are not restricted to cultural or 
philosophical readings but offer a new basis for interpretation within the field of 
                                                                                                                                            
arguably engaged in a similarly circular (but explicitly material) form of meaning-making, one that does 
not imagine a point of epistemological or even performative resolution. 
13  Haraway in (1991) is unequivocal in her call for an ethics of knowledge production: ‘I am arguing 
for politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, and situating, where partiality and not 
universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims. These are claims on 
people’s lives; the view from a body, always a complex, contradictory, structuring and structured 
body, versus the view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity’ (Haraway 191:195). 
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quantum physics. I would take this further and suggest that expanded ideas of 
causality and interaction are also relevant to digital works and to a reconsideration  
of interactivity in terms of its meanings, its goals and some of the orthodoxies that 
have established themselves in relation to notions of the interactive.   
 
  
My own practice is grounded in a reconsideration of the ways in which interactivity 
can be deployed and defined, for example, decentralising the notion of individual user 
choice in favour of more collective processes and less overt or conventionally 
individualised forms of ‘user’ control. Wherever possible my own partiality of 
perspective, in the form of rules embedded in the code, can be examined and, where 
structurally possible, changed by readers.  
 
Figure 5 Below, a screen shot from the South software. The system-rules are displayed, and 
the software agent changes these rules according to overall reader responses and situating 
events, such as economic and climactic changes and my own subjective weightings. Readers 
can also directly change these rules if they wish. 
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Summary 
The notion of a subject is dynamic and historically situated.  The idea of a unitary, 
rational individual has reinforced biases in ostensibly objective methodologies, in 
particular the natural and psychological sciences, which have largely allowed the core 
notion of viewer neutrality to remain un-theorised even in light of radical breaks  
from this tradition represented for example, by theoretical physicists such as Niels 
Bohr. Many of the writers mentioned in this section of the review essentially call for 
an end to dualisms that spilt the individual from society and to the denial of observer 
bias. None of them imagine a methodology in which there is no bias, (unlike certain 
humanist proposals), but many of them, such as Harding, Code and Pyne Addelson 
call for the development of more complex methodologies that include a systematic 
account of the partiality of perspective inherent in any process of observation and its 
associated practices. The new epistemologies and paradigm shifts represented in 
these books offer a radical and significant contribution to our understanding of 
knowledge production. These theories relate very clearly to my own practice, not 
least of all to the possibility of formulating an alternative form of practice around 
subjectivity.  My practice is built on the understanding that notions of subjectivity are 
inextricably bound up with all forms of epistemology and that all of these notions are 
(and always will be) non-neutral. 
   
 There are significant analogies between the ideas mentioned in this review and some 
of the more promising developments in more recent artificial intelligence practices. 
Although their provenance may not always be acknowledged, ideas of distributed, 
connectionist and collective intelligence strike me as having many resonances with 
feminist notions of reflexive and contextualised knowledge production.  It seems that 
aspects of feminist theory are offering viable new paradigms and alternatives to the 
mind-body dualisms that have immobilised traditional artificial intelligence, 
particularly in terms of its top-down empiricist and unitary views of what constitutes 
knowledge, and indeed what constitutes a model of mind.  The ‘bottom-up’, situated 
and embodied models proposed by feminist epistemologists appear to offer more 
useful paradigmatic starting points from which artificial intelligence projects might 
move forward. This review has examined these ideas and other key works, concepts 
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and references that have complemented the development of my practice, but as 
Barbara Bolt states (2006): 
 
Words may allow us to articulate and communicate the 
realizations that happen through material thinking, but as a 
mode of thought, material thinking involves a particular 
responsiveness to or conjunction with the intelligence of 
materials and processes in practice. Material thinking is the 
magic of handling.  
(Bolt, 2006: 1). 
 
 An epistemology based in practice is described by Barbara Bolt (2006) as a process 
of developing ‘research pedagogies from the bottom up, rather than from the top 
down’ (1). Contrary to the highly stylised form that a literature review, perhaps 
inevitably takes, the wider aim of this thesis has been to articulate the materials and 
processes with which I have sought to engender new forms of knowledge, not in the 
service of theory but in the production of a form of knowledge that, like the 
subjectivities I am interested in, emanates from the base of practice itself. 
 
 
2.2: Digital fiction systems and agent based works 
2.2: Digital fiction  1 
 
Introduction 
 
My own software could be described as a multi-agent system, in which inter-
dependent blocks of code make decisions on my behalf. The agents working on my 
behalf also represent my own partiality of perspective, the software I have written 
aims to expose and implement this partiality as a creative and provocative resource. 
 
Figure 6 following page, a simple structure for a software agent. The agents operating within 
the South system work with psychometric data, CCTV images of the South Bank, news and 
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climactic data, tide tables and writing generated by readers. These are framed as 
environmental percepts. 
 
 
 The works I have focused upon in this section offer a critique of current and 
historical practices, including agent-based systems. Cybertext by Espen Aarseth (1997) 
presents a typology of textuality. Aarseth investigates the perceived and actual 
differences between diverse forms of fictional writing. Cybertext is particularly 
focused upon the range of critical reactions to ‘new’ or digitally mediated forms of 
narrative.  Aarseth’s central question revolves around the applicability of old forms 
of literary theory to new forms of literature.  Narrative Intelligence, edited by Phoebe 
Sengers and Michael Mateas (2003), is a more diverse work, offering multiple 
perspectives on current and historical developments into computationally generated 
narrative, and narrative agents. The breadth of Narrative Intelligence is an opportunity 
to explore a wide range of approaches to computational fiction and to establish a 
broad frame of reference for my own research.  As mentioned, Narrative Intelligence 
also deals at length with a number of projects that are agent-based. These projects 
offer valuable case studies in relation to my own practice.  
 
 It is important to point out that the breadth of this review exemplifies the 
interdisciplinary basis of the South project. All of the works cited have provided 
methodological as well as theoretical insights of relevance to the project.  As such 
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this section provides a useful and unifying bridge between these diverse aspects of 
my PhD, a connection between its theoretical, technical and pragmatic contexts.   
  
 
 
Part 1:  
What are digital fiction systems? Definitions and criticisms of ‘traditional’ 
and current approaches 
  
Both Cybertexts and Narrative Intelligence stress the historical continuity of story 
telling within human culture; indeed Kerstin Dautenhan in chapter four of Narrative 
Intelligence, ‘Stories of Lemurs and Robots, the Social Origins of story-telling’ 
(Mateas, Sengers, 2003: 63) examines the roots of story telling within non-human 
primate societies.  Likewise Aarseth continually emphasises the longevity of narrative 
and emphasises the inadequacy of certain paradigms that have been cited as the 
distinguishing features that separate new forms of writing from traditional narrative.  
Aarseth is more concerned with a continuum of discourse around communication 
rather than establishing schismatic or oppositional categories of literature. If there 
are significant differences, Aarseth states, they are ‘differences in teleological 
organization’ (Aarseth 1997: 20).   
 
 In identifying subtler levels of medium specificity Aarseth asks us to expand our 
categorisations of what constitutes literature and of ‘what is literary’ (23). These 
emerging categorisations necessitate a new literary aesthetic and an awareness of the 
dangers inherent in imposing (without questioning their pertinence) naturalised 
literary terms onto new forms of textuality. Throughout Cybertexts Aarseth 
questions the meaning of reified terms, such as non-linearity, interactivity, and narrative. 
Early in his book Aarseth establishes the term ‘cybertext’ to define texts that he 
defines as placing the reader in an overtly exploratory role.  Aarseth makes the 
controversial claim that cybertexts are texts that grant the reader an agency beyond 
the degree of responsibility conceded by reader response theory, in which the 
reader is defined as having a high degree of control in extracting meaning from 
 47 
texts14.  These claims should be seen as one aspect of a wider context that involves 
widespread debates about agency in the reader-writer nexus, often defined in  
 
 
 
 
Quick start:  
 Before undertaking the core algorithms presented in this book the reader should 
complete a series of processes. These processes will help the South system to 
construct a hypothesis about you, or, what my grandfather called a psychogenic 
topology.  Some of these processes take the form of ‘repertory grid’ tests, the 
investigation of your own networks of beliefs, which may also be called constructs 
(Exactly how you use these tests will be explained in great detail).  Other processes 
may be more familiar. 
 
Most of these processes use bipolar scaling methods, identifying the magnetic 
attraction of dichotomous concepts, discovering which pole a particular notion pulls 
you towards.  Oddly numbered scales do not allow for equatorial malingering. Your 
ontological commitment is required at all times.   
 
 
6a 1 
Figure 6a a page from South, a Psychometric Text Adventure.
                                                 
14
 The key theorists of reader-response theory are Stanley Fish, Wolfgang Iser and Norman Holland; 
their theories were developed from the 1960s onwards. 
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polarised terms that characterise ‘passive’ and ‘active’ engagement with texts (see 
Landow, (1992), Bolter, (1991), Dovey et al (2003) for a range of positions across 
this debate).  Aarseth states that the reader is largely responsible for defining the 
passage of a cybertext. I will clarify the term here because it is clearly central to 
Aarseth’s thesis. As its name implies a cybertext involves cybernetic processes, an 
exchange of control through cycles of feedback. Aarseth has derived this term from 
Norbert Wiener’s influential book, Cybernetics, Control and Communication in the 
Animal and the Machine (1948). Cybertexts also involve a process of calculation, but 
the notion of a cybertext does not implicitly point to a digital form of delivery or 
construction. ‘Paper’ writes Aarseth, ‘can hold its own against the computer as a 
technology of ergodic text’15  (Aarseth, p.10). The ancient form of the I Ching (circa 
1122-256 B.C.) is cited as an example of a non-digital cybertext. 
 
Narrative Intelligence approaches the meaning of digital story telling from a different 
perspective. The book is introduced with a brief survey outlining the role of 
narrative investigation in early artificial intelligence research. This research explored 
the idea of narrative frameworks as a core facet of human intelligence and theories 
of mind. Early research in this era was conducted by Roger Schank at Yale University 
and by the designers of such systems as SAM, the ‘Story Understanding System’, 
Cullingford (1981), PAM, Wilensky, (1981) and Tale-Spin, Meehan (1977). Though 
these projects were diverse and imaginative they were subject to the same cut-backs 
that were applied to other artificial intelligence projects within the so-called AI 
Winter:  
 
These early narrative systems fell out of favour, suffering the 
same fate that befell many 70’s AI systems. They were 
intensely knowledge based, which meant that they 
functioned only in very limited domains and could be made 
more general only by intensive and probably eventually 
infeasible knowledge engineering process. 
(Mateas, Sengers: 2003: 2). 
                                                 
15 The term ergodic is used by Aarseth to imply texts in which the reader must work to find a path, in 
which ‘nontrivial effort is required to allow the reader to traverse the text’ (Aarseth, 1997: 1 – 2). 
The word ergodic is a combination of the Greek words for work and path. 
 49 
 
 Despite the AI Winter (in which support for artificial intelligence research dwindled), 
there was a growing interest in narrative psychology and human-computer-
interaction, which revived research in story-telling during the 1980s. This interest 
was connected to a wider concern with ‘humanistic perspectives’ (3) and to the 
context of interaction as part of a broader notion of what constitutes a 
computational (or psychological) interface, and to ideas that construct the ‘context’ 
itself as a form of interface.  In this sense, narrative was emerging as not merely an 
individualised activity but as part of a wider social and cultural network of meaning. 
 
 Mateas and Sengers identify research into narrative and artificial intelligence as 
particularly suited to an interdisciplinary trope, providing fertile ground for the 
expansion of complexities such as ‘designing computational artefacts for and within 
cultural contexts’ (4). The interdisciplinary nature of research into computational 
and ‘intelligent’ narrative has informed the structure of Narrative Intelligence, in which 
a diverse range of subjects are covered.  Cybertexts is arranged around categories of 
cybertext including hypertext fiction, adventure games, multi user dungeons (MUDs) 
as well as a chapter on interaction and another chapter concerning Aarseth’s 
textonomy, or typology of textual communication. Both books are at times 
concerned with the increasingly contested and clouded boundaries between readers 
(or users) and consumers, and also of ambivalent categories such as those of ‘author’ 
and ‘writer’. 
 
 Aarseth’s work is particularly concerned with theoretical definitions and the 
construction of typologies relating to digital fiction. Aarseth also asks how new 
literary forms, or cybertexts, fit into dominant literary and cultural theories. 
Cybertexts investigates medium-specific and structurally specific aspects of writing. 
Narrative Intelligence engages with some of these issues but also with the limitations 
of computational paradigms, particularly the conceptual models that have emerged 
from traditional artificial intelligence research. 
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A critique of traditional AI agent structures 
 
‘Schizophrenia and Narrative in Artificial Agents’, by Phoebe Sengers (chapter 16 of 
Narrative Intelligence) outlines some of these limitations in more detail, examining the 
‘something deeply missing’ (Sengers, Mateas, 2003: 259) or more specifically the 
something deeply missing from ‘the currently dominant ways of building artificial 
agents’ (259). Sengers’ critique of conventional agent design is of particular relevance 
to my own practice. The South system consists of multiple agents, including overtly 
subjective agents that interact with human agents and modules of code that perform 
small cooperative functions within the system. Sengers presents a coherent critique 
of so-called ‘divide and conquer’ software design practices, explaining how they can 
contribute to the creation of fragmented and systemically constrained agents. The 
divide and conquer approach is a way of dealing with complexity in computer 
programs by abstracting problems into smaller and smaller units or sub-problems. 
One could argue (as Sengers does) that both detail and larger meaning is lost in this 
methodology, that the gestalt of divide and conquer design is actually a series of 
fractured black boxes, often produced by people who have no knowledge of how 
the other parts, the sub and sub-sub problems, in the overall design work. Sengers’ 
argument is that these types of structure when applied to agent design result in 
depersonalised fragmented behaviours, and that the modularity of such designs is a 
systemic limitation (259 – 260). Sengers states: 
 
Some practitioners have argued that the various 
components of an agent strongly constrain one another, and 
that the complex functionalities of classical AI could come 
up with could not easily be coordinated into a whole 
system.  
(260). 
 
Sengers relates this methodology and its outcome to institutional psychiatry and 
suggests that the underlying problem is a deep-seated lack of narrative 
understanding. Sengers cites the roboticist Rodney Brooks’ observation that  
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alternative forms of behavioural AI also present problems of integration. Brooks 
notes that using more than a dozen or so agents is problematic, as the more 
behaviours you add the more things tend to  ‘fall apart’ (260).  One could argue that 
the use of the term schizophrenic has far too much obfuscation, stereotype and 
tabloid value to be fluently ‘read off’ into problems of software design. However, 
Sengers’ point about divide and conquer methodologies and the importance of 
narrative understanding is valuable.  
 
Figure 7 Below, an example of an algorithm embedded in the South software, it counts the 
number of words a reader uses and makes assumptions about them based on its calculation. 
 
 
/** 
* countWords() count words in any .txt file used to assess user       * input 
*  
* @param String txt - name of .txt file to read 
* @return int -number of words 
*/ 
 
public int countWords(String txt) { 
 
int numo; 
 
String a = ""; 
String lines[] = loadStrings(txt + ".txt"); 
 
for (int i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) { 
 a = join(lines, " "); 
 
} 
 
String[] list = split(a, " "); 
numo = list.length; 
print(" " + numo + " "); 
 return numo; 
} 
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 My own emphasis on subjectivity may be seen as a form of narrative production, re-
framing ‘psychometric’ data as a new form of story telling (likewise my fictional 
character Ivan Dâr reframes his own psychological condition as a narrative of 
exploration).  My interpretation and use of psychometric data is comparable to 
Sengers’ notion of comprehensibility in narrative agent architecture. Sengers outlines 
the key properties that agents should have to support narrative comprehension, 
citing her own Expressivator project, in which agent behaviours are coherently 
integrated across narrative sequences. Sengers, in common with the South system, 
also emphasises cultural context as a key to narrative coherence. 
 
Types of digital text 
 
 While Sengers pinpoints narrative intelligibility as a key solution to problems of 
dislocation in narrative agent architecture, Aarseth asks the more fundamental 
question: what actually constitutes a text or a narrative? Aarseth is keen to shatter 
certain illusions about the formal differences between digital and traditional texts, 
and to underline the vagueness of certain terms that have been uncritically inherited 
from the commercial computing world, such as ‘‘interface’, ‘hypertext’, ‘interactive’ 
and ‘virtual’’ (Aarseth 1997: 59).  
   
 Aarseth begins his own analysis of cybertext by looking at a previous text typology 
undertaken by Michael Joyce in 1988.  Michael Joyce identified a distinction between 
texts that can be explored versus texts that can be ‘changed, added to and 
reorganised by the reader’ (60). However, Aarseth concedes that text cannot 
ultimately be defined and admits that pragmatic accommodations had to be made in 
constructing his own typology (62). Aarseth’s textonomy involves a complex and fluid 
categorisation of types of texts and variables that apply to them such as 
determinability and transience. A particularly subversive and refreshing argument 
made by Aarseth is that hypertexts are ‘more, not less linear than the codex’ (65).  
Writers cannot control the way in which readers traverse traditional books.  These 
may be described as random access works, whereas linking and conditional branching 
can certainly constrain the way in which a reader traverses hypertext works:
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The reader’s freedom from linear sequence, which is often 
held up as the political and cognitive strength of hypertext, 
is a promise easily restricted and wholly dependent on the 
hypertext system in question.   
(Aarseth 1997: 77). 
 
 For a text to qualify as ergodic it must meet one of the user functions defined by 
Aarseth, including an aspect of calculation. Cybertexts must also generate a 
cybernetic feedback loop between the reader and the text. Again Aarseth 
emphasises that this is not the exclusive domain of digital texts (and that it is 
arguably a feature of all texts). Aarseth cites the I Ching (circa 1000 BC) as, by his 
own strict specifications, a fully qualified cybertext, and as such the oldest text he 
can identify that meets his criteria. Aarseth also identifies Joseph Weizenbaum’s Eliza 
(an early form of what would now be called a chatbot) and John Cayley’s 1995 work 
Book Unbound. This is a digital work that consists of a ‘holographic sentence 
generator that merges and mutates other texts, inviting readers to feed their 
favourite results back into the system’ (67). Both of these works, particularly Eliza, 
are relevant reference works in relation to my own practice. Their interest to me is 
as works that may be viewed as inter-subjective and temporal.  The combination of 
user interaction and stochastic processes is able to engender unrepeatable narrative 
sequences, writings that are in and of their specific time and place. This relational 
convergence and entanglement of events is not the same as claiming that some sort 
of democratic ‘co-production’ between readers and writers is occurring.  Such a 
notion, is, according to Aarseth, part of the mythology of hypertext fiction, and has 
been a key factor in claims that hypertextual structures are somehow more suited to 
human cognitive processes (whatever they may be) than traditional texts. But, as 
Aarseth clearly maintains throughout Cybertext, the differences between hypertext 
and what he frequently alludes to as ‘the codex’ are overblown. Aarseth warns us 
that ‘identical signifiers do not guarantee identical meanings’ (84). He also asks what 
a narrative is. Aarseth suggests that the hypertext theorist and author George  
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Landow (1991) has confused ‘fiction and narrative’ (84). These are not the same 
entities Aarseth states: one describes content while the other describes form16. 
 
 Like a number of the projects featured in Narrative Intelligence, such as ‘Agneta and 
Frida’ and ‘Terminal Time’, Aarseth also challenges the term ‘interactive’. Chapter 8 
of Cybertext, Ruling the Reader: The Politics of Interaction investigates the ambivalent 
boundaries between users, consumers and producers; ‘to elevate a consumer group 
to producerhood’ Aarseth writes, ‘is a bold political statement; and in the 
production and consumption of symbolic artefacts (texts) the boundary between 
these positions becomes a highly contested ground’ (Aarseth 1997: 163). Cybertexts 
adds more complexity to this already ambivalent area. Interaction with cybertexts may 
be interpreted as ‘empowering’ or ‘authoritarian’ (163), but Aarseth again warns us 
of the danger inherent in applying terms from traditional literary theory to new 
forms of literature, and suggests that our understanding of ‘agency’ requires 
rethinking.  Aarseth is also wary of technological determinism, citing George Landow 
for his claims that hypertext is somehow a democratising force. It is the individual, 
Aarseth writes, not technology or interactivity that can bring about institutional 
reform; such reform could be equally well managed with a pen and paper.  
 
 Chris Crawford, creator of the Erasmatron storytelling system, describes the 
‘misuse’ of the term ‘interactivity’ (191) and the notion of choice: 
 
I need only assert one characteristic of interactivity: it 
mandates choice for the user. Every interactive application 
must give its user a reasonable amount of choice. No 
choice, no interactivity. This is not a rule of thumb; it is an 
absolute, uncompromising principle.  
(Crawford in Sengers, Mateas, 2003: 191). 
                                                 
16 The question of what constitutes narrative is also discussed at length in regard to computational 
works in Perron et al (2003), while a more orthodox definition can be found in Toolan (1992), though 
Toolan also recognises that there are no unequivocal definitions. ‘A first attempt at a minimalist 
definition of narrative might be: 1 a perceived sequence of non-randomly connected events.’ (Toolan, 
1992:7). Toolan also states that the term event opens up further areas of complexity. 
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His critique of interactivity consists of pinpointing the lack of choice in many systems 
and even inanimate objects that claim they are interactive, including bottles of 
shampoo, rugs and candy bars. ‘With any given dramatic situation, our user can 
imagine a great many possibilities…our task’, Crawford writes, ‘is to provide as many 
of those possibilities as is reasonable’ (192). But his critique leaves the conception of 
choice un-theorised: what is choice and is ‘choice’ really at the heart of interactivity? 
Do we really want to make choice the ultimate goal of all new forms of digital 
fiction? Crawford’s belief in ‘choice’ is matched by a deterministic belief in the 
expressive power of computers; he states that a ‘general purpose’ programming 
language can code anything, that its limitless potential is only held back by human 
users: 
 
There can be no doubt that C++ has the expressive 
potential to write a program capable of, say, writing 
profound novels. 
(Crawford in Sengers, Mateas, 2003: 195). 
 
It is hard to find any evidence to support Crawford’s belief in the limitless potential 
of programming languages, let alone their ability to write coherent or even 
‘profound’ novels. While Crawford suggests that it is humans who limit the potential 
of technology (as opposed to any inherent creative deficiencies in a rule-based 
system), Sengers cites the ‘missing juice’ of traditional AI as narrative cohesion. I 
would also argue that other crucially missing elements are embodiment, the 
‘irrational’, tacit knowledge and, perhaps most crucial of all, the situated knowledge 
outlined by  Haraway (1991) and extended by Barad (2007) as discussed earlier in 
this review. Crawford’s statement epitomises the disembodiment and technological 
determinism that have limited traditional artificial intelligence to ever-expanding, 
monolithic knowledge-based systems that know nothing of situation or embodiment.   
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Figure 8 Above, subject specific content generated by the South software 
 
  Though the interdisciplinary breadth of Narrative Intelligence is useful, too few of the 
contributors engage critically with issues of epistemology, embodiment and agency. 
Neither Narrative Intelligence nor Cybertext provide an extensive critical challenge to 
the implicit dualism of binary notions such as ‘the user’ and their ‘context’ (and, in 
fairness, this was never their stated intention). It could be argued that many of the 
works referenced in these two books reinforce this dualism, and that it is implicit in 
works that refer to humanism or the humanistic (Sengers, Mateas, 2003: 3).  My 
review of subjectivity explains in more detail how humanism is still entrenched in 
reified notions of a unitary, rational and essentially solipsistic idealisation of 
individuals. This notion of the individual is problematically predicated on a mind-body 
dualism, and establishes the impression of the neutral knower, the scientific observer 
of positivist foundationalism (sometimes referred to as the Cogito) for whom 
universal truths are rationally self-evident. 
 
  Haraway’s notion of situated knowledge (and also Lynn Hankinson Nelson’s related 
conception of communal epistemologies) still emerges as the most viable 
epistemological alternative to the problematic ‘Cogito’, pragmatically, ethically and 
theoretically. Haraway’s notion of situatedness is extended and supported by Lucy  
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Suchman, a Professor of the Anthropology of Science and Technology at Lancaster 
University. Suchman challenges orthodox notions of the boundaries between 
subjects and objects and writes of the ‘reconstructive engagement with received 
conceptions of the human, the technological and the relations between them’ 
(Suchman, 2005: 1). Suchman’s exploration of such issues within the domain of 
robotics and artificial intelligence has lead her to a position which emphasises 
sociality ‘in strong contrast to prevailing models of the individual cogniser as the 
origin point for rational action’ (3). Between Suchman, Barad and Haraway new 
epistemological theories are being forged, and, through the materials and processes 
of an informed practice, new computational systems of production can be conceived. 
  
 The second part of this review will look at projects that have approached narrative 
generation from a more situated and reflexive position, such as the challenging 
conception of interactivity presented in The Rise and Fall of Black Flag, Terminal Time 
(Sheldon Schiffer, 1999 - ongoing) and Per Persson’s, Kristina Höök’s and Marie 
Sjölinder’s  Agneta and Frida project (1999). 
 
 
Part 2: New approaches to digital fiction systems 
 
  The first part of this review identified areas of tension and difficulty in the field of 
electronic literature, in particular some of the structural problems inherent in using 
traditional computational practices that emerged from artificial intelligence research 
in the 1970s. Sengers emphasises context-sensitivity as an alternative to modularised, 
fixed and fragmented blocks of code. Sengers calls for software designs that 
accommodate contextual mutability as well as ‘the background, assumptions, 
knowledge and perspective of the interpreter. In order to design narratively 
expressive agents, designers must respect (rather than attempt to override) the 
context–and-audience-dependency of narrative comprehension’ (267). 
Where I would depart from Sengers (and from almost all of the contributors to 
Narrative Intelligence), and also with Aarseth, is in the epistemological construction of  
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context17. My interest is in the distribution and form of these normalised boundaries 
such as those between a context and a user, and in the perspective and partiality of 
these notions.  
 
  Haraway has stated that in undertaking a reformulation of epistemology we need to 
exercise a complex mobility of meaning: ‘It is not enough to show radical historical 
contingency and modes of construction for everything’ (Haraway 1991: 187).  What 
is needed is a ‘successor science project that offers a more adequate, richer, better 
account of a world, in order to live in it well and in critical, reflexive relation to our 
own as well as others’ practices of domination and the unequal parts of privilege and 
oppression that make up all positions’ (187). Haraway urges us to ground a 
successor science in an embodied form of objectivity, but it is a form of grounding 
that is not about ‘fixed location in a reified body, female or otherwise, but about 
nodes in fields, inflections in orientations, and responsibility for difference in 
material-semiotic fields of meaning. Embodiment is significant prosthesis; objectivity 
cannot be about fixed vision when what counts as an object is precisely what history 
turns out to be about’ (Haraway 1991: 195). My understanding of this embodied 
form of objectivity is that we cannot assume a universal conception of what it is to 
be human or to have a body, and that therefore our objectivity is in itself inevitably 
situated, always located and always partial:  
 
I am arguing for politics and epistemologies of location, 
positioning, and situating, where partiality and not 
universality is the condition of being heard to make rational 
knowledge claims.  
(Haraway 1991: 195). 
 
My aim has been to find ways of constructing situating computational processes, 
avoiding the structural failings Sengers touches upon, while developing and deploying 
a form of software that is grounded in epistemologies of location.  
                                                 
17
 The South system partially constructs context through the subjectivity of readers and through wider 
situating agencies. We, meaning readers, myself as a programmer and the wider agencies at play are 
‘the context’ or environment for this system. 
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Agent-based projects 
 
  Narrative Intelligence describes a number of projects that appear to have loosely 
related goals. The Agneta and Frida project (Per Persson, Kristina Höök and Marie 
Sjölinder ,1997-1999) consists of two cartoon characters or agents, Agneta and 
Frida, who ‘sit’ on the computer ‘desktop’ accompanying individuals as they browse 
or ‘surf’ the web. As users visit different sites Agneta and Frida appear to be 
watching the material like television viewers, making sarcastic and critical comments 
about the content while continuing with their own lives, going to the toilet, having 
disagreements and picking their noses, constructing both a meta-narrative, a 
narrative about the web material, and a soap-opera like narrative about their own 
lives. In this way Agenta and Frida is a project that encompasses a critique of the 
notion of choice, digital consumerism and interactivity, though its stated intention is 
to explore the way in which narrative coherence is generated, in particular the ‘gap 
filling readers appear to undertake’ (Sengers, Mateas 2003: 246). The designers of 
this project, Per Persson, Kristina Höök and Marie Sjölinder write that within a 
narrative context ‘Inferences and relationships are not primarily textual phenomena, 
but mental ones.’ (246): 
 
They are not ‘in the text’, but exist rather as readers 
constructions during and after the course of the story.  
(246). 
 
After extensive user evaluation the designers of the project concluded that the dual 
narratives resulted in a rupture between the web content and the agents. Rather 
than unifying the experience of browsing the web by bringing narrative clarity to 
disparate content, as they had intended,  ‘Subjects in our study did not gracefully 
merge Agneta and Frida and the web content into a narrative whole’ (256). 
Interestingly the designers also reflected that contextual, or socio-cultural 
parameters, needed to be taken into account in evaluating the system, particularly in 
relation to humour. There is a sense that in recognising the cultural specificity of  
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their work the designers are problematising it, as if it could ever somehow be 
culturally neutral.  As stated at the beginning of this review, a key goal for my own 
work has been the visibility of non-neutral (and therefore subjective) material 
embedded within the programmatic structures of my software, these subjective 
structures act as a type of protagonist within the work, but they are also open to a 
degree of modification by readers. 
 
 Sengers’ Expressivator (1999) is an agent architecture that also focuses upon the 
‘personality’ and narrative expression of agents. As explored in part 1 of this review 
Sengers identifies the lack of narrative comprehensibility as a major failing of the 
modularised architectures of conventional AI agents. According to Sengers the 
Expressivator as a character, ‘attempts to eke out a miserable existence while being 
bullied by the Overseer’ (267), while as a software system The Expressivator 
implements both a sign management system (a system that accommodates the 
complexity and mutability of meanings, particularly their ‘context-dependency’) and 
overarching or meta-level controls for generating intelligible transitions between 
agent behaviours. This structure integrates behaviours beyond merely explaining 
what an agent is doing but also the reasons for an agent’s actions. 
 
The Rise and Fall of Black Velvet Flag (Sheldon Schiffer, 1999 - ongoing) also presents a 
reflexive storytelling system that is aware of its own context-dependence. The 
project consists of a database driven interface for generating documentaries, 
designed by Sheldon Schiffer at Georgia State University. Sheldon Schiffer begins his 
paper with the recognition of the inherent difficulty and non-neutrality of forming 
ontologies. Schiffer provides a valuable insight in stating that he does not agree with 
Lev Manovich that the process of retrieving data from a database is immune to 
implicit orderings, instead Schiffer states that the logic of the ordering imposes a 
form of narrative. Schiffer’s system also self-consciously deploys non-neutral 
alternatives to the documentary form, highlighting the partiality of all supposedly 
objective documentary-making processes. Schiffer refers to the ‘propagandistic 
algorithm’ (148) of Roosevelt era documentary film making, and to Frank Capra’s 
second-world war documentary Why We Fight as ‘a pre-digital model of the database 
as a mechanism for the production of documentary’ (148). The processual 
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transparency of Schiffer’s work is a provocative challenge to conventional forms of 
documentary filmmaking and a valuable reference for my own practice.  
 
  Terminal Time by Michael Mateas, Steffi Domike and Paul Vanouse (1999) is a 
project that also explores and challenges the neutrality of documentary film-making 
processes. ‘The Recombinant History Apparatus Presents Terminal Time’, chapter 9 
of Narrative Intelligence, describes the project as ‘a history “engine:” a machine which 
combines historical events, ideological rhetoric, familiar forms of TV documentary, 
consumer polls and artificial intelligence algorithms to create hybrid cinematic 
audiences that are different every time’ (155). Terminal Time is also engaged with a 
critique of the rhetoric of choice, and of corporate media dominance, which they 
describe as keeping ‘innovative and critical historical documentaries, as well as media 
of other genres, from reaching the public’ (159). The authors identify many of the 
myths embedded in the notion of choice, which they characterise as ‘rhetoric of 
utopian navigation’ (162) according to which: 
 
The computer provides unlimited access to information and 
experience, a pure source of empowerment that imposes 
no interpretation on the data that is processed.  
(162). 
 
The authors also highlight the exploitation of user interaction, this is described as 
‘the raw material for corporate data collection’ (162). This approach has resonance 
with my own practices, such as the overt deployment and feeding back into the South 
system of market research and psychometric methodologies. Terminal Time uses 
audience polling and demographic data collection as a way of constructing 
unintended or atypical histories. But Mateas, Domike and Vanouse are keen to 
emphasise that Terminal Time is not purely an exercise in cynical commentary but an 
‘exploration of some of the unexamined assumptions and unintended side effects of 
information technology’ (162), including the myth of neutrality or the idea of the 
computer as a value-free conduit for unfettered user agency.  
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Figure 9 Above, a screen-shot from the South evaluation software. The software asks readers to 
measure their emotional response to ‘real time’ CCTV images. 
 
Terminal Time is particularly engaging in its recognition of artificial intelligence 
systems as cultural artefacts and in its conception of expressive AI, in which the 
concern is not with an autonomous system but a system that engages in a form of 
relational performance: ‘Expressive AI views a system as a performance. Within a 
performative space…Expressive AI thus changes the focus from the system as a thing 
in itself (presumably demonstrating some essential feature of intelligence), to the 
system as a communication between author and audience’ (167). Despite the 
pluralist discourse of advertisers and technological determinists, the creators of this 
project ask the crucial question: what is not allowed by a computer system? (163).This 
question can be applied to any computer system. What types of behaviour and 
information are excluded beneath the apparently participatory design? What are the 
built-in boundaries of its design? Terminal Time is built with recognition that systems 
are the ‘active messengers of a worldview’ (163). Its architecture consists of modules 
or major code components described as rhetorical or ideological goal trees. Terminal 
Time appears to be amongst the most keenly critical works featured in either 
Narrative Intelligence or Cybertexts.  
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 It is interesting to note that Domike, Mateas and Vanouse reject a strongly 
emergent architecture, which they describe as a ‘form of rootless non-intention’ 
(168). Their critique is important to my own work, as a decentralised, more widely 
distributed system is key to my design, but it is not one that I would describe as 
emergent, for similar reasons. Domike, Mateas and Vanouse rely heavily on a top-
down, high-level knowledge base within the Terminal Time architecture.  Their choice 
of such a high level system is confusingly defined by motivations that are similar to 
Sengers’ incentives for making use of less centralised forms of architecture. Mateas, 
Domike and Vanouse reject ‘strongly emergent’ processes, which, they state, lack 
authorial ‘hooks’: 
 
Much of the architectural work that went into the iterative 
prototyping of Terminal Time was a search for an 
architecture providing authorial “hooks” on the right level 
of abstraction: fine-grained enough to allow significant 
combinatorial possibilities and the capability for surprise, yet 
providing the appropriate authorial affordances to allow the 
exertion of authorial control over multiple levels of the 
story construction process.  
(168). 
  
The notion of authorial “hooks” seems strikingly similar to Sengers’ emphasis on 
narrative coherence, yet her intention is to avoid the fragmentation and loss of 
narrative intelligibility that is often the result of traditional AI architectures (though 
she is particularly concerned with agent architectures). My own system deploys 
bottom-up, simple agent structures where practicable. Though I take the point made 
by the designers of Terminal Time that emergence is a problematic form of 
authorship, I would contend that my system deploys these more distributed 
structures in a different form18.  My interest is in what Karen Barad describes as  
                                                 
18 Espen Aarseth identifies MUD (or multi User Dungeon games) as a particularly subversive form of textuality, 
though there is not room in this review to go into MUD games in detail, I wonder if they might also have a closer 
relationship to notions of emergence and things-in-phenomena then the works that arise from the top-down 
architectural systems used by Mateas, Domike and Vanouse?  
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differential patterns of mattering (Barad 2007: 140) or of ‘things-in-phenomena’. In 
(2007) Barad writes: 
 
relata do not pre-exist relations; rather, relata-within-
phenomena emerge through specific intra-actions. Crucially, 
then, intra-actions enact agential-separability – the condition 
of exteriority-within-phenomena. The notion of agential 
separability is of fundamental importance, for, in the absence 
of a classical ontological condition of exteriority between 
observer and observed, it provides an alternative ontological 
condition for the possibility of objectivity.  
(Barad 2007: 140). 
 
 I do not have any commitment to or interest in the notion of emergence for its own 
sake, rather I have a commitment to systems that (wherever possible) try to eschew 
predefined boundaries between users and contexts, or society/individual dualisms; a 
form of contingent meaning-making that is closer to the description made by Sarah 
Kember (2003), in relation to artificial intelligence and Alife, in which emergence is 
characterised as ‘based on a non-linear, non-deterministic model of connection or 
communication between multiple rather than individual units’ (Kember 2003: 110). 
This description seems to directly address the problems outlined by Sengers in 
chapter 16 of Narrative Intelligence, though, as noted before, it is significant that other 
designers have chosen contrary solutions, highlighting the unavoidable fact that these 
are undoubtedly difficult, complex and often-contradictory areas. Above all I want to 
avoid falling into an entrenched position in regard to the architecture and sensibility 
of my own system. In Cyberfeminism and Artificial Life, Sarah Kember (2003) discusses 
the limitations and structures of artificial agents, including Rodney Brooks’ 
downsized ‘dumb’ mobile robots, or multi-agent system, which en masse might 
constitute a  ‘political economy of information systems’ (Kember  2003: 119). 
Brooks’ mobots have eschewed symbolic internal models and have instead adopted a 
networked intelligence or ‘subsumption architecture’. Though this is an interesting 
break from the symbolic models of traditional artificial intelligence it is my 
understanding that this is pragmatically a very limited architecture.   
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 Sarah Kember (2003) also discusses the disappointing limitations of ‘trick’ 
conversational agents or chat bots such as Eliza and Julia that have limited 
repertoires of static responses and no capacity to learn or analyse their own 
reactions let alone act in situated awareness of an environment. One of the issues of 
interest to me is the ‘best practice’ paradigm that habitually reverts to face-to-face 
intra-human experience as the ideal form of interaction, placing, for example, the 
intra-human flow of a chat site above the ‘question and response’ pattern of an 
online bulletin board’ (Dovey, Giddings, Grant, Kelly, Lister 2003: 22). These 
anthropomorphic value judgments do not always seem logical or necessary but as 
the authors point out, the anthropomorphising sensibility ‘inflects the whole idea of 
interactivity by lending it a context of person-to-person connection’ (22). This is 
perhaps where chat bots from Eliza onwards have failed both in intention and 
practice, pursuing a mimetic or anthropomorphic goal at the expense of exploring 
the true strengths of computational forms and structures.  
 
 Hayles (1999) describes the distributed and situated paradigm represented by 
Rodney Brooks’ subsumption architecture as offering an alternative approach to 
exploring artificial intelligences and narratives of cognition; an approach that does 
not form itself around a central (or computational) conceptual model of ‘reality’ or 
‘mind’, but sensory interaction with environments and distributed cognitive 
structures.  Hayles enlarges upon the crucial observation that Dawkins, Minsky and 
many other scientists create anthropomorphic narratives of agency. Hayles 
references Stefan Helmreich’s anthropological observations of artificial life 
researchers, in Silicon Second Nature, Culturing Artificial Life in a Digital World (1998) in 
which Helmreich records the closed paradigms that A-life scientists habitually 
construct, interpreting the universe as a mathematical construct, a realm of 
information. Other scientists such as William Grey Walters work with the 
awareness that they are creating systems designed to model anthropomorphic 
strategies. If “we ask how this narrative is constituted” Hayles writes, “we can see 
that statements about the operation of the program and interpretations of its 
meaning are in continuous interplay with each other” (Hayles 1999: 227). 
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Summary 
 
  The complex interplay of computational writing, subjectivity and agency presented 
in this review highlights many of the key issues raised within my practice and 
theoretical research. From the outset I knew that in pursuing this practice I wanted 
to address some of the issues arising from the impasse in traditional artificial 
intelligence practices. This impasse is characterised by top-down, centralist, rule-
based systems whose modular and fragmented construction sometimes results, 
particularly in the domain of agents and narrative generation, in disjointed and 
impersonal works.  
 
 In creating my own software there are many questions I have attempted to answer, 
such as, how, for example, might I accommodate the recognition that I am producing 
an unavoidably partial notion of a subject and how do these theories relate to the 
design of interactive software or ‘ergodic’ fictions described by Aarseth (1997).  
Aarseth’s notion of cybertext is that ‘the subject’ must work to find a path through a 
story, but in some ways my fiction inverts the ergodic trope identified by Aarseth, 
and is instead constructing a literature which must work to find its subject. 
However, I have sought to recognise that the ‘subject’ is both historically and 
dynamically brought into being. The subject within my work is relational, 
contradictory and mutable. That realisation is embedded within my code, but it is 
not integrated as a form of illustration, rather as knowledge generated in and 
through specific creative practices, some of which I have outlined within this review. 
What is clear from the readings and research I have undertaken in forming this 
review is the need for subtlety in the ways in which we theorise and produce new 
forms of fictional text, and for greater subtlety still in our ability to discern what 
exactly constitutes both a new form of text and a significantly new form of 
computer-human intra-action.  
 
2.3: Readers and writers, hypertext theories, site-specific art works, 
pervasive games and artist’s books 
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2.3: Readers and writers 1 
Introduction 
 
 The discourses around the role of the author exemplified in Roland Barthes’ 1967 
essay The Death of the Author, and in Foucault (1977) and Derrida (1967), were 
central to hypertext theories that emerged in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, and, as I 
will show in this section of the review, relate directly to theories of the subject.  This 
section will also explore discourses around authorship and site specificity evident in 
more recent forms of digital art such as augmented or mixed reality games19.  Like the 
other sections of this review, this part will show the relationship between my 
theoretical research and practice. It will summarise what I have accepted and 
rejected from the material I have researched and show how it relates to the 
theoretical and practice-based content of my work.  This part of the review engages 
in particular with the writings of early hypertext theorists, who often conflated 
hypertext and non-linearity with post-structuralist theory.  Writers such as Jay David 
Bolter (1991) and George Landow (1992) have boldly presented hypertext as the 
embodiment of post-modern theories. Such literalising of the relationship between 
practice and theory is a valuable warning by example to any practitioner in this field. 
Examining the mistakes and hyperbolic claims made by early hypertext theorists 
highlights these dangers. Such an examination also highlights many of the humanistic 
errors made in the limited designation of agency, and narrowly deterministic notions 
of subject-object differentiation. These issues were examined in relation to 
subjectivity and cybertext systems in the previous sections of this review, this 
section aims to extend this analysis, exploring Landow (1992) and Bolter’s (1991) 
inflated claims for hypertext, particularly in relation to Roland Barthes’ ideas of 
readerly and writerly texts and other post-structuralist notions of the relationship 
between the reader and the author. I will highlight critiques of this approach, made 
by, among others,  Aarseth (1997) and Dovey, Giddings, Grant, Kelly, Lister (2003) 
and examine other approaches to the role of the reader (or player in some 
configurations) and the writer within digital literary systems and in pervasive games, 
in which the real and the virtual can become critically enmeshed.  
                                                 
19 Augmented reality games, also sometimes known as pervasive games and mixed reality games mix real-
world locations with digital forms of play, drama and exploration. 
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 The complex relationships between subjects and locations have also played a 
significant part in theoretical approaches to site-specific art. The art historian Miwon 
Kwon writes of such works as a focus for ‘critical intervention’ (Suderburg 2000: 
43). Her writing resonates with many of the issues discussed throughout this review, 
not least of all in the analysis of works that recognise themselves as part of a 
relational phenomena, an ‘unfixed impermanence, to be experienced as an 
unrepeatable and fleeting sensation’ (43). Miwon Kwon (2004) uncovers the extent 
to which the notion of site-specificity is also embroiled with Death of the Author 
discourse and with questions of authenticity and the art-site. My own work is 
coupled to a specific location, (the South Bank area of South London), its structures, 
imagery and narrative references appear to be inseparable from the specific 
geography and history of the site, and yet, as Kwon shows, there are new paradigms 
of site specificity and mobility that challenge the very conception of unique and 
unrepeatable localities and the customarily literal spaces of art practice. My practice 
engages with notions of stability and place, self and text. It is a practice that seeks to 
displace boundaries and question categories through direct material encounters. The 
final part of this section will look at key texts and works relating to artist’s books, 
showing how the lack of formally documented material has necessitated alternative 
research processes, including the instigation of online dialogue through Artist’s book 
forums and Twitter sites. 
 
Figure 10 following page, content generated by the South software 
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Multi-linear texts 
 
 The hyperbole surrounding certain claims for hypertext and hypermedia as 
tantamount to an extension of the human mind (championed for example by Ted 
Nelson (1981), Jay David Bolter (1991), George Landow (1992) and Richard Grusin 
(1998)) can be linked to Marshall McLuhan’s notion of technology as an extension ‘of 
the human body’. These new paradigms, like other hypermedia structures, were 
frequently presented as a radical threat to the oppressive authority of linear and fixed 
forms of text, (so-called readerly texts) in which ‘book-based knowledge systems’ 
could be fruitfully replaced by ‘network knowledge systems’ (Dovey, Giddings, 
Grant, Kelly, Lister 2003: 27) or writerly texts, that are posited by Barthes (1977) as 
making readers into writers. In 1991 Jay David Bolter wrote of electronic writing 
that it would restore ‘a theatrical innocence to the making of literary texts, 
electronic writing will require a simpler, more positive literary theory’ (Bolter 1991: 
147). Other writers, such as George Landow (1992), claimed ingenuously that 
hypertext fictions were in sync with post-structuralist notions of reader agency, 
which emphasise the supremacy of readers in bringing meaning to texts. But these 
claims, states Aarseth, are, ‘confusing two different levels’ (Aarseth 1997: 83) and 
represent a ‘misalignment of the reader response (phenomenological) and the 
postructuralist (semiological) concepts of text with the philological (material) 
concept of hypertext’ (83). 
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Aarseth is rigorous in his critique of previous theoretical arguments that have 
created false dichotomies between analogue and digital texts. Aarseth offers a 
detailed repudiation of Jay David Bolter’s (1989), George Landow’s (1992), and 
Stuart Moulthrop’s (1989) assertions about the theoretical significance of hypertext, 
in which hypertext is posited somehow as embodying post-sructuralist ‘conceptions 
of text’ (58). According to Aarseth certain aspects of technological shifts, such as the 
transition from records, to tapes to CDs are superficially significant (59). A 
meaningful difference between digital and analogue texts however, is the issue of 
instability. The issue of textual instability is also raised by Lister et al (2003) who cite 
the fluidity of both the text and its interpretation as specific to interactive text. They 
connect this fluidity of both form and meaning to a sort of self-subverting threat to 
the ‘canonical’ status of written works. 
  
 Questions of instability, authorship and erasure are present in the context of my 
own mutable texts and computational writing practices. What happens to my 
signature as a writer in the context of a software environment that creates 
unforeseen changes to my texts? How is meaning constructed between my texts, my 
readers and the computational processes that mediate between these entities and 
myself? Is this even a useful way of looking at the texts that are generated by this 
collision of entities and agencies? New forms of disseminating and generating texts 
create both fluidities of interpretation and problems of coherence, Lister et al write: 
 
Established methodologies for thinking about the way in 
which meaning is produced between readers and texts 
assumes a stability of the text…Under certain conditions of 
interactivity this traditional stability also becomes fluid.  
(23). 
 
 Roland Barthes’ essay The Death of the Author (1967) is firm in asserting that the 
contextual situation of the author plays no part in the reader’s understanding of a 
text. But how does Roland Barthes’ notion of the author relate to more recent 
notions of situatedness and locational epistemology?  
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The Author 
 
Roland Barthes’ key notion in Death of the Author is that the ‘text’s unity lies not in 
its origin but in its destination’ (148). But is ‘the true place of writing’ reading (147) 
as Barthes assures us, or is the agency more distributed, to include many other 
factors, such as time, external events, the reader, or (if the work is digital) the 
computer and the author him or herself? 
 
 Barthes is right to emphasise the rise of the author as attendant to the rise of the 
enlightenment Cogito, or rational self, and right to challenge the presumed singularity 
of that self.  But is Barthes right in his belief that the potent figure of the author can 
be neutralised, or indeed, wholly negated, in the reader-writer nexus? Is the negation 
of the author’s role in meaning tantamount to a reduction of the author to the 
paradigm of a communication channel, an information-processing paradigm, in which, 
as Barthes put it, the author must ‘die’ in order to allow the reader to be born? In 
contrast to Barthes, (who largely excises the author from this meaning-making 
equation), reader-response theory envisions a virtual position that emerges from a 
symbiotic interaction between the reader and the text, rather than a process that 
eliminates the author completely. Wolfgang Iser writes of the reader- writer dyad: 
 
if one loses sight of the  relationship, one loses sight of the 
virtual work. Despite its uses, separate analysis would only 
be conclusive if the relationship were that of transmitter and 
receiver, for this would presuppose a common code, 
ensuring active communication since the message would 
only be travelling one way. In literary works, however, the 
message is transmitted in two ways, in that the reader 
“receives” it by composing it.  
(Suleiman Crosman 1980: 107). 
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 Of interest to my own research is the assertion by Wolfgang Iser that ‘a text cannot 
adapt itself to each reader it comes into contact with’ (109). Iser states this in order 
to support the differences between reading and forms of social interactions such as 
conversation: 
 
The partners in dyadic interaction can ask each other 
questions in order to ascertain how far their images have 
bridged the gap of the inexperiencability of one another’s 
experiences. The reader, however can never learn from the 
text how accurate or inaccurate are his views of it. 
(109). 
 
I believe this assertion is partially undermined by the responsive and discursive 
potential of computational works. Such works may be capable of responding to 
readers and of calculating a notion of interpretive ‘accuracy’. Certain types of 
dynamic theatre writing, for example the Theatre of The Oppressed 20, and the works 
of a writer such as Martin Crimp, may similarly attempt to melt these supposedly 
twin poles, of authored aesthetic realisation and artistic interpretation by the reader. 
Crimp’s play Attempts on Her Life (1997) is a case study in destabilising such 
boundaries.  The plays of Martin Crimp’s are striking for their mutable and relational 
constructions of identity and narrative. The titular attempts on her life consist 
perhaps, not of assassination attempts but attempts to decode or interpret a 
personality - that of the central ‘character’ Anne or Anya. This interpretation takes 
place within the context of a play that is essentially without characters. The task of 
interpretation is overtly distributed between the production (including the author) 
and the audience.  There are no stage directions for the actors, and it may therefore 
be described as both open and indeterminate. The drama consists of an exploration 
of what the play might be about. This is strikingly reminiscent of the I Ching (a key 
reference for my own practice) and the Tarot, and serves as a constructive case 
study. Such an indeterminate and self-referential work is, I would venture, a difficult  
                                                 
20
 The Brazilian director Augusto Boal established the Theatre of The Oppressed in the 1950s and 
1960s. His intention was to generate social transformation through an audience’s active involvement 
and dialogue with dramatic works. 
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task to effectively negotiate, as such this is a valuable example of an engaging and 
(subjectively) successful experimental performance. The modular or in some senses 
algorithmic structure of the play is also reminiscent of interactive digital narratives 
but (in my opinion) markedly more engaging and complex than many digital works.  
 
 I would argue that Attempts on Her Life repudiates Iser’s notion of the irreconcilable 
differences between writing and conversation, though in fairness Iser himself 
backtracks a little by stating that gaps in understanding spur conversation in a similar 
way that gaps in understanding define the interaction between a reader and a text. 
Iser, not unreasonably, sees the responsive cues generated in social interactions as a 
crucial difference between the two forms of communication. However, I would ask 
how new forms and ways of experiencing text might take advantage of these 
distinctions, and return to the question that underpins much of my practice - what 
will a literature be like that attempts to deploy the asymmetric relationship between 
the reader and the text, (and indeed between a reader and a computer) as opposed 
to a work that perpetuates Iser’s ‘fundamental asymmetry’ (109) as problematic?  
 
 The notion of asymmetry in both textual and social interaction is central to 
Wolfgang Iser’s construction of how conversation and communication are induced.  
But his interpretation is not entirely negative, and is perhaps closer to Barad’s 
(2007) notion of diffraction: 
 
Asymmetry and the “no-thing” are all different forms of an 
indeterminate, constitutive blank, which underlies all 
processes of interaction. With dyadic interaction, the 
imbalance is removed by the establishment of pragmatic 
connections resulting in an action, which is why the 
preconditions are always defined in relation to situations 
and common frames of reference. The imbalance between 
text and reader, however, is undefined, and it is this very 
indeterminacy that increases the variety of communication 
possible.  
(Barad, 2007: 109 – 110). 
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 My own interest in exploring the degree of symmetry or discourse possible 
between agents in a computational literary system is not motivated by the same 
goals of early hypertext writers and theorists. It seems that what hypertext theorists 
such as Jay David Bolter and George Landow were seeking was, as Bolter 
ingenuously proposed, a form of innocence or neutrality that is intrinsically 
unachievable. There is no such thing as a view from nowhere. The closest we can get 
to a view without perspective is the fragmentation of so-called legendary 
psychasthenia, as Grosz writes in (1994).  It is a view that can form no perspective 
and cannot locate itself in time or space.  
  
 Grosz emphasises the notion of body image as intrinsic to our ability to create a 
‘distinction between the figure and the ground, or between central and peripheral 
actions. Relative to its environment, the body separates the subject’s body from a 
background of forces’ (Grosz 1994: 83). By stating this, Grosz is challenging 
Cartesian mind-body dualisms and placing the body at the centre of epistemological 
processes. But Grosz is keen to deny holism or transcendental notions of mind-body 
unity. Her approach is more complex, alluding to mind-body processes as a form of 
inter-constitutional entanglement, a Möbius strip of ‘inscriptions and 
transformations’ (vii).  Elizabeth Grosz’s work on the body re-conceptualises 
subjectivity and provides a framework for explaining subjectivity through 
corporeality rather than through binary notions of the conscious versus the 
unconscious. Likewise Grosz does not construe mind and body as opposites, but as 
two parts of a whole.  
 
 My work aims to place location, sensation and tactile response at the forefront of 
the site-oriented experience it offers to readers. Spatial fragmentation and psychic 
disorientation are also part of my site-specific narrative works, in which readers can 
find narrative threads through tactile experiences or lose themselves and find the 
work collapsing around them. The South project is committed to an investigation of 
alternative forms of knowing that are grounded in material practices, such as the 
generation of meaning through tactile experiences. Readers are invited to construct 
their own narrative interpretations through touch, sound and movement, to locate  
 75 
themselves within and through the environment. The fictional protagonist of my 
work is an embryologist called Ivan Dâr. Ivan Dâr experiences a ‘mental breakdown’ 
in which he loses the ability to differentiate himself from his wider environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Above and below, pages from the South book depicting case-notes relating to the fictional 
character Ivan Dâr. 
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 Readers of the South book and software writings are required to engage with the 
construction or representation of their own subjectivity. This construction is also 
enacted through sensory experiments as well as more traditional forms of 
psychological assessment. If readers attempt to ‘cheat’ or alter the system’s 
assessment of their personality type, then they are engaging in an unconcealed form 
of subjective performativity.  This notion of performing ones identity has a degree of 
resonance with Judith Butler’s idea of gender as ‘a regulated system of performances’ 
(Mansfield, 2000: 77), but  Butler’s statement that the body has ‘no ontological status 
apart from the various acts which constitute its reality’ (Butler, 1990: 136) is 
contentious and has been contested at length (see Kember, 2003), not least for the 
circularity of an argument that equates the total meaning of the body with 
discourse21.   
  
Site-orientation 
                                                 
21 Butler herself attenuates this claim in (1993) Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive limits of “Sex”, 
Routledge. 
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 This review has demonstrated how my work makes an explicit connection between 
subjectivity, epistemology and location, citing Grosz (1994) and Suchman (2005) as 
key theorists on the role of both embodied and environmentally situated knowledge 
production, but also describing the specific practices I have developed and through 
which I have generated alternative forms of knowing and narrative within the South 
system. I would now like to connect the centrality of corporeal and located 
knowledge production to the notion of site-specificity in my work.  
 
 
 
Figure 12 Above, a screen shot from the South evaluation software. 
 
The notion of site-specificity shares some of the tensions implicit in conceptions of 
the subject and of the author. Miwon Kwon (2002) emphasises the problematic 
centrality of the author (synonymous with the artist in her terms) in contemporary 
site-oriented works.  Kwon also suggests that a once radical form (variously known 
as site-specific, site-oriented, and site-conscious art) has been neutralised, ‘becoming 
insignificant or innocuous in recent years’ (Kwon, 2002: 2), largely through 
commodification and incorporation into the mainstream of arts institutions, but also 
because of limitations inherent in the form as it is currently perceived. Not least of 
the problems intrinsic to older notions of the site-specific is the instability of the site. 
Relatively recent conceptions such as virtual space, distributed networks and mobile 
technologies have challenged our ideas of the fixed location. Kwon writes ‘the very 
concept of site has become destabilised in the past three decades or more’ (2). This  
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is also the theme of ‘ROAM: The Reader on The Aesthetics of Mobility’ (Hoete (ed) 
2004), in which new types of spaces and mobility are explored in light of these 
technologies and alternative notions of the site. One particular project ‘Sites Pacific 
®’ by Albert Refiti and Anthony Hoete  (2004)  ‘is founded upon the borderlessness 
of oceanic, rather than land-based exchange: “to be located in and around the Pacific 
is to confront the undifferentiated abyss that is the ocean”. The ocean is the ground 
in Polynesia and has the ability to “rise up to decompose the face of identity”‘ 
(Hoete, 2004: 216). Refiti and Hoete’s conception of site is challenging and non-
literal, providing a valuable practice-based example of extending notions of site-
specificity. My own conception of the South Bank site is also paradoxical and 
mutable. The site is present within my work as a series of both virtual and physical 
locations, but also as subjective, inter-subjective and situated formations, as complex 
sites of mutual constitution.  
 
  Miwon Kwons’s description of the problems around defining site-specificity may 
also be re-framed (as I would argue they have been by Refiti and Hoete) as 
opportunities to re-formulate the notion of site-specificity within the context of new 
technologies and new notions of both agency and subjectivity. Miwon Kwon also 
warns of the hermetic dangers of works that overly focus on the author. Kwon 
expands upon the paradox of works that apparently negate the author but at the 
same time, and by doing so place the author at their centre. Kwon describes a form 
of site-specificity that is in fact a form of decontextualisation in the guise of historical 
re-contextualisation’ (Kwon 2002: 49). Kwon interprets such works as an atavistic 
throw-back to modernist autonomy in the guise of post-modern mobility. These 
regressive works, Kwon asserts, also implicate a ‘domestication of vanguard works 
by the dominant culture’ (49), as previously described, a form of neutralisation by 
appropriation. Interestingly Kwon uses a specifically computational term to explain 
the paradoxical alienation from place of these works, describing them as ‘object-
oriented’. This term is resonant with the critiques of modularity in computational 
narratives made by Sengers (2004), and discussed earlier in this review. Kwon 
implies that certain types of site-specificity represent a ‘fits all sizes’ form of practice, 
creating a mere illusion of specificity. 
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 Kwon’s writing on site specificity establishes a rounded critique of site-specific 
works that incorporates many of the issues at the forefront of my own practice, not 
least of all the epistemological functions of the subject and the author. Kwon’s 
warning against the ‘hermetic implosion of (auto) biographical and myopic narcissism 
that is misrepresented as ‘self-reflexivity’ ‘(53) is both a stinging and valuable caveat 
that I have endeavoured to bear in mind throughout the development of this project. 
However, I would challenge Kwon’s across-the-board problematisation of placing the 
author (or artist) at the forefront of such works. My presence within the South 
system is motivated by an intention to highlight the partiality of my own perspective  
(and practices) within the data and control structures of my software and to negate 
the notion of a ‘view from nowhere’, that would indeed represent a form of object-
oriented de-contextualisation. 
 
Pervasive games  
 
Recent practices in site-specific art, theatre and gaming have coalesced into 
significant new forms. A number of so called mixed reality, pervasive or ubiquitous 
games have consolidated these diverse practices. Can You See Me Now? By Blast 
Theory (2001) is an example par excellence of the confluence between games, 
performance, site specific art and interactive narrative:  
 
Tracked by satellites, Blast Theory’s runners appear online 
next to your player. Situated in the real city, handheld 
computers showing the position of online players guide the 
runners in tracking you down. (Quote from website for Can 
You see me Now? Available at: 
http://www.canyouseemenow.co.uk/belo/en/intro.php   
Accessed 27/12/08). 
. 
 The stated intention of Can You See Me Now? is to explore the creative possibilities 
of locative media, to ‘attempt to establish a cultural space on these devices’22.  In  
                                                 
22
 Quote available at http://www.canyouseemenow.co.uk/v2/game.html accessed 27/12/08 
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relation to Blast Theory and other mixed reality works, Richard Colson (2007) 
defines what he calls two schemas of mixed reality gaming: 
 
In the first, aspects of real world action, dimensionality and 
finite spatiality are digitally captured and provide the source 
of raw data that is used to control corresponding elements 
within a simulated construct of reality. This is usually 
displayed on a screen. 
 In the second, mobile communication networks deliver 
real-time data to participants giving them the information 
necessary for navigating the real world and completing tasks 
that have been assigned to them. 
 (Colson, 2007: 124). 
 
 My work has points in common with both of these definitions. South captures data 
relating to a real-world space (the South Bank) and uses it (in conjunction with other 
factors) to define narrative themes and actions that will be enacted by readers, who 
might also be defined as players.  Such works are defined by Jane McGonigal in (Von 
Borries,  Walz,  Böttger, 2007) as works that ‘augment everyday objects and physical 
environments with invisible and networked computing functionality’ (233). Examples 
of ubiquitous or pervasive games (also known as Augmented Reality or Alternate Reality 
games, among other titles) include Can You See Me Now? (Blast Theory: 2001) and 
more commercially motivated works such as the massive player game I Love Bees (42 
Entertainment: 2004).  The more challenging of these works such as Can You See Me 
Now? and WHAVSM? (Budzinski, Iserman: 2005) engage directly with issues of agency 
and reception, but Kwon asserts that their sometimes overblown emphasis upon 
‘rich local information – maps, plans images and sounds’ (249) opens them up to the 
accusations of a spurious and schematised form of specificity.  
 
 It is striking that much of the writing about pervasive games and other innovative 
forms of game experience demonstrates a degree of hyperbole reminiscent of early 
writings around hypertext fiction.  Lukas Feireiss for example, in Von Borries, Walz,  
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Böttger (2007), claims that computer generated worlds can dissolve linear and 
‘hierarchical order structures’ (219). He insists that virtual worlds are somehow 
outside of socio-historical or  any other ‘external’ influences. Players, according to 
Feireiss can be recruited ‘beyond social, factual and time boundaries. At the same 
time, they make it possible for them to become master builders of their own virtual 
spaces’ (221). My own practice is critical of such idealising statements, it involves the 
construction of exploratory narrative experiences that incorporate aspects of virtual 
and site-specific or ‘real spaces’. In placing my own partiality of perspective as a 
central facet of these works I aim to generate a creative investigation into 
subjectivity and partiality within areas that frequently claim a form of transcendental 
neutrality. This notion of neutrality is too infrequently challenged or even explored 
within the context of interactive narrative and games, however, in using terms such 
as ‘narrative’ and ‘game-play’ I am aware that the work is entering into problematic 
territories. Such difficulties are outlined by, among others, Aarseth in (1997) and 
Frasca in (Perron et al, 2003), these points of contention, are, I would argue, an 
opportunity to generate an invigorating source of provocation and an instrumental 
counter-argument within my own practice. As the next section will show, the subject 
of artist’s books, like that of narrative and games also encompasses areas of 
contention, a reading of the core works on this subject reveals problematic issues, 
not least of all in agreeing upon a definitive description of such works. 
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Figure 13 Above, drawings of the South Bank contained within the South book (E. Dare, 2009) 
 
Artist’s books 
 
The South book exists within a historical tradition of artists producing their own 
books and also of artists sporadically involving themselves in self-publishing and of 
creating reproducible objects, sometimes known as Multiples23. However, despite 
the tradition of artists working with the book form, Stefan Klima (1998) articulates a 
lack of consensus in the definition of what an artist’s book is. This, as Klima notes, is 
also reflected in disagreements about the correct form that the words should take, 
between artist’s books, and artists’ books with the apostrophe, at the end, the itinerant 
punctuation is poetically indicative of an unsettled form. There is also a significant 
difference between the earlier livre d’artiste and what have become known as artist’s 
books. Livre d’artiste were luxurious editions of books produced from the early 
twentieth century onwards and often designed and commissioned by art dealers 
such as Ambroise Vollard.  
 
 Johanna Drucker (1994) characterises the artist’s book as a mid twentieth century 
form with distinctive characteristics, these are also acknowledged by Atwood and 
Phillpot (1976). The authors describe artist’s books as marked by an engagement 
with the philosophical and material meaning of the book form, however, as my 
research indicates, there is very little documentation about artist’s books and 
computation. N. Katherine Hayles’ Writing Machines (2002) is a notable exception, 
this book investigates the possibilities that digital technology brings to the artist’s 
book. Writing Machines writes positively about the medium specificity of Shelley 
Jackson’s hypertext fiction Patchwork Girl (1995), it also contains a chapter on Talan 
Memmott’s From Lexia to Perplexia (2000), a digital work that deploys computation to 
a significant degree, beyond using the computer as an image processing tool or as an 
inert vessel for a literalised remediation of the book form. Hayles’ emphasis upon 
the materiality and embodiment of our engagement with diverse forms of book has 
been an essential reference and a vindication of the possibilities that computation has  
                                                 
23
 The word Multiples describes works of art that are made specifically to be repeated, the subject will 
be covered in greater length in Chapter four. 
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to offer the evolving form of the artist’s book. Hayles also looks at the impact 
computation has had on popular analogue books such as Mark Z. Danielewski’s 
House of Leaves (2000).  
 
 
In contrast to Writing Machines Stefan Klima’s Artists Books, a Critical Survey of the 
Literature, (1998) makes no reference to artists working with computation. A slim 
book, at 85 pages, it is significant and by no means exceptional among writing about 
book-arts that Klima makes no mention of the possibility of digital artist’s books, 
instead the argument is made that all books will become artist’s books or rather 
book objects, sculptural rarities in an age where most information will be disseminated 
digitally. Likewise, Johanna Drucker’s The Century of Artists’ Books (1995), probably 
the core text on artist’s books (referred to by Stefan Klima in 1998 as the ‘one 
monograph on the subject’ (Klima, 9: 1998)), contains very little reference to digitally 
mediated works. Though the updated 2004 edition acknowledges the opportunities 
for wider dissemination presented by the internet, the book contains no images of 
digitally mediated books and no reference to any specific project or artist working 
with computation. At best computation is seen as a useful tool for printing books, 
disseminating information about book-arts or processing images, at worst it is seen 
as a potential threat to the book form24.  Though this omission is symptomatic of a 
significant lack of engagement with computational processes among many book 
artists, Drucker’s book nevertheless provides a comprehensive background to the 
development of book-arts and to the emergence of the form as radical and socially 
engaged. The Century of Artists’ Books is undoubtedly the definitive text on the subject 
and one of the major references in my own research. However, the lack of printed 
documentation about digitally mediated artist’s books has been problematic, indeed 
Drucker and Klima both acknowledge that the form is generally under represented, 
Drucker writes ‘it is remarkable how little comprehensive critical work has been 
done in the field of artist’s books’ (Drucker, 1998 (2004 reprint):  xvii). 
                                                 
24 This sense of threat is not limited to book artists, Sven Birkerts in The Gutenberg Elegies (1999) also 
characterises digitally meditated text as threatening to canonical forms of reading and writing. Birkerts 
writes, ‘our educational systems are in decline; that our students are less and less able to read and 
comprehend their required texts, and that their aptitude scores have levelled off well below those of 
previous generations. Tag-line communication, called "bite-speak" by some, is destroying the last 
remnants of political discourse’ (Birkerts, 1999) available here http://archives.obs-
us.com/obs/english/books/nn/bdbirk.htm accessed 10/03/0.  
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 Cornelia Lauf’s and Clive Phillpot’s (1999) Artist/Author, Contemporary Artist’s Books is 
another impressive survey of artist’s books that nonetheless fails to acknowledge 
digital forms beyond the production of images or as a putative threat to the future of 
the book. Clive Phillpot one of the co-authors of Artist/Author has been a significant 
and controversial figure within the sphere of artist’s books, variously offering 
definitions of the form then renouncing or reviving them. Lucy Lippard (1977) has, 
like Phillpot, issued warnings against the reversion of the artist’s book to its 
historically luxurious form, to the opulent and elitist livre d’artiste. Artists such as 
Larry Walzack (1979), Brad Freeman (1991) and Janet Zweig (1989) are among the 
many book artists highlighted by Johanna Drucker as eschewing the one off ‘auratic’, 
or rare art object, and instead engaging through the book form with social and 
political issues as an ‘agent for social change as well as a site for intervention’ 
(Drucker, 1995 (2004 edition): 307). Such works are of interest to me for being 
receptive to the possibility of books as situated and agential entities, inseparable 
from the environmental and temporal contexts they exist in. 
  
 
 The lack of formally documented material about artist’s books and computation has 
necessitated the pursuit of alternative research processes, including the instigation of 
online discourse through artist’s book forums including Artists Books 3.0 and Micro-
Pages. These research sources have yielded valuable dialogues about why artists do 
or do not use computation, in particular the book artists Sara Bowen and Abigail 
Thomas have provided extensive insights into their understanding of the book form.     
 
I read books, make books, look at artist’s books and make 
artist’s books and in all of those activities the physical 
presence of the book object is important to me. I haven’t 
thought deeply or in a scholarly way about what it is I feel 
I’m lacking when I encounter a book in the digital realm 
alone, but I do feel I’m lacking something. That physicality is 
really important to me, and I haven’t yet encountered a 
work that exists purely in a digital format that has given me  
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something that makes me forget the lack of a physical 
presence. 
(Sara Bowen, Micro-Pages forum, December 4th 2009, 
available at: http://micropages.ning.com/  accessed 22/12/09). 
 
Though engaged with computers both artists have expressed their ambivalence to 
the perceived loss of physical connection with books that the digital realm signifies. 
This emphasis upon the embodied nature of our relationship to books has been 
fundamental to my understanding and remediation of the book form. The South 
project seeks to establish a form of computation that is mindful, and indeed founded 
upon, alternatives to propositional, disembodied processes of knowledge generation. 
The technical section of this review will look in more detail at the epistemic 
foundations of artificial intelligence, providing a context for my development of a 
subjectively and environmentally situated work that has sought alternatives to the 
kind of knowledge generation epitomised by earlier digital narrative works, such as 
ROALD (Yazdani, 1982, 1983) and UNIVERSE (Michael Lebowitz ,1985). 
 
Summary 
The research I have undertaken in forming this review suggests that the notions of 
agency (particularly in relation to reading) propounded by post-structuralist and 
hypertext theories have been rigidly entrenched in narrow subject-object binaries 
and paradigms of cause and effect.  It appears that, in particular, feminist theories of 
embodiment, agential realism and situated epistemology offer a viable and pragmatic 
alternative to historically entrenched approaches to reading and writing and 
interactive systems. Such traditional notions (even in the guise of radical theory) 
have been predicated on fixed notions of cause and effect which Suchman describes 
in (2005) as an  ‘enlightenment, humanist preoccupation with the individual actor 
living in a world of separate things’ (Suchman 2005: 3). This preoccupation with the 
singular and fixed subject has not accommodated the relationality and situatedness of 
agency or, in Suchman’s terms ‘the always relational character of our capacities for 
action; the constructed nature of subjects and objects, resemblances and differences; 
and the corporeal grounds of knowing and action’ (3). This emphasis upon 
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corporeality is central to Elizabeth Grosz (1994) and arguably offers a radical and 
viable alternative to Cartesian mind/body dualisms.   
 
 Within my own practice a central aim has been to construct a system that 
incorporates relational conceptions of agency and knowledge production. The South 
system attempts to interrogate the problematic dualisms enshrined in Western 
culture, such as those of mind and body, the subject and the object, the rational and 
the irrational. The system as such may be described as reflexive, situated and 
embodied. At the same time I take on board warnings from hypertext history and 
from writers such as Miwon Kwon, in particular the realisation that negotiating one’s 
own subjectivity and authorship (without resorting to hermetic solipsism) is a 
complex and paradoxical undertaking. From the artist’s book tradition I embrace a 
continuum of concern with the materiality and specificity of my mediums, I also draw 
upon the social engagement of book artists such as Janet Zweig (1989) and Joan 
Lyons (1989) whose work is committed to engaging with books, writers and readers 
as agents of change. The final section of this review will look in detail at the technical 
context of these methodological commitments, providing a comprehensive insight 
into the development of ‘intelligent’ narrative systems, software agents and 
technologies of personality assessment. 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Above, a screen shot from the South evaluation software. The software uses web scraping 
to obtain a ‘real time’ evaluation of situating data, such as the weather at the time of interaction. 
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2.4: Technical review 
2.4: Technical review.  1 
 
Introduction 
 
 The purpose of this technical section of the literature review is to contextualise  my 
technical references, explaining the links between my practice and my theoretical 
research and indicating the major issues that have arisen through that research. It 
will summarise what I have accepted and rejected from the technical material and 
how it relates to the theoretical and pragmatic aspects of the South project.   
 
 The materials I have reviewed in this section have much in common with the 
theoretical texts discussed so far. A major critical work that bridges both my 
practice and its theoretical contexts is Hubert L .Dreyfus’s, What Computers Still Can’t 
Do, A Critique of Artificial Reason (1972). Despite the fact that this book was written 
nearly forty years ago (its introduction has been updated a number of times) this is 
still a core critical text. Dreyfus presents a critique of computational models of mind 
that dominated early AI research (and arguably still have currency within some 
spheres), he is also critical of context-free, disembodied models of intelligence. 
Dreyfus’s standpoint is shared by, among others Rodney Brooks (2002) and Lucy 
Suchman (1987, 2007). The works of Lucy Suchman are also cited throughout this 
thesis and have been cited extensively in the first section of this review. Plans and 
Situated Actions: The Problem of Human-machine Communication (1987), like Dreyfus’s 
What Computers Still Can’t Do is a coherent, convincing and invaluable critique of 
rigidly fixed rule-based systems. Suchman also emphasises the dynamic interplay of 
context, situation and the wider social agencies at play in human-computer 
interactions. 
 
 A book which has had less direct influence on my work but is nevertheless an 
important background reference is Computers and Writing (Holt et al, 1989). This  
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book is in some ways similar in purpose and structure to Narrative Intelligence 
(Sengers, Mateas: 2003), but it is concerned overwhelmingly with matters of 
technical construction and offers no substantial critical content.  Despite that, the 
book does provide a solid grounding in the first computational narrative systems, 
which I have briefly outlined in the review where they are closest to my own goals (I 
have omitted systems that are interested in language analysis alone or systems 
constructed for aiding factual writing and report analysis). The work of Schank and 
Ableson in understanding narrative structures is still of immense significance within 
the history of artificial intelligence and writing. Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: 
an Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures (Schank and Ableson, 1977) has been a 
useful reference. My interest in this work is in taking its valuable insights into 
narrative structures and causal dependencies and incorporating them into more 
recent ideas around agency and intra-action.  The other books I have reviewed here 
have provided both pragmatic and theoretical support in relation to the development 
of my thesis. This part of the review endeavours to explain that contribution and to 
situate my own work within a technical context.  
 
 At a glance the key names and projects in the earlier fields of computational 
narrative which have had most bearing on my own research are as follows: Schank 
and Ableson (1977), J.R. Meehan, inventor of TALESPIN (1981) and AESOP-FABLE 
GENERATOR, Natalie Dehn, creator of AUTHOR (ongoing?), Michael Lebowitz, 
UNIVERSE (1985), Colby and de Beaugrande, STORY-TELLING RULES (1976), Klein 
(1973, 1975), Rumelhart (198O), Propp (1968), Dreizin et al (1978) and Yazdani, 
creator of ROALD (1982, 1983). Sengers and Mateas also highlight many of these 
names as representing key historical figures and projects (Sengers, Mateas 2003). I 
would also like to mention a pre-digital work that has structural and theoretical 
significance to my thesis and practice. The I Ching, or Book of Changes, (edited by 
Confucius, 551-479 B.C.) is a divination system that treats events as processual and 
contingent. The mathematical structure of the I Ching (based on a biased random 
number generating system) influenced Gottfried Liebniz in the development of the 
binary numeral system. Its emphasis upon the mutable and relational nature of events 
pinpoints the Book of Changes as a significant reference for this thesis. The Book of  
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Changes also establishes a complex balance between authorship and interpretation 
that generates a uniquely situated new narrative.   
 
 This review has highlighted the centrality of notions of authorship in both my 
theoretical research and practice. These issues are also central to the development 
of many computational narrative systems, though they are not always overtly framed 
as such. In relation to ROALD and other similar projects, Masoud Yazdani wrote: 
 
What these systems have in common is a disregard for the 
notion of "authorship". They aim to build an environment 
(instead of an algorithm) for creativity where new artifacts 
are created in a partnership between the Author and 
Reader (or User).  
(Article undated, see Yazdani, M, A New Theory of 
Authorship). 
 
Though Yazdani does pinpoint the primacy of the environment in generating 
intelligence, rather than a model of mind, this statement is very much in keeping with 
George Landow’s and David J Bolter’s conflation of hypertext systems with post-
modern theory, (see section three of this review) particularly Roland Barthes’ notion 
of the Death of The Author. Exploring the value or relevance of these ideas is one of 
the central themes of this thesis. My hope is that my research into subjectivity and 
epistemology makes an overt connection between these ideas, relating the idea that 
Death of the Subject discourse is entangled with Death of the Author discourse and that 
these ideas in turn have their routes in the so called crisis of confidence. In computing 
this crisis may be translated into a crisis of representation. In relation to my own work 
I would express this crisis in the following questions: 
 
• How do we generate knowledge?  
• How, (if we chose to), do we represent knowledge? 
• Who and perhaps, what, is doing the knowing?  
• How self-contained and stable is that knowledge and that knower?  
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14a 1Figure 14a PhD Journal entries 25th March and April 6th 2008, E. Dare. 
Tuesday 25th of March 2008 
Continuing with the Repertory Grid theme, with images anchored to my own highly 
contrived, totally scrambled yet more or less unitary sense of self, a self that is 
nevertheless subject to the mysterious effects of Hitchcock films and ‘documentary’ 
photography, ancient layers of psycho-ocular fluence... Despite reservations about 
the methodology (see March 10th 2008) in particular the cultural specificity and 
dualisms inherent in its seemingly positivist persepctive blah blah, I’m thinking of 
ways to destabilize the materialist Cartesianism of the Repertory Grid, to allow for 
the ‘errors’ that the empiricist approach appears to dismiss, to restore the 
intelligibility of parapraxes, repressed motive, socio-historical forces. At the same 
time its hard to believe that Georges Polti’s and Vladimir Propp’s crypto-rationalist 
archetypes are really so universal anyway, and even more difficult to verify or 
repudiate, as one would have to read or listen to every story ever told, an exercise 
that would dwarf the adventures promulgated upon the reader by Italo Calvino in ‘If 
on a Winter’s Night a Traveler’. The autoblog (see 16th March 2008) is a start of 
course, hooked up a with a dozen or so promiscuous web bots it might eventually 
form a narrative singularity, a black hole of tales, the ultimate collapsing publishing 
house. 
Sunday 6th April 2008 
Snow hooray! Fitted a google image finding mechanism today (see top of page) , it 
takes words from this journal and then looks on the web for images to match them, 
I want to incorporate news feeds and other dynamically changing data into my 
writing system, to construct a distributed epistemology, a kind of standpoint 
software that evolves in response to ever changing events... this isnt emergence for 
the sake of emergence but an attempt to encompass a non unitary subjectivity in the 
generation of my own writing, the distribution of my own ‘creative’ agency, a type of 
self distribution, the open sourcing of my own subjectivity.  
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How rational and individual can we presume this knower and this knowledge to be?     
 
   Many contemporary computational narrative works are based on constructionist 
ideas of the rational subject, who is framed as a scientist/user. These ideas are 
central to evaluative techniques such as George Kelly’s repertory grid (or personal 
construct) system, also discussed in this thesis. As section one of this review shows, 
these ideas have been coherently criticised by epistemologists such as Henriques and 
Hollway (see Henriques et al, 1984) as reinforcing unsupportable assumptions of 
neutrality and epistemological autonomy. These apparently irreconcilable standpoints 
represent key tensions in this thesis, and, I would argue in many contemporary 
computational works concerned with narrative generation. All of the works 
mentioned in this section of the review touch upon these issues as technical 
challenges, but as I indicate, do not always make overt connections with wider issues 
of representation and epistemological discourse. 
 
 Computers and Writing was written in 1989 in order to provide an overview of early 
attempts to use ‘new’ technology for writing applications. The book states in its 
introduction that the field of computational writing has found it difficult to establish a 
didactic focus due to the very breadth of its interdisciplinary concerns. Indeed the 
book represented an attempt to establish such a nationwide focal point and is 
connected to the first UK conference on Computers and Writing, this was part of the 
Communication and Information Research Group which, in 1988, belonged to what 
was then called Sheffield City Polytechnic. Many of the projects mentioned in the 
book, such as RUSKIN and WRITER’S ASSISTANT were concerned with creating 
technology to help people improve their writing skills. Though such projects had 
different end goals from my own project, they all asked key questions such as ‘What 
is writing?’ and ‘How do we find out about it and model it accurately?’ (Holt, 
Williams, 1989:  x).  With the advantage of hindsight I would observe that the book, 
particularly in its introduction, has an enthusiasm and hope for hypertext technology 
symptomatic of its time, and what we might perceive today as a naïve belief in the 
ever-improving possibilities of broader computational technologies. As I have 
suggested in the introduction to this section, it is in this sense uncritically  
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deterministic. My review of this book will focus on the projects and questions that 
are most relevant to my own research. TALE-SPIN and ROALD were two programs 
that attempted to generate stories. TALE-SPIN was created by J. R. Meehan (1981) 
and put into practice some of the ideas developed by Schank and Abelson 
throughout the 1970s. These ideas return to a model of human cognitive behaviour.   
 
 Masoud Yazdani describes five hypothetical processes that might be involved in a 
computational story generating system, these are: ‘plot-maker, world-maker, 
simulator, narrator and text generator’ (Holt, Williams 1989: 126). This model, 
Yazdani writes, ‘simulates purposeful behaviour of characters as in TALE-SPIN, as 
well as interactions between the writer and the reader’ (126). Yazdani also discusses 
the use of templates in generating stories, a notion explored by Roger Schank 
(1977).  A template-based system is clearly limited (as all a priori structures are), but 
it is also a reflection of practices upheld by some analogue writers, who might also 
‘produce a new story by varying a known story’ (Holt, Williams 1989: 126). The 
ability to reuse story structures, points, according to Yazdani, to the cognitive 
processes involved in comprehending stories. Yazdani assumes an essentially 
constructionist outlook in interpreting storytelling processes:  
 
if people’s memories are filled with detailed but 
nevertheless, flexible representations of past events and 
stories there is no reason to doubt that they would use 
some of these as the bases for generating new ones. 
(127). 
 
 But is this outlook something we can take for granted? Part one of this review raises 
some of the points of tension implicit in these assumptions. Yazdani, like Holt, sees 
previous attempts to model story writing as too little engaged with the writing 
process, he cites Rumelhart’s exhaustive story grammars featured in ‘Notes on a 
Schema for Stories’ (Rumelhart, 1975), which might, Yazdani  suggests, be reversed 
‘from comprehension to generation’ (Holt, Williams 1989: 127). Yazdani mentions a 
program created by S. Klein that identified such story writing structures in fairy tales 
and used them as a basis for computational reconstructions. Apparently this program  
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was able to generate ‘2100 word murder mysteries in less than 19 seconds’ (128), 
but the process also involved rigidly prefabricated sequences. According to 
Rumelhart such structures are the basis for all human story-telling which can be 
abbreviated into the following six plots:  
 
The Promethean striving for omnipotence. 
Individual against society. 
Polygonal patterns of libidinal relations. 
War of the sexes. 
Love triumphant or defeated. 
The conquest of the flesh.  
(128). 
 
Van Dijk, Kintsch and Propp (1968) have also attempted to identify and classify story 
grammars to establish a structural ‘relationship between these elements’ (129). This 
represents a further simplification of the 36 ‘dramatic situations’ identified by Goethe 
(among others) in the eighteenth century. The Russian formalists proposed detailed 
‘Rules of Expressiveness’. I would concur with Aarseth, however, in asking how 
relevant such models are to new forms of narrative generation. Is it useful to make a 
wholesale superimposition from the tradition of Aristotelian aesthetics to 
computational systems? As section two of this review states, this is one of the 
central questions of Aarseth’s Cybertexts, it is also significantly explored in Perron et 
al (2003). 
 
  Meehan’s TALE-SPIN approaches stories as essentially about the theme of problem 
solving, in symbiosis with a reader, the program generates a story about a problem 
and how it gets solved, the reader chooses ‘the problem which the story is all about, 
out of a set of only four problems’ (Holt, Williams 1989: 132). This approach has 
some similarities with my own initial model for a story-telling system, in which users 
could choose from a range of initialising events. But I do not see this as a particularly 
novel form of ‘interactivity’, a far more interesting approach for my own purposes is 
to allow situating and relational phenomena to define what theme will be generated.  
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  Meehan’s successor to TALE-SPIN, the AESOP-FABLE GENERATOR deployed a 
top-down approach, using template-filling to create a story structure such as ‘Never 
trust flatterers’ (133). Readers were asked to fill in certain aspects of the story such 
as who the characters were. Masoud Yazdani identifies this approach as a pragmatic 
synthesis of two models that have varying degrees of creative autonomy. Yazdani 
notes that the program is incapable of making accurate assessments of its own work 
and frequently eliminates stories that it perceives as ‘wrong’, when in fact they are 
more interesting variations on Aesop’s fables. More complex variations on story 
telling rules might allow for the evolution of stories containing multiple characters, 
such a program would need to have a monitor, an agent that manipulates characters 
and their problems. De Beaugrande and Colby have identified plausible ‘STORY-
TELLING RULES’ in pursuit of this goal25.  
 
Many of the questions which De Beaugrande and Colby have left unanswered, such 
as why choose one character over another, and, how one constructs a micro world, 
were subsequently addressed by Lebowitz and Natalie Dehn in their respective 
programs UNIVERSE and AUTHOR. Natalie Dehn attempted to incorporate the 
author’s intentions into her program AUTHOR, (an ongoing work). Dehn writes ‘a 
large part of the work of making up a story is the successive reformation of the 
author’s goals’ (Holt, Williams 1989: 136). Natalie Dehn uses a recursive method to 
loop through narrative goals, reformulating ‘previously remembered stories’ (136) 
and ‘finding better narrative goals to pursue’ (136). Yazdani describes this as a 
‘reverse fashion of remembering’ (136.). 
 
The presence or absence of the author in narrative generation systems appears to 
be a problematic issue. Without falling into the trap of reading off between domains, I 
would pinpoint complex similarities between the role of the author in computational  
                                                 
25 Meehan, Colby and de Beaugrande were working on the development of systems driven by a model 
of writing that was essentially about characters solving problems and taking goal-directed actions, 
ROALD on the other hand represented an attempt to create a story-generating system that had its 
visual counterpart in Harold Cohen’s AARON drawing program. Unlike the other programs 
mentioned in this chapter ROALD had both goal-driven aspects – its characters for example, and a 
separate monitoring module to assess the plans of those characters. Events were separated from the 
plot and loosely followed Aristotelian notions of a narrative arch while also having an awareness of 
previously constructed stories.  
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narrative systems and the role of the author or artist in site-specific works and in 
post-modern discourses around reading. In relation to site-specific art these issues 
have been clearly defined by Miwon Kwon in her essay One Place After Another: Notes 
on Site Specificity (Kwon, 2000). These issues meet head-on in my own work, which 
deals with site-specificity and subject specificity in the context of a computational 
narrative system. In a sense Lebowitz’s UNIVERSE uses site and subject-specific 
structures established by Schank and Abelson to generate ‘personal frame 
information for each character consisting of name, stereotypes, trait modifications, 
goals, interpersonal relationships, marriages and lists of events’ (Holt, Williams 1989: 
137) in the characters’ past history. These personality stereotypes not only 
incorporate the numerical scales introduced in TALE-SPIN but also ‘includes 
references to a set of built-in schema for professions…. social background… 
race….religion’ (137). But it is the author who ultimately establishes the characters 
chosen in this hypothetical system. This is a system that has been deployed and 
proposed elsewhere, as Yazdani points out, he has proposed such a system himself 
(this system is also used by Natalie Dehn).   
 
 Within his own process-based model Yazdani differentiates and categorises the 
three systems, AESOP-FABLE GENERATOR, UNIVERSE and AUTHOR as 
simulator, plot-maker and world-maker (137). The notion of situtatedness deployed 
by these systems is echoed by d’Inverno and Luck, (2004) and in d’Inverno, Luck, 
Ashri, (2004) in their writing about agents. A particularly potent conception of 
agents is as ‘situated and embodied problem solvers that are capable of functioning 
effectively and efficiently in complex environments’ (d’Inverno, Luck 2004: 3). The 
authors identify several definitions that illustrate the confusion and ambiguity 
surrounding the notion of agents and agency in computational terms: 
 
a weak notion of agency is identified that involves autonomy 
or the ability to function without intervention, social ability 
by which agents interact with other agents, reactivity 
allowing agents to perceive and respond to a changing 
environment, and pro-activeness through which agents 
behave in a goal directed fashion. To some extent, these 
characteristics are broadly accepted by many as 
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representative of the key qualities that can be used to access 
‘agentness’. 
(4). 
 
A stronger notion of agency incorporates human conceptions such as ‘belief, desire, 
intention, knowledge and so on ‘(4). In addition such agents would have temporal 
continuity, effective communication abilities that might constitute a type of 
personality, flexibility (in relation to the needs of users) and mobility across different 
systems. Autonomy may be further defined as goal-directedness, the ability to self-
start, facilitated by sensitivity to their environment and the ability to choose when 
action is required. More complex qualities include ‘veracity, benevolence and 
rationality’ (4). My own interpretation of so called deliberative agents, or agents with 
beliefs, desires and intentions are central to the system I have developed. Within the 
South system multiple agents undertake the following tasks: 
 
• Collect data from a range of web sources and analyse it. 
• Generate weightings from situating data. 
• Analyse and interpret the behaviour of readers. 
• Maintain consistency of character behaviours. 
• Analyse and interpret CCTV images and generate narratives as a result of 
that interpretation. 
• Control the extent and range of vocabularies according to the height of the 
tide at London Bridge. 
 
 Multi-agent systems, defined as systems that contain ‘a collection of two or more 
agents’ (42), allow agents to generate a collective functionality. Such distributed 
agency is inherently more complex.  d’Inverno and  Luck define a formal framework 
for developing agents, in addition to describing how agents might make plans, 
interact and take action; the book explains agent notations such as the language Z, 
that are used to specify, develop and refine agent-based software systems. The 
authors also state that each researcher who refers to an autonomous agent should 
define their own meaning for the term (d’Inverno, Luck 2004: 3). I am reassured by 
the entreaty to define my own notion of an autonomous agent, and indeed, perhaps 
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to take a further step in providing my own interpretations of autonomy and 
alternative paradigms to those of cause and effect. My own agents do not use an 
agent language, but they can communicate the reasons for their behaviour. Jacques 
Ferber (1999) provides a useful chapter on communication, divided into three sub 
chapters entitled Aspects of Communication, Speech Acts and Conversations. The book 
points out that communication is a core ability for an effective agent, particularly in 
relation to its interactions and social organisation. Without the ability to 
communicate the agent is ‘closed into its perception-deliberation-action loop’ 
(Ferber 1989: 307). Ferber is keen to point out that communicated messages do not 
have an intrinsic meaning but are entirely situated: ‘only the context is able to shed 
any light on the significance of modes of interaction’ (310). 
 
 In pursuit of a system that can situate and differentiate subjects I have also 
undertaken research into statistical and psychometric processes. Segaran in (2007) 
offers a pragmatic exploration of statistical algorithms, exemplifying ways in which 
situating data can be analysed through orthodox statistical systems or more complex 
biological models, such as genetic programming for machine learning and the analysis 
of predominantly Internet-based data. Segaran also covers recommendation 
algorithms such as k-nearest neighbours (kNN) in which new data is compared to a 
pre-existing model and averaged to predict a new value, or recommendation. ‘The k 
in k-nearest neighbours refers to how many of the top matches you use for 
averaging. For example, if you took three matches and averaged them, this would be 
kNN with k=3’ (Segaran 2007: 293). Such deductions are made using distance 
metrics such as Pearson correlation, Tanimoto score and Euclidean distance. 
Straightforward distance metrics offer practical solutions to implementing some 
aspects of my own analytic processes. These may be distinct from or embedded into 
a multi-agent system. Long-term strategies might evolve from the storage and 
modification of successful models. 
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Figure 15 Above, an algorithm from the web-Gather program in the South software. The code pre-
processes a file of raw data obtained from the web via string manipulation. It extrapolates a ‘real-time’ 
temperature for the moment of interaction. 
 
 
 As well as analysing news, weather data and CCTV images, the South system also 
requires readers to engage with psychometric processes. Robert Edenborough 
(1994) presents a broad (and largely uncritical) introduction to the subject of 
psychometric testing that also provides a short historical overview of the area. This 
overview reinforces my perception of psychometric testing as an extension of other 
surveillant systems; this is explicitly suggested within the South system through the 
use of CCTV images and other control structures. Edenborough also provides 
practical information about the range, context, practice and interpretation of 
psychometric tests.  Edenborough discusses different models for personality testing, 
from the Gordon Personal Profile that defines types of intra-human interactions, or 
tests predicated on other psychological models of personality such as the Myers 
Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), a Jungian model of personality types. The Edwards 
Preference Schedule defines fifteen ‘needs’ that a person may be dominated by, such as 
a need for affirmation or a need for autonomy.  All of the models can be reduced, 
(according to this book), to five essential dimensions of personality: extroversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and intellect (Edenborough 1994: 38). 
Other tests may have 31, 15 or 16 essential scales. Edenborough also writes about 
personal construct methods. This process facilitates an individually-focused form of 
assessment based on a technique known as a ‘repertory grid’ testing, in which 
individuals progressively narrow their range of choices, such as choosing from lists of  
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people. Different categories of groupings are deduced in batches of three. The 
process goes through numerous iterations until ‘all combinations are exhausted or 
no more types of combinations emerge’ (148). The subject then ranks these 
constructs in terms of different definitions such as ‘effectiveness’ or ‘importance’.    
 
 As the previous sections to this review indicate, these methodologies are not free 
from critical interpretation, not least of all by Henriques et al in (1984). The 
repertory grid process described by Edenborough has been used extensively, and I 
might add, critically within the South project.  It is a process, states Edenborough, 
that is more effective than asking subjects ‘simply to describe their perceptions of 
the world around them’ (Edenborough 1994: 149), though Edenborough does not 
ask what is lost in contracting the process of subjective assessment to such a 
reductionist schema. Edenborough suggests the possibility of making comparisons 
across repertory grid outputs from a range of subjects, as a means for exploring 
individual as well as group value systems26. The initial section of the South book 
consists of extensive repertory grid processes, but they are formulated as fiction-
generating exercises and as invitations for readers to perform, invent or exaggerate 
their subjectivity. 
 
Conclusion 
This part of the review has sought to situate, analyse and reflect upon the key issues 
and figures relating to the technical aspects of my work. It has also attempted to 
explain the choices I have made in undertaking my research and to demonstrate how 
they relate to my practice, providing a rationale for my specific lines of technical 
enquiry. This review as a whole represents a critically evaluative appraisal of the 
materials I have drawn upon; it has attempted to clarify how my work fits into the 
larger context of digital literary systems, artist’s books and interactive programs, as 
well as to theoretical questions relating to epistemology and agency. It has also 
shown how the research I have made into both subjectivity and intelligent narrative 
systems highlights the need for methods that accommodate situated and transparent 
structures. My aim has been to demonstrate that there is a significant lack of work 
                                                 
26
 Edenborough cites Bannister and Mair 1968. 
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that has pursued these goals and that there is a need to develop works that 
accommodate more challenging notions of subject-object boundaries and by 
extension human-computer interactions. I conclude that my own software should be 
predicated upon an open and comprehensible system of situated knowledge that 
includes an account of the authors’ (i.e. my own) position within that system. Such a 
system also presents the opportunity to contest assumptions about narrative 
structures. This review has sought to demonstrate that a slavish adherence to 
conventional notions of narrative form has not necessarily yielded any significant 
creative breakthroughs within the field of computational writing. My aim has not 
been to produce or discover a definitive solution to these problems (this would be 
at odds with my own methodology), but to develop an arena for creative 
engagement with computers, artist’s books and the generation of electronic 
literature.  
 
 In keeping with the diverse, non-singular readings emanating from South and its 
agents, my practice is underscored by a methodological breadth, and by a degree of 
ethical commitment to a multiplicity of perspective and practice. The next chapter 
will explain in detail the methodological scope that has supported South, establishing 
my theoretical frameworks and commitments while outlining the specific ways in 
which a non-passive and critical methodology has influenced the form of this project, 
both in its developmental processes and final outcomes (see page 122). The chapter 
will also show how I have engaged with a range of readers, or reader-researchers, 
pursuing an iterative process of evaluation and development, observing and 
interviewing real readers to gain an insight into the strengths and failings of the South 
system in order to establish a meaningful relationship between readers and 
electronic forms of narrative, deploying contemporary, networked and situated 
computation optimally, critically and creatively. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology. 
Hacking South: a society of software explorers. 
Chapter 3: Methodology 1 
 
 
Figure 16 Figure 16 Kavad for My Methodology, acrylic and varnish on papier-mâché with assorted 
objects. The kavad I have made is a conceptual tool for refining, defining and articulating my 
methodology. E. Dare, 2009. 
 
 
I’m grappling with this issue of theory not leading practice. 
I’m finding it difficult to grasp, the relationship seems 
entangled and I’m not quite sure what the rules are and why 
they exist, I suppose they are there to uphold the rationale 
for allowing practice to count as research, rather than an 
illustration of theories - the essential mistake of early claims 
around hypertext fiction. 
(Eleanor Dare, research journal, 18/12/08) 
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In any practice-based PhD the researcher is required to generate new knowledge.  In 
the hybrid zone between arts and computational technology there are meaningful 
differences between arts-based and scientific research. Recognising and 
accommodating these differences, as well as the significant points of convergence has 
been one of the central challenges for my PhD research project. As Graeme Sullivan 
states (2005), there is a need for artist researchers to generate ‘different paradigms 
of theorizing’ (Sullivan, 2005:  xix). 
 
There have been no ready-made recipes or off the shelf methodologies available to 
me. I have largely, therefore, had to invent my own strategies and systems in 
conducting my research. As a consequence, this chapter will outline the logic of my 
strategies, how I have designed and organised my work.  Following Mason (2006) the 
‘significance, effectiveness and meaning’ of my methodology and practices are 
reflected in my journals, field notes, and evaluations.  These documents provide the 
means by which I record a ‘feel’ for the work I have undertaken while also providing 
data for analysis. They are flexible tools which help in the formulation and 
clarification of vital issues which might otherwise become lost. They enable a 
reflexive and temporally situated dialogue (both with the self and others) that 
unfolds over time. The research journal records the details of the process of 
problem formulation and the derivation of a research methodology and orderly 
reflection on the methods and techniques at the centre of my practice-based 
research. The quote from my research journal at the beginning of this chapter 
emphasises its importance in the shaping and orderly evaluation of my practice. 
 
South is an arts project, or more specifically an arts and computationally based work. 
This brings its own particular qualities and challenges, such as how to represent non-
verbal knowledge and how to evaluate it27. This chapter engages with the strategies I 
have formulated in response to these challenges while also addressing the following 
questions: 
 
                                                 
27
 Jennifer Mason (2006) and Paul Carter (2004) have been valuable references in formulating my own 
arts-based methodology. 
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 
16a 1Figure 16a PhD Journal entry, March 4th 2008, E. Dare. Available at 
http://www.dareinteractive.com/blog2.html, accessed 07/04/2011. The research journal records 
the details of the process of problem formulation and the derivation of a research methodology and 
orderly reflection on the methods and techniques at the centre of my practice-based research. 
 
Tuesday 4th March 2008  
The ‘genetic’ algorithm I am working on is at least spitting out partially coherent 
sentences, which is quite an improvement on my normal writing style. It isn’t going 
to be the hub of a text generation system though, it’s operating on a sub-symbolic 
level, more suited to a tarot reading or the I Ching. The sentences are intriguing and 
meaningful to me, but other people might not agree. The text breeder is also 
recycling textual detritus - spam and blogs, feeding them into the software to get 
more ergodic results. 
This month I’ve been reworking the PhD question, it seemed rather unsatisfying and 
lumpy throughout the first term. Now the question has got some solidity it can act 
like an anchor to stop the ship of ideas from capsizing due to overload. A more 
stolid question brings more detail and form to the literature review. The plan is to 
keep track of ideas, to observe how the work is ‘progressing’, ideas arrive which 
seem really useful but a couple of hours later they are often forgotten. I’ve been 
keeping a non-linear sort of journal, spread out across a network of tatty notebooks. 
None of it would make any sense to anyone else; I like to think of this as a strategy 
of fracture, a way of preserving immanence in my work. (only joking) There is no 
construction of consistency in this approach. 
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What is the methodology deployed in this PhD? 
• What are the main issues that this methodology addresses? 
• What are the main methodological issues in my field? 
• What research tools have I constructed in undertaking my research? 
 
 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: 
 
Section one provides an overview of my methodological approach and the 
philosophical assumptions underpinning my research. The section will also introduce 
my kavad, or mobile-methodology-box, a conceptual tool used by me as an alternative 
means for documenting my research methodologies using verbal and non-verbal 
forms, and alternative logic forms to those more commonly found in computational 
and scientific research practices. The kavad aids me in recounting a pragmatic and 
philosophical description of my PhD research, including a rationale for the unusually 
intense demands that the South project places upon its readers. 
 
 
Section 2 will describe the conceptual significance of the South project’s 
methodology, including specific techniques and interactions. The section will 
evidence some of the difficulties inherent in imposing notions such as assessment and 
user evaluation in relation to an arts project, it will show how South has utilised but 
also destabilised these concepts in the service of multiple interpretation, provocation 
and play.   
 
 
 
3.1 Outlining the field: ontological and epistemic foundations for the South 
project 
3.1 Outlining the field 1 
 
 A ‘standard’ methodology would outline its ontological and epistemic foundations 
before proceeding to describe specific practices and a rationale for any analytical 
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deductions resulting from them.  My research design adheres to aspects of such a 
schema, in that my core questions are clearly formulated. This design is supported by 
a statement of core issues relating to the field of electronic literature, human-
computer-interaction and the broader domain of arts computing. It is further 
underpinned by a set of epistemic interests.  Where this schema departs from an 
orthodox strategy is in its arts-based provenance28.  As an artist with a background 
in visual and sonic arts my epistemic interests represent a commitment to broader 
ways of knowing in all their multiplicity. This includes challenging GOFAI (Good, Old 
Fashioned AI) and positivist science in wider terms, such as propositional logic and 
the a priori knowledge bases of rigidly rule-based, disembodied systems.  I 
acknowledge the importance of recognising that ontological foundations are fluid, 
contextual and consciously subjective. The following section will outline a brief 
ontology for South, or the putative essence and nature of my PhD practice. 
 
South’s ontology  
 
 
Figure 17 Below, ontological mapping for South, or the putative essence and nature of issues 
relating to this PhD: 
 
The world cannot be represented through propositional logic alone. 
 
Our knowledge of and experience of the world is embodied and includes 
knowledge that evades formal representation, such as tacit knowledge. 
 
Intra-activity is posited as a relational, temporal and entangled locus of 
agency, offering a dynamic alternative to interactivity.  
                                                 
28 In explaining some of the essential features of arts-based research Graeme Sullivan, (2005) states: 
 
What distinguishes arts-based research is the multiplicity of ways of encountering 
and representing experience, and the deployment of forms of expression that can 
effectively communicate these phenomena. This intersubjectivity and interactivity 
are seen as agents in research that are assets rather than liabilities. (Sullivan, 2005: 
60) 
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Intra-activity is environmentally and subjectively situated. 
 
Intra-activity is a viable alternative to the rigidly rule-based systems, or a 
priori knowledge bases embedded in GOFAI. 
 
The difference between subjects and objects (including computers and 
humans) is contingent, emergent and unfixed. 
 
Accounting for oneself in ones own epistemology is an ethical, and in  
Haraway’s terms, a more rigorous scientific practice. 
 
 
 
 In conceptualising an ontology for the South project, it should be explicitly stated 
that such a reduction (or ontology) is clearly one of many possible ontological 
perspectives that could be theorised in this field. The value of forming an ontology 
has aided me in conceiving of a workable position from which to proceed with my 
research while overtly recognising that I have imposed an ontological perspective 
upon it, rather than coming at the subject with an idealised conception of my own 
neutrality. Identifying my ontological base has also informed the particular 
methodological tools I have deployed and in some cases originated. The diagram 
above is not merely a list of subjects relating to my PhD. Each statement represents 
a complex epistemic interest and, more importantly, a non-neutral position, or a set 
of well-researched value judgements. I have endeavoured to match my epistemic 
interests to appropriate and philosophically coherent research methods. I have 
opened the system up to more fluid processes of knowledge generation, and 
conceived of a system that invites its readers to hack into it. The ambivalent notion 
of ‘hacking’ into South will be explained in more detail in section two of this chapter 
and in chapter four, the South book chapter.   
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The data I have generated during this PhD has been analysed in a way that is 
consistent with its epistemological interests, especially in pursuing a reflexive and 
contextualised reading while acknowledging the problems that are inherent in any 
system of knowing, in particular the potentially circular systems inherent in the 
notion of reflexivity and in self-regulating digital systems. Computers, unlike 
traditional book forms, can dynamically change their content, what is more, by 
creating learning algorithms, computational fiction systems can potentially observe 
their readers and adapt their content to suit them and to accommodate external 
factors, for example significant economic, meteorological or political activities.  In 
suggesting that computers can understand or learn from human subjects, it is 
important to acknowledge the medium specificity of digital systems and 
epistemologies. In stating that computers might be able to understand human beings I 
am not implying an understanding that is symmetrical to inter-subjective knowledge. 
By asserting the asymmetries at play in HCI, the question of subjectivity is also raised 
-  what do I mean by a subject, how stable is this entity and how can subjectivity be 
represented or stored within a computational system?  My thesis question also 
suggests, via the word intra-active, a situated and dynamic form of inter (or intra) 
action that unfolds between or rather within the moment of connection between a 
range of actors, or agents, both human and non-human.  
  
Once I had established a well-mapped foundation of ontological and epistemic 
interests, focused on a specific set of questions, I was in a reasonable position to 
proceed with my research. The next section shows how my research design relates 
to these questions and will also introduce the kavad – or mobile methodology box, 
as a means of interrogating my overarching research design and the way it relates to 
my methods and epistemology, before focusing upon specific research techniques 
and tools in section 2. 
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Figure 18 Above, the kavad. The long sheet of paper on the right is a longitudinal and 
quantitative mapping of my mood over several months. The data was fed into a software 
program called Subject Oriented Software. 
 
 
Documenting methodologies: introducing the Kavad, or mobile-
methodology-box 
 
‘It might act as a portal/filter to the streams of information 
coming in’ 
(Response from informant number 14 to a survey on the 
meaning of the South egg, 2009) 
 
My methodology and its associated methods are grounded in the context of my 
research questions.  Mason (2006) recommends that ‘all qualitative research should 
be constructed around an intellectual puzzle of some kind, and should attempt to  
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produce some kind of explanation of that puzzle or an argument’ (Mason, 2006: 18). 
In light of Mason’s characterisation of research as a puzzle-solving activity, my 
research has been, according to her criteria, variously developmental, mechanical, 
comparative and Causal/predictive. (18)  
 
Background to the Kavad: an unfolding box of puzzles 
 
 The kavad, as used in my research, is an experimental and conceptual form for 
documenting my PhD methodology via verbal and non-verbal means. It addresses my 
need to invent alternative research paradigms in order to more coherently match 
my specific epistemic interests, and commitments, to bespoke methodological tools 
and practices. I have used the kavad heuristically29 to aid my understanding of my 
own research methodologies and their interrelationship to specific practices and 
conceptual issues.  
 
 My interest in the kavad form came from research into the development of story-
telling technology. The kavad, God-box, itinerant shrine or mobile temple, is an ancient 
Indian (and broader Asian) mobile story-telling device. I have researched examples of 
kavads and kavad-like forms from India (Rajasthan) Bhutan and Tibet. Kavads are 
carried by itinerant story-tellers, or bhopas, (and by Monks in certain circumstances 
and locations) and are used as aids to religiously themed storytelling; the storytelling 
may involve audience participation, singing and dancing as well as talking. Kavad’s are 
wooden objects, about the size of a small rucksack. They are always brightly 
coloured (often predominantly in red) and furnished with multiple hinged doors that 
open outwards to reveal myriad layers of painted narratives. According to 
Macdonald (2000) kavads often contain slots to receive payment. There is also often 
a strict procedure for opening the Kavad doors and detailed symbolic codification of 
the colours used in the designs (such as red for the body and yellow for ornament). 
Behind the last, inner set of doors, there is traditionally a three-dimensional figure of 
a deity, as such the traditional Indian kavad is viewed as a sacred object. Macdonald  
(Macdonald, 2000: 4) links the kavad form to ancient storytelling practices that go back to 
the second century BC (BCE).
                                                 
29 In relation to the kavad the word heuristically is used to evoke an experience-based problem solving 
device. 
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Figure 19 Above, Kavads from Rajasthan. Below left, Kavad-like altar from Tibet, and right, a mobile 
Buddhist stupa from Bhutan, closed and open30. 
    
 
 
My use of the kavad form to document my methodology has been supported by the 
notion of the kavad as a technological, mobile, participatory, situated and processual 
device. With its many doors and possible interpretations, and, in the case of my own 
kavad, its many secret compartments, the kavad night be characterised as a type of 
mechanical or causal puzzle, but it is also a heuristic device that has helped me to 
understand the relationships between my thesis questions, my epistemological 
perspectives and appropriate means for generating and analysing relevant data. The 
Kavad I have made is the size of a rucksack with strong straps so that it can be 
carried on the back; it is constructed from papier maché sourced from London’s 
local newspapers and is painted in red to signify embodiment.  
 
                                                 
30
 Image credits to http://hearstmuseum.berkeley.edu/exhibitions/rajasthan/portable_shrine.html 
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The kavad I have made has puzzle-like qualities in its own right, emphasising the 
layers of processes at play in developing a research methodology and the possibility 
of contradictions and tensions existing between different methods.  The different  
categories of puzzle embedded in the kavad, relate to the puzzle-making aspects of 
my thesis research, they are as follows: 
 
Developmental 
 
A developmental research puzzle is concerned, as its name suggests, with an 
examination of how things have developed. In the case of South developmental 
research has been both theoretical and practical. I have dismantled and tested the 
code used in a number of other works, such as text adventures and hypertext 
structures in order to understand the logic and limitations of electronic literature. At 
the same time I have also researched the historical and contextual development of 
those same works. My kavad doors (of which there are four outer-doors and a 
further three inner-doors) loosely outline the direction of my developmental 
research through visual imagery. The images on the doors represent broad headings, 
enabling me to construct multiple narratives around the development of my practice, 
including relevant historical developments and the development of my own research. 
These narratives may be formal, involving examiners, supervisors and peers, or 
internal, enabling me to tell myself the story of my research in order to deconstruct 
and develop it. The illustration below shows the various doors, each illustrating 
types of knowledge. Propositional knowledge is represented by symbols from 
programming and logical mathematics while embodied knowledge is represented by 
pictures of human sense organs. Images of places such as the South Bank depict 
situated knowledge. 
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Above, kavad, acrylic and varnish on papier-mâché, E. Dare, 2009. The kavad has shoulder 
straps so it can be carried on the back like a rucksack. 
 
Mechanical 
 
In the context of my practice-based research the notion of a mechanical puzzle is 
linked in many ways to the developmental puzzle explained above. Mechanical 
puzzles are concerned with uncovering the mechanics of systems, whether 
epistemological or pragmatic, such as the computer systems mentioned in the 
previous section. Using the kavad to explore my methodologies necessitates a high 
degree of engagement with a mechanical puzzle – the kavad unfolds mechanically in  
the manner of a disassembly puzzle or the Japanese and Moroccan genre of puzzle 
boxes, while conceptually the unfoldings reveal a network of epistemological systems. 
When opening the first set of doors, curious people may discover that beneath the 
first layer of representations there are further layers of meaning that can be 
unfolded. These doors reveal some of the objects I have deployed in my research, 
including books and computers. The next layer reveals embodied tools for 
generating knowledge, while beneath that layer the curious will discover objects  
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(such as puzzles and maps) and further secret doors, some of which reveal voids, and 
others which reveal, for example, tiny keys and miniture books. 
 
 
 
Comparative 
 
A comparative puzzle involves comparing systems and epistemologies. The South 
project is a comparative puzzle par excellence, comparing computational and human 
epistemological systems, while also comparing analogue and digital books. These 
alternatives are also outlined via the kavad, which is itself an analogue form of mobile 
narrative technology in contrast to those aspects of the South system which model 
similar notions computationally. On the outer doors of the kavad there are visual 
representations of an ontology for South, these can be obscured or augmented by 
further artefacts, written texts, and non-verbal forms of data. The kavad can 
accommodate digital technology via a secret compartment for carrying mobile digital 
devices; this enables it to work discretely with capabilities such as GPS, thus 
attenuating the exaggerated polarisations that can be formed when making analytical 
comparisons. 
 
 
Causal/predictive 
 
My research takes a critical approach to the linear characterisation of many 
‘interactive’ systems or linear models of cause and effect, hence my interest in 
researching alternatives such as intra-active, multi-linear systems of meaning-making.  
Having stated that, however, my rationale in constructing the South system has been 
based on identifying causal factors in the failings of electronic literature and in 
predicting the value of creating alternative, intra-active and situated systems. The 
kavad traditionally follows a particular type of causal logic in its narrative procedures, 
my kavad can work with the same, schematised and deterministic steps, but these 
may be confounded by void or closed cavities and by objects that resist straight-
forward explanations, such as a wooden puzzle and a tiny book of cut-up  
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Shakespeare plays. The kavad can also be used to take extempore narrative pathways 
and thus to elicit multiple interpretations of my methodology. 
  
 All of the puzzles outlined above have been matched to appropriate epistemological 
or knowledge generating systems, at the same time, there is a holistic sense of the 
puzzles creating what Mason calls a ‘sensible whole’ (19), or a reasonable degree of 
coherency and transparency. In addition to the requirement for reasonable 
consistency, or what I think of as a research gestalt, the research design, or response  
to these puzzles, has allowed for flexibility over time and the ability to ask additional 
questions as my research developed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20 Above, the kavad. At the top there is a door that opens onto a secret compartment 
designed for hiding mobile phones, this enables the kavad to be tracked and to discretely trigger 
certain sounds as a mobile performance device. 
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The demands placed on readers 
 
The kavad’s historical relationship to a nomadic narrative practice and existential 
teaching is an important part of my choice in using it to document my methodology.  
The South project, as chapter four demonstrates, is exceptionally demanding of its 
readers, framing them as existential explorers and researchers, indeed, the use of the 
word south is an allusion to Antarctic exploration and the extremes of survival 
documented by Ernest Shackleton in his book South: The "Endurance" Expedition 
(2004). The egg motif featured throughout the South project (explained in chapter 
four) also has many meanings, but one of its foremost connotations within the South 
project, originates from Apsley Cherry-Garrard’s book The Worst Journey In The 
Word (1922), this gruelling book documents both the extreme efforts incurred to 
retrieve Emperor Penguin eggs from Cape Crozier (in the name of evolutionary 
research) and then to rescue Robert Falcon Scott and his three fellow explorers 
following their catastrophic attempt to reach the South pole between 1910-1913.  
Both books may be viewed as narratives of futility, especially in light of their 
proximity to the outbreak of World War I and their resonance with the end of the 
British Empire, but they may also be viewed as a testimony to human endurance and 
curiosity.  
 
 
The kavad (and the South project as a whole) frames exploration as a metaphor for 
the research process, and in turn the research process is framed as a metaphor for 
exploration, both physical and existential. The fact that the kavad is carried on the 
back like a rucksack also has visual and physical resonance with the image of 
explorers and the physical hardships they experience. As chapter four of this thesis 
will clarify, the exercises generated by the South project emphasise physical 
endurance in their overarching theme of walking and seeking in the service of story-
telling. At the same time, the many references to self-help culture within the South 
project also emphasise the commitment that readers are making to an intense 
process of self-examination and possible transformation, this is related in the South  
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book to the long term psychotherapeutic experiences of South’s protagonist Ivan 
Dâr.  
 
South is concerned with processes as much, if not more, than with teleological 
objectives. Having outlined some of the extreme practices readers are expected to 
follow, the next section will also discuss the specific methods and practices that I 
have followed and designed in linking my research questions to the generation of 
relevant new knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
    
Figure 21 Above left, kavad, middle - detail of  kavad, book with secret compartment, right  
- locked feedback/payment section of kavad, E. Dare, 2009. 
 
3.2 Specific methods: mapping thesis questions to a coherent research 
design 
3.2 Specific methods 1 
  
Although I have tested many ‘solutions’ throughout the last three years, the greatest 
part of my PhD practice has been involved with finding or inventing answers to key 
questions, rather than testing out a set of originary solutions.  Paul Carter (2004) 
suggests that the word ‘technique’ is used within the arts to hide what is 
institutionally and dogmatically unpalatable, which he unequivocally states is the 
notion of invention. Carter asserts the radicalism of associating research with both 
process and invention, he also points out the localised nature of discourse around  
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creative research and material thinking, again with the radical premise that the 
localness (for want of a better word) of creative research is at odds with the 
discovery of overarching  or universal truths. These core departures from orthodox 
theories of research have great resonance with my own work and have informed the 
design of my research strategies. 
 
‘What is my work for?’ 
 
 A significant part of finding possible answers to my core questions has been the 
generation of appropriate practices, methods, or, indeed, creative inventions to 
generate the new knowledge that I have needed. The methods I have used and the 
research puzzles they are matched with are outlined below. Each method is related 
to a specific question and assessed for suitability, including a justification for using the 
method and an assessment of the pragmatic issues relating to it, and any ethical 
issues that might arise: 
 
Text analysis: This is matched to the comparative, developmental and causal 
research puzzles mentioned in section 3 of this chapter. A great part, particularly of 
my initial research involved an examination of previous works and critiques of 
electronic literature as well as subjectivity, interactivity and agency. The data sources 
ranged from theoretical materials to digital fictions themselves, as well as blogs, 
journal articles, plays, novels and conference papers.  
 
Psychometric tests: As part of my research into subjectivity I investigated a range 
of psychometric tests, this involved background reading but also taking a number of 
tests myself. Subjecting myself to psychometric tests generated insight into how I 
might deploy them computationally as well as in the South book, my experience of 
their many limitations lead to my s a critical response to them.  
 
Quantitative subjective data: During the first wave of my research I wrote 
stories and embedded them in xml files (these are files that follow a structured set of 
rules in defining and laying out data) along with meta-data about my own moods,  
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thoughts and situating events. Some of this data included quantitative evaluations. 
The South software quantitatively tracks the mood of each reader as well as my own 
quantitative self-evaluations and evaluations of news events. The psychometric input 
of readers is also quantitatively assessed and compared to my own psychometric 
input, in order to obtain a Euclidean distance (the distance between two points) 
between a reader’s evaluation and my own. These quantitative methods are used 
critically, with a view to each reader interpreting their validity for themselves. 
 
 
Disassembling code: The disassembly or reverse engineering of code (where 
legal) was matched to the mechanical, developmental and causal puzzles outlined in 
this chapter. These processes, or disassembly puzzles, clearly relate to my main 
thesis questions, which are concerned with investigating ways in which computers 
might gain a subjective understanding of readers and situations. Code and structures 
that were deconstructed include text adventures, hypertext fictions, Weizenbaum’s 
Eliza, aspects of Schank and Ableson’s story-telling scripts and Marvin Minsky’s 
frames as well as many other digital forms of fiction. 
 
Generating new code: This relates to the mechanical, developmental, causal and 
comparative puzzles I have discussed. The generation of new code and programs has 
arguably been the most comprehensive and methodologically integrated aspect of my 
research. Generating new code relates to all of the questions I have outlined. 
 
Writing: Of itself writing becomes a form of research and meaning-making, 
particularly in relation to my comparative puzzles around human and computational 
epistemologies and communications. Re-mediating my writing processes through 
computational systems has revealed a great deal about the fundamental differences 
between computers and humans. Trying to get computers to break down my own 
natural language input was initially frustrating, until I realised that the output the 
computers generated should be viewed as medium-specific, almost as a cultural 
artefact in its own right, and not an imitation of human sensibilities. 
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21a 1Figure 21a Phd journal, 7th March 2008, E. Dare. 
 
Friday 7th March 2008 
A Double murder in Deptford: 
  
If Lacan asked what humans would be without language, perhaps the question now is 
what would we be without data structures? In Britain this question was rapidly 
instantiated by the discovery of one greasy fingerprint on a paint shop cashbox 
following the murder in 1905 of Mr and Mrs Farrow at the Chapman’s Oil and Paint 
shop on Deptford High Street. The brothers who committed this terrifying crime 
(also known as the Mask Murders) were the first British criminals to be hanged as a 
result of fingerprint evidence.  
The execution of the Stratton brothers could be seen as the initializing event in a 
narrative of escalating taxonomic rapacity that includes the superimposition of other 
quantitative processes onto human experience, including intelligence and 
occupational testing, psychiatric evaluation, and more recently the transactional 
analysis of our banking, shopping, listening, looking, eating, shitting, talking, etc.  
We might reinterpret this cheerless story of the Stratton brothers as death by the 
agency of both feckless human brutality and statistical analysis, but all this data, like 
language, represents us as subjects on behalf of divisive and deconstituting symbols, it 
constitutes our fractured subjectivity, the fact that there will never be a language, 
database or data structure big enough to make us fully understandable to anyone 
else; The data structures represent another despairing idiom, another human 
symptom.  
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Observation: I undertook longitudinal and intense observation of informants in the 
process of interacting with the South system (in both computational and book forms, 
but also, in one case, in the location of the South Bank itself). General observation of  
the South Bank area was also an important part of my research for the project, 
examining, for example, how people moved through the environment, what places 
they seemed to avoid, what parts of the South Bank were the noisiest or the 
calmest, and why this might be so. My observations were supported by drawings, 
photographs and by recording moving images with sound. I will explain these 
processes of observation in more detail in the section 3, as well as the following 
methods of reader evaluation:  
 
• Depth interviews. 
• Questionnaires and more creative forms of participatory writing. 
• Participatory photography and drawing. 
 
 
Using the kavad to assess my own processes 
 
Figure 22 following page, the kavad as a mobile heuristic device, mapping questions to 
methods and aiding me to assess and communicate my research design. 
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I have used the kavad heuristically to map my research questions to possible 
methods, and to highlight issues of integration and conceptual coherence by forming 
an overview of my research design. Possible options are outlined throughout the 
kavad as reminders, primarily, that I should not dogmatically reject methods but 
consider their pragmatic as well as their theoretical feasibility. The kavad also 
provides documentation of possible data sources, including written, visual and sonic 
resources for knowledge generation. The kavad is made from news data, both local 
and national, in the form of papier-mâché, a happy symbiosis in light of my 
computational stress upon news data as a situating and dynamic form of input. In 
terms of its basic material composition the kavad may also be thought of as a 
fossilised form of news database, physically situating my PhD research in events that 
unfolded at the time of its formation. 
 
 
Non-passive research design  
 
 
<= 
Ontology 
& 
Epistemology 
 
research questions 
justifications 
data sources & 
 methods 
ethical questions 
pragmatic issues 
coherence of research design 
 
terra incognita 
 122 
non-passive reaserach desihn 1 
 
I have emphasised a non-rigid and non-passive research design from the outset of my 
PhD practice.  A non-passive research design reinforces the idea of research as an 
ongoing process. This process is supported by documentation, which I have 
undertaken in a number of different forms, such as: 
 
An online PhD research journal: this journal reaches an unknown audience, 
potentially anyone with web access, but it is written for my own reflexive purposes. 
The journal features written as well as visual and sonic data. 
 
‘Private’ diaries: written with no audience in mind other than myself, this degree 
of privacy enables me to express and explore really serious doubts about my work, 
or particularly unresolved ideas without the spectre of embarrassment or judgement 
by others. 
 
The Kavad: is an experimental work in progress, and research ‘tool’ for 
documenting my methodology, it is designed primarily for my own heuristic use but 
will also be viewed by supervisors, examiners and peers. 
 
Drawings: ranging from drawings for my own private use but also for seminars and 
web publication via my PhD journal. My drawings of the South Bank often involve 
drawing the same view or objects over many months, or even years. It is hard to 
articulate everything that I learn from making these drawings, but one aspect that I 
can articulate is the difference between my own drawings of a particular place and 
those of reader-researchers, and also the often significant differences and 
fluctuations in my own mark-making and fluidity over time. Epistemologically these 
changes can be related to my interest in subjectivity and mutability, computer vision 
and human vision. 
 
Photographs: Serve the same purpose as my drawings but in my own practice are 
less reflexive and more instantaneous. The difference between my own photographs 
and those of reader-researchers is also a significant, if analytically elusive, data  
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source. I have also used CCTV images of the South Bank area extensively; these 
images are used to assess readers (they are asked to react to these images and to 
write descriptions of them) but also to generate narrative computationally via 
processes of image analysis. 
 
Three dimensional models: The models I have made are both physical and 
computational; they have largely been used for my own research purposes, as aids to 
understanding locations, systems and stories. 
 
 
Story telling via Street View: These stories were written under an algorithmic 
system of constraint, consisting of 100 words for each ‘micro story’, and a sample of 
pixels from the image that engendered the story, each image is 100 by 100 pixels in 
size. The writing of these stories was an exercise in observing the South Bank via 
digitally re-mediated space. The stories document changes in my perception of what 
a virtual South Bank signifies, from a perception of the images as straightforward 
representations, to an analysis of what they might cause to happen, in other words 
to a notion of their social significance and possible agency. 
 
Sound files: some of my sound files have been published on the web, and others 
presented in seminars. These files consist primarily of unfolding narratives, but there 
is also some modelling of spatial resonances and field recordings of the South Bank. 
As in the case of my algorithmic storytelling it has been revealing to see how my use 
of sound files, (my perception of their purpose and meaning) has moved from the 
representational to the heuristic. More recent sound files have been deployed as 
heuristic tools in the evolution of narratives, rather than as narrative sources in their 
own right. 
 
Moving images: are used for researching and documenting reader responses to 
the unfolding South project. These images may be shown to final examiners and used 
in seminars, but are primarily aids to my own understanding and tracking of the 
project. 
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Acknowledging the possibility of transformation within my research and 
documenting it via these methods has also supported the fluidity and development of 
my main research methods in all their forms. The next section will discuss the notion 
of assessing the ‘success’ of those methods and evaluating ‘user responses’,  
 
 
 
3.3 Analysing and hacking: assessing the value of research data 
3.3 Analysing and hacking 1 
 
 In this section I will show I have evaluated the ‘success’ of these methods, explaining 
the rigorous and reflexive self-interrogation required to obtain and analyse data that 
is logical and consistent within the context of my overall research design. I have 
sought out complementary methods where possible, and in the case of my 
quantitative methods have deployed them as provocations, such as the ‘scoring’ of 
readers in comparison to my own psychometric ‘score’. This is clearly offered as a 
provocation to readers and is flagged up as such through the software ‘interface’ for 
the South project, in which highly subjective comments are made about the 
difference between myself and my readers31.  
 
I have used reflexive and self-critical methods to support the generation of what I 
would argue are relevant and ‘trustworthy’ forms of knowledge. However, it is 
important to acknowledge the fact that the notion of trustworthy or ‘true’ 
knowledge is far from straightforward and that both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods are subject to extensive criticism.  
 
Quality control 
 
How then could I analyse the efficacy of my research in the context of a complex, 
multi-layered interdisciplinary project, which as I have stated throughout this thesis,  
                                                 
31
 If the software identifies a significant quantitative difference between myself and a reader it might 
announce, ‘I hardly know how to talk to you, you seem like a complete stranger’ or ‘we have 
absolutely nothing in common you and I’. The system may also choose to give such readers a harder 
set of tasks or fewer materials, as evidence of its judgemental, inter-subjective stance. 
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cannot be represented or assessed under the aegis of a single-issue or a 
straightforward ‘outcome’. South encompasses what Wilkie and Gaver et al (2008) 
describe as a ‘heterogeneously composed’ assemblage, an ‘interweaving of practices’ 
and technologies and, in the specific case of South different forms of knowledge and 
authorship. Wilkie and Gaver et al (2008) articulate the complexity of projects that 
are heterogeneously composed and not focused upon single outcomes32.  How could 
I analyse the value of my data while accommodating what Wilkie and Gaver et al 
describe as the consideration of ‘‘logics’ of interdisciplinarity beyond accountability 
and transfer and to avoid linear conceptualisations of innovation.’? (2) 
 
The question of transfer, and the transfer of intellectual property, is particularly 
relevant in the context of the South project, which is supported by a high degree of 
participatory material and a high dependence upon situating data. I have made my 
interpretations or non-reactive, non-adversarial arguments as a result of the 
knowledge generated by my research, those arguments are presented in the form of 
computational and narrative systems as well as the more formal arguments 
presented in this thesis. The direction of my research has changed from its very 
earliest days, in which I was focused upon a far more static and linear notion of 
computer-human-interaction and had not yet formed a particularly nuanced notion 
of subjectivity and its role within a bespoke computational and narrative system.  
Over time my arguments have emerged in forms that are appropriate to the 
questions they answer. The methods I have generated match the types of puzzle they 
have addressed, as evidenced below: 
 
                                                 
32
 Wilkie and Gaver explain how multiple outcomes allow us: 
to appreciate and make legible a range of project forms, including 
not only simple collaborations producing easily articulated 
outcomes, but also the more sprawling, multidimensional 
collectives that produce a variety of seemingly less coordinated 
outcomes. The conjoint term creative assemblage attunes us to 
how creativity can be acknowledged as an effect of such 
assembling process rather than the residual capacities of an 
individual innovation author.  
(Wilkie and Gaver et al, 2008:2). 
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Developmental arguments: My developmental arguments have been formed 
both theoretically, and computationally, through the South software, which has 
addressed the developmental problems and shortcomings, identified via my research 
into electronic literature and artist’s books. Qualitative arguments, based on textual 
analysis and practice-based research into the development of electronic literature 
have entailed ‘detailed, contextual and multilayered interpretation which is unlikely 
to simplify or caricature developmental processes’ (Mason, 2006: 175). My core 
argument is that electronic fiction systems, like the earliest forms of Artificial 
Intelligence have been held back by top-down a priori structures and rigid rule bases 
that and have denied wider forms of knowing. These propositional forms of knowing 
have negated the contextual value of local situations, bodies, tacit knowledge and the 
subjectivity of program writers themselves; The South project is an argument for 
alternative structures and systemic relationships. 
 
Comparative arguments: Likewise my comparative arguments have been 
supported by a similarly detailed and contextualised set of research processes. These 
processes have been based both upon textual analysis (with all the breadth of source 
material that this implies) and in the deconstruction of a wide range of electronic 
systems. Both methods are contextualised, ‘local’ and concerned with what systems 
and ideas do, (to people and to other systems), as much as how they work. In 
comparing notions of inter and intra activity as well as rigid a priori structures and 
flexible systems, particularly those proposed by Suchman (1987, 2006), I have 
presented theoretical and practice based arguments for dynamic, situated and less 
rigidly goal-oriented forms of intra-active narrative system. 
 
Mechanical arguments: The mechanical arguments I have formulated have been 
theoretical but also situated and practice-based, necessitating intense processes of 
computational disassembly, testing and construction, while recognising the modes of 
interpretation that are always at play in making decisions and deductions about how 
mechanisms work. The situated nature of my programs and the ability of readers to 
access and change the core logical structures of that code through ‘hacking’ (see 
chapter four), is one of main responses and arguments; this argument has developed 
from the mechanical puzzles inherent in my main thesis question. 
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Causal/predictive arguments: The causal/predictive arguments operating within 
the South project are perhaps the most complex and the hardest to validate. My 
background research has lead to a critical approach to the linear characterisation of 
many ‘interactive’ systems or linear models of cause and effect. This criticality has 
resulted in the adoption of alternative paradigms such as intra-activity and multi-
linear systems of meaning-making.  The computational and analogue systems I have 
generated aim to effect a relational, dynamic and situated network of 
causal/predictive arguments. 
 
 
 So far I have evaluated my own responses to my research data, but how could I 
evaluate the reaction of readers, or what I have come to describe as reader-
researchers to the South project? The next section will look at alternatives to the 
singular interpretations of human-computer-interaction that have characterised and 
arguably restricted the design of many interactive systems, limiting them to notions 
of utility and a single authoritative interpretation. 
 
 
Evaluating user experience 
 
My home culture was based on Buddhism. The religion asks 
people to consider the relationship between themselves, 
nature and the world through self-questioning. However, 
these days many Koreans forget this great function of self-
questioning in a rapidly changed society. So this small egg 
will be a reminder of how important self-query is in our 
lives.  
(Informant 8, response to survey on the meaning of the 
South egg). 
 
 
In writing about the evaluation of user experience I have found the work of Bill 
Gaver (2006), Gaver et al (1999, 2004, and 2008) and Sengers, (2006) particularly 
relevant. Evaluation within an arts context is an ambivalent and often neglected 
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concept (for example, it played no part in the teaching of my own degree in painting) 
and I have therefore drawn upon wider disciplines to investigate how I might 
evaluate my own work and the experience that it engenders in others. Gaver and 
Sengers (2006) frame evaluation within a methodological strategy, or logic of 
research generation, that is characterised by a commitment to multiplicity of 
interpretation. As this section (and also chapter four of this thesis) will show, part of 
the logic of my evaluation of readers and the solicitation of feedback from them, is to 
allow readers to ‘hack’ into the South software system and to reconstruct it 
according to their own epistemological perspectives. 
 
 As Sengers and Gaver (2006) observe, there are costly limitations inherent in 
judging user experience against the expectations of the artist, programmer or 
designer who has produced the system in question. As alternatives to single 
interpretation I show how the South system has solicited complex, multi-layered and 
often contradictory interpretations, characterising them not as problems in need of 
solutions, but as creative and welcome resources within the context of an arts 
computing-based project. Gaver and Sengers (2006) have outlined useful evaluation 
strategies that can accommodate multiple and complex interpretation of human-
computer-interactions, in which ‘potentially competing interpretations can fruitfully 
co-exist’ (Gaver and Sengers, 2006: 1).  They also document how ‘design and 
evaluation strategies shift when we abandon the presumption that a specific, 
authoritative interpretation of the systems we build is necessary, possible or 
desirable’ (1), stating that it is difficult ‘to conceive of interaction without 
interpretation’ (1). The multiple meanings that are assigned to computational 
systems by their users emphasise the importance of interpretation within HCI. 
Although the notion of single use and single interpretation may be appropriate in 
some cases, Sengers and Gaver point out that even in issues of road safety it is 
sometimes better to stimulate drivers and pedestrians into making their own, non-
passive interpretations of safe behaviour, rather than telling them what to do. 
 
In the case of South I am producing a system that is open to interpretation on many 
levels, from the interface itself, including buttons and colours, to the overarching 
significance of the entire system, summed up in the survey questions ‘what role can  
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it play in my life’ (2) and ‘what does it mean about me, my social group, my society, 
my culture’? (2). These questions, among others, are ones that I have asked a range 
of people in relation to aspects of the South project, confirming the assertion by 
Gaver and Sengers (2006) that multiple interpretations are almost inevitable in 
relation to computational systems. For a full description of the egg please refer back 
to the introduction to this thesis. 
 
22a 1Figure 22a PhD Journal entry 21st October 2009, E. Dare. 
21st October 2009 
Revising my methodology chapter, my relationship to it has changed considerably 
since the first draft. The surveys I have undertaken have had a big impact on my 
relationship to the project, ‘informant 8,’ for example, wrote this: 
My home culture was based on Buddhism. The religion asks people to consider the 
relationship between themselves, nature and the world through self-questioning. However, 
these days many Koreans forget this great function of self-questioning in a rapidly changed 
society. So this small egg will be a reminder of how important self-query is in our lives.  
(Informant 8, response to survey on the meaning of the South egg) 
I want to re-evaluate the project interface, in terms of the software interface and the 
characterisation of the South experience, not being so reticent about it’s framing of 
writing as a type of spiritual/self-exploration and performance, (of a processed based 
‘identity’). I’m building a detailed ‘paper computer’ to evaluate with a broader range 
of people. Opening the project to multiple interpretation (by others) has reminded 
me of some of my original intentions for the egg and the book, which were poetic 
and magical.. not so mechanistic 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23  following page, an example of a questionnaire, the aim of the survey was to gain 
insight into interpretations of the egg’s purpose. The egg was described to respondents. 
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Within the context of the South project it has been more engaging and productive to 
allow for ambivalence and multiplicity of interpretation. With this ambivalence of 
purpose in mind, notions of utility are also challenged, and as, Gaver and Sengers 
state, ‘alternative values, such as curiosity, play, exploration, and reflection are also 
important from this point of view’ (3). Gaver and Sengers emphasise the importance 
of generating new strategies and methods for creating systems that embody these 
alternative values, such as ‘purposely blocking’ (4) and, thwarting ‘any consistent 
interpretation’ (4). This, Gaver and Sengers are at pains to point out  is not the same 
as deliberately generating confusion at the level of usability, stating that ‘what the 
system does and how it can be controlled is obvious – but the ultimate purpose 
meaning and usefulness of the device is left open for users to decide’ (4). 
 
 
In addition to the feedback forms illustrated above, other methods I have used to 
solicit feedback and user evaluation are: 
 
• Usability testing (see appendix). 
• Depth surveys (see appendix).  
• Scenarios (see chapters four and six). 
• Creative forms of participatory writing (see chapter four). 
• Filming interactions. 
• Participatory photography and drawing (see chapter four). 
• Enabling readers to ‘hack’ the South software, changing its rules and logic at 
the level of code, as well as being able to change colours, narratives, types of 
situating news data, photographic references and embedded interpretations.  
 
Examples and more detailed information about usability reviews, testing and 
interviews are documented in the appendix to this thesis.  An additional level of user 
feedback is also solicited through the possibility of user based re-configuration or 
hacking of the South software described in more detail in chapter four.  
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The notion of usability testing, as Gaver and Sengers (2006) point out, is complicated 
by the notion of multiple interpretations33. I have solicited multiple user 
interpretations through the evaluation processes listed above and through the 
invitation to re-write or hack my code and to expand the content of the South book.  
In this way I have used multiple interpretations to generate feedback cycles of 
interpretation and reinterpretation that uncover new ways of seeing my own work; 
these cycles also reveal some of my own unconscious projections and meanings in 
relation to the work. For example, respondents to the egg surveys (in which the egg 
was described and respondents were asked to speculate on its significance and 
purpose) told me variously that it was ‘a substitute for a pet’ (respondent 16), 
‘someone to discuss personal issues with’ (respondent 6) and ‘an alarm that awakens 
the subconscious’ (respondent 17). All of these interpretations have given me fresh 
insight into my work and have revealed possible directions for it that I had not 
previously considered. The complexity involved in this approach has arguably been 
more suited to an arts-computing project than paradigms of unitary interpretation 
and idealised conceptions of impenetrable scientific objectivity.  As the above section 
testifies, the South project requires a high degree of involvement from its readers. I 
would now like to assess and outline the ethical implications inherent in this degree 
of reader participation. 
 
 
Research ethics and ethical knowledge generation 
 
 
This section is relatively brief as I feel my measures for protecting user identity and 
privacy, while ensuring informed consent, have been sufficient to outweigh any 
potential problems, but in creating this section I am recognising the importance of 
                                                 
33
 Common approaches to evaluation in HCI are based on 
developing and testing against a priori evaluation criteria 
corresponding to the designers’ anticipated interpretation of a 
system. But in taking multiple interpretations into account, 
systems can no longer be effectively evaluated in terms of criteria 
generated from a single, authoritative interpretation. 
(Gaver and Sengers, 2006:7) 
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maintaining and emphasising an ethical practice at every level, from the 
epistemological to the inter-personal. This section is concerned specifically with 
inter-personal research ethics, outlining an ethically-based process of interacting with 
informants and their materials, however, the thesis and the South project as a whole 
are concerned with broader ethical questions relating to the way we generate, value 
and use knowledge and to the ways in which we frame the notion of a subject. Barad 
(2007) emphasises the ethical significance of agential realism, describing it as a 
conception ‘with far-reaching consequences for grasping and attending to the 
political possibilities for change, the responsible practice of science, and the 
responsible education of scientists, among other important shifts’ (Barad, 2007: 34). 
Likewise, Haraway has asserted that situated knowledge is a means to ‘become 
answerable for what we learn how to see’ (Haraway, 191: 190).  Similarly my own 
PhD practice is embedded with an ethical commitment to situating knowledge and to 
a form of accountability that does not presume my own neutrality of perspective.  
The ethical methodology I have pursued has involved a critical engagement with the 
social and historical conditions of my own knowledge production. In this way I have 
sought to avoid what Liz Stanley describes as ‘alienated knowledge’ (Stanley, 1990: 
3), an epistemology that assumes the God-like ‘view from nowhere’ Haraway so 
abhors (1991). 
 
 
As stated above, the South project generates a high volume of material and activity 
from its readers, or reader-researchers. When users interact with the South software 
it generates tailor made instructions for them (discussed in detail in the next 
chapter). These instructions often lead to creative engagement by readers. This takes 
the form of writing, photography, drawing and physical actions. In addition to the 
material generated by end-users through their interactions with the South book and 
egg (which is an image viewing device in which the contented generated by the 
software is viewed). The developmental stages of the project also involved  
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observation, interviews, questionnaires, photographs and filming, involving a range of 
informants, twenty-one in total. From the outset I have endeavoured to generate an 
ethical research design, both epistemologically, in the rigour of my research practice, 
(including not overriding the rights of others, practicing honestly and without  
plagiarism) and inter-personally - planning, framing and asking research questions as 
transparently and ethically as possible. It is important to state that putting the 
question of ethics at the end of this chapter is not the same as suggesting that ethical 
practice is an augmentation or an ‘extra’ part of my practice, it is fundamental to my 
research design, and applies to all aspects of it at every level; so what, one might ask 
does, an ethical methodology mean in practice? 
  
 Mason (2006) recognises the complexity of ethical issues, or even of defining what 
‘ethical’ means. She recommends a pragmatic approach in which researchers ask 
what the purpose of their research is and how it might impact, for example, other 
individuals, institutions and research bodies. Following both Mason’s 
recommendations and those of Payne and Payne (2005), writing on ethical practice, I 
have embedded the following core values and commitments into my research design: 
 
• Informed consent is obtained from all informants. 
• The identity of all informants is protected in all published material. 
• Involvement can be withdrawn at any time, for any reason by any and all 
informants. 
• My research is explained clearly and reasonably to all informants prior to 
their participation.  
• Confidentiality of all informant materials is assured and maintained. 
• No harm is done to any informant. 
 
The practices these ethical commitments relate to are outlined below: 
 
 
Visual methods 
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Mason (2006) raises the point that there are particular ethical issues connected to 
visual methods, foremost is the difficulty of gaining consent from all subjects 
captured in images. Where permission has not been obtained from subjects clearly 
appearing in participant and my own images, (and those images have been used in 
this thesis or the South book) I have blurred them. No research participants have 
been photographed without explicit consent from them to be filmed or 
photographed, and explicit consent has been obtained to use any images they have 
contributed. 
 
Observation 
 
No covert observation has taken place of informants; informed consent was 
obtained from subjects for all observations. Additionally, in a commitment to 
situating myself in my work, I have also tried to observe myself in the process of 
observation, noting where needed if I feel I lost track of events, missed something 
important or experienced any significant reactions within myself. These notes, as 
Payne and Payne recommends, are not documented as a stream of consciousness 
but are systematically organised (Payne and Payne, 2005: 169). 
 
Depth interviewing 
 
Face to face depth interviews were conducted with reader-researchers. My 
professional training as an interviewer emphasised the importance of not projecting 
my own opinions onto my informants, however, these interviews were semi-
structured, with a core of key, pre-determined but open-ended questions which I 
freely probed. The notion of impartiality is contentious, as the questions I asked 
were defined by me, and also interpreted by me. These interviews initially involved 
note taking and then both note taking and photographic documentation. Informed 
consent was obtained from the informants to show these images to others as long as 
their names were changed. The informants were explicitly told they could withdraw 
from the research at any time and for any reason, fortunately this did not happen.  
 
Participant writing 
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All informants and reader-researchers can request withdrawal of their material from 
new additions of the South book at any time, if that occurs the book will immediately 
be republished minus their contributions. This is made possible by the immediacy 
and flexibility of Publish-On-Demand technology. As in the case of visual methods, 
informed consent was obtained from all informants to use their materials, and all 
informants have had their identities protected. The results of psychometric 
processes engaged upon via the South software are not accessed by any third parties. 
 
 
Questionnaires 
 
All respondents were told about the purpose of the research and gave informed 
constent to take part. Respondents were left to fill in the questionnaires without any 
prompting by me, though I was near enough to answer any questions about the 
surveys when needed, but not to prompt, paraphrase or ‘interpret’ the survey for 
them. Instead I advised respondents when necessary to re-read the question and 
make their own interpretation of what it might mean for them. 
 
Interview scripts and details of sample sizes and methods can be found in the 
appendix. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Throughout this chapter I have sought to demonstrate both the appropriateness and 
the conceptual significance of my methods, and to present arguments in support of 
the meaningfulness of my analysis and inferences without resorting to the idea that 
my data is non-neutral or somehow able to access an idealised and wholly objective 
set of truths. This chapter has discussed my kavad, or mobile methodology box, a 
heuristic device through which I have been able to examine and articulate my own 
methodological imperatives and design strategies. The kavad evidences an alternative  
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means by which an artist practitioner can reflexively research and assess their own 
practice, articulating aspects of that practice both verbally and non-verbally, through 
images, but also through materials, embodied actions and sensory experiences.  
These experiences and actions are explored through interaction with and analysis of 
my kavad, by opening its many doors, handling the objects contained within it and 
analysing the symbols and illustrations inscribed on its doors a range of 
methodologies and options are revealed. 
 
In keeping with the rich notion of multiple interpretation that has underpinned my 
practice, and to emphasise the conceptual unity of this project, I would like to point 
out that the South egg, (the image viewing device through which the South content is 
accessed and displayed) is itself an inherently ambiguous object, with its circular 
causality (‘what came first?’) and its uncertain ontology (is it an object or a subject, 
an animal or a mineral, solid or liquid, inside or outside, fragile or strong?), the egg  
represents the possibility of multiple interpretation and non-reified ontologies. 
Additionally it is important to state that one of my meta-level goals (for want of a 
better articulation of artistic intention) has not been to create an immersive system, 
but rather its opposite, an anti-immersive system in which computational 
materialities are clearly at play, with non-invisible operations, as evidenced by South 
Hacks, a book embedded within the South book, for teaching readers how to ‘hack  
into’ and change the South software system (explained in more detail in the next 
chapter). This I should add is not an attempt to idealise this project or to give the 
impression of a Utopian system that operates without constraints, indeed the 
limitations of the system should also be accountable and non-invisible. The notion of 
hacking is itself parodied by the idea of an official guide to it34.  
 
 A criticality of perspective is also maintained in relation to the idea of user evaluation. 
The use of methods such as participant photography and participatory drawing 
emphasise some of the illusory aspects of such evaluation, serving to outweigh the 
idealisations that can arise in notions of ‘end-user’ assessment. The photographs and 
drawings produced by readers are not easily analysed, a point made clearly by Gaver,  
                                                 
34 A guide to hacking the South software is available online here: 
http://www.doc.gold.ac.uk/~ma501ed/south/Hacking%20south.pdf 
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Dunne and Pacenti (1999) and Gaver and Boucher et al (2004). In relation to 
photographs, however, these materials do document aspects of user experience that 
cannot be obtained through talking or observing, charting the grey areas between 
‘what we say and what we mean’ (Jørgensen, 2000).  Within the South project these 
non-verbal types of participant material test the limits of representation in a similar 
manner to the way in which the limits of digital representation are interrogated via 
the computational aspects of the system.  As the South system tries to understand 
users and readers via symbolic logic, it is also a test for human subjects to 
understand the efficacy of visual symbols. What, for example, does a reader mean 
when they photograph a concrete staircase as a representation of a ‘male place’, can 
such a meaning be blankly deconstructed? Such devices serve to remind researchers 
that there are limits to our knowledge and limits to our ability to represent what we, 
and others, know, particularly within the orthodox frameworks of scientific and 
objectivist epistemology. However, acknowledging these limits, as I hope I have 
demonstrated, is not a reason to reject the notion of definable and testable goals; 
rather it is a call to invent creative and insightful methodologies for accommodating 
complex and richly diverse practices.  
 
 
The next chapter will explore my engagement with a computational artist’s book, it 
will relate this conception to the other elements of the South project while 
elucidating the South book’s theoretical and cultural contexts. The chapter will look 
at examples of other artists who work with both the concept and the materiality of 
the book form, expanding upon the historical provenance of such books touched 
upon in the literature review. Chapter four will also explore the relationship 
between my practice and my own historical and cultural background. An illustrated 
case study will show in detail the way in which readers can engage with the South 
book and egg.  
 
 
 
 140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: The South Book 
Chapter 4: The South Book 1 
 
 
Throughout the ‘modern movement,’ at least since the mid-
nineteenth century, artists have published material both as 
an adjunct to their work at large and, at times, as its main 
practice. 
(Cutts et al, 1986: 3). 
 
 South: A Psychometric Text Adventure, is an artist’s book designed to be used in 
conjunction with the South software and egg, it is also designed to work with a 
physical location, the South Bank area of South London. This short chapter will look 
in detail at the way the South book is constructed and how it interacts with the other 
elements of the South project. The chapter will also explain the theoretical and 
cultural context of the South book, citing relevant examples of other artists who 
produce books and their historical/cultural provenance.  Readers are urged to read 
both the South book and to watch the DVD submitted with this thesis (which is 
about the South project) before reading this chapter. The overall aim of this chapter 
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 is to anchor the PhD thesis in the actual processes and artefacts engendered by my 
practice. It also contextualises the rationale for the South book, highlighting the 
relationship between my practice (concerned as it is with themes of agency and 
narrative) and my own historical and cultural provenance, in which wider social 
forces have played subtle yet formative roles, profoundly influencing the linguistic 
opportunities for two of my grandparents. 
 
 As my opening quote from Cutts et al attests, the South book exists within a 
historical continuum of artists producing their own books, sometimes also involving 
themselves in self-publishing, in order, for example, to establish a high degree of 
control over the production and dissemination of their textual works, and also of 
creating reproducible objects, frequently referred to as Multiples35. South is 
connected to this practice but it also emanates from traditions of often marginalised 
forms of writing, such as: 
 
•  Self-help books 
•  Star signs 
•  Dream interpretations 
•  Populist psychometrics 
 
These types of writing can all be characterised as tailor-made or interest-matching 
texts, they might also be described in George Landow’s terms as proto-hypertexts, as 
textual versions of such books are often multi-linear and also frequently require 
readers to write in them and to undertake their own calculations to further the 
content. As such these texts could also qualify as ergodic, meeting the conditions 
defined by Aarseth (1997), in which the reader must work non-trivially to navigate a 
path through them. My motivation for creating the South book exists within the 
continuum of my practice as an artist engaged with writing and making books, and 
with an ongoing investigation into the meaningful strengths and characteristics that 
computation can bring to the experience of reading and writing.  
                                                 
35
 As the name suggests, multiples are notable for their lack of uniqueness, they are works of art made 
to be repeated, sometime mass produced. Multiples can be found-objects or purpose-made objects, 
they may be books, letters, sculptures or other types of 2 or 3D artefacts, examples of artists 
producing multiples include Ed Ruscha and Dieter Roth. 
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To augment this chapter a case study is presented, in which a real reader interacts 
with the South book and software. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24 Above, the South book; it was produced iteratively, 
bearing some resemblance to the development of a computer program. 
 
 
 
4.1: The book  
4.1: The Book  1 
 
The artist and theorist Roy Ascott calls the meeting of the digital with the human, 
including the embodied, the cultural and the mobile, ‘moist media’ (Alexenberg, 
2008). This is an apposite term for my own work, dealing as it does with, not only 
the human, but the environmental, including the Thames tides and London’s weather 
patterns. The South book consists of evaluations, algorithms, additional exercises, 
stories, and some academic writing about the South Project. The book, egg and 
software engage in a series of exchanges, exchanges of agency and varying degrees of 
narrative congruence.  Depending on specific interactions and situations the egg will 
also instruct readers to look for hidden content in the book, and to navigate new 
pathways through both the paper-based text and the physical location. 
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Figure 25 Above, the South egg instructs people to search out particular pages in the book 
as well as site-specific experiences conditional to their interaction with the software. 
 
 The South book assumes that its readers are intricate, intelligent and often 
inconsistent. The current form of the South book assumes a broad readership, 
ranging from people who are interested in London, walking and psycho-geography to 
those who are curious about what a location can tell them about themselves. Other 
readers may come to the book through their interest in game forms such as ‘Choose 
Your Own Adventure’ books and text adventures. All readers are required to 
engage in a series of psychometric (or psychologically evaluative) processes woven in 
and around the South Bank. 
 
 
‘Psychometric’ Evaluations  
 
 A significant part of my practice has involved the construction of evaluative 
processes and procedures, both in analogue and digitally mediated forms. I have also 
researched the historical context of such evaluations and critical approaches to the  
 
 
 
 
 
Go to the London aquarium, your 
floating mood and general lack of 
substance will be mirrored in this 
environment. Look for yourself in 
the fish tanks. Talk to the fish 
who resembles you most, there 
will be one, there always is. 
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notion of personality assessment. The analysis of psychometric tests relates closely 
to my research into the notion of the subject, expanded upon in Chapter five. The 
notion of psychometric evaluations has its roots in the evaluation of intelligence 
(associated in particular with the nineteenth century eugenicist Sir Francis Galton) 
but later also evolved into the investigation and evaluation of ideas around 
personality traits or the notion of psychological types, such as ‘extroverts’ and 
‘introverts’. My own interest in Psychometric tests stems from my childhood 
exposure to many forms of psychometric test designed by my Grandfather, who was 
an educational psychologist involved professionally (and ambivalently) in the 
psychometric evaluation of children. The procedures he designed were often tested 
on myself and my siblings and had the quality, at least in my own mind, of games, a 
connotation that I have clearly not abandoned over the years. The South software 
and book frames subjective evaluation as a form of mutable, multi-linear surveillance, 
fiction and performance, in the sense that readers are invited to physically act out 
the construction of different identities. This engagement with subjective evaluation is 
also intimately connected, within my work, to the notion of the site36.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Miwon Kwon’s (2002) ideas about site specificity and identity have been particularly useful in 
supporting my interpretation of sites and subjectivities as relational and non-linear. 
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Figure 26 Above and below, evaluative exercises in the South book. 
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Figure 27 following page, the subjectivity of South’s readers is also framed as a 
complex form of location and, in conjunction with computational processes, an extended 
notion of an environment. 
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 South proposes a mutable form of both subjectivity and site specificity. The site in 
South is formulated by specific situations and corporeal sensations, the book 
therefore emphasises both situated and embodied interaction. Many of the evaluative 
procedures involve the senses, and indeed the progression of the evaluations 
through the five senses is part of the underlying narrative of the assessment process. 
The emphasis upon sensory and embodied interaction in both the South book and 
software also enforces the central notion that the technology we use does not exist 
in isolation from the cultural or physical spaces in which we live and work. The 
question of what constitutes knowledge or intelligence in these tests is also 
challenged (it is also an important question in the context of claims about intelligence 
and computing), what, the book asks, do we mean by intelligence? Are there other 
types of intelligence or knowledge that computers and conventional research 
processes can deploy? Such as: 
 
•  Embodied knowledge 
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•  Tacit knowledge37 
 
•  Situated knowledge 
 
The processes presented in the South book and software are designed to facilitate an 
exploration of these questions within and through the South Bank location. My own 
subjectivity is also posited as a site or meta-location, resonating throughout every 
aspect of the South project. The book and software therefore aims to understand 
individual subjects and sites, but in order to work with these concepts I have had to 
investigate what the notion of a subject and subjective experience means. My 
research, (including lived experience) suggests that the notion of both the subjective 
and the subject is politically fraught and philosophically unstable; as such it is highly 
conducive to a critical artwork that capitalises on instability and contingency. The 
dynamic, mutable and  networked nature of the subject framed by my research is  
highly suited to a computational form, and can, I suggest, support a meaningful use of 
computational strengths in relation to books, augmenting them with dynamic 
qualities that one could argue analogue books do not (literally) have. The notion of 
the site is also posited as a similarly complex configuration. 
                                                 
37
 Tacit knowledge is summed up by the scientist and philosopher Michael Polanyi in his statement 
"We know more than we can tell." (Polanyi, 2009: 4)Tacit knowledge implies a multi-layered 
background of subjective and  unformalised skills and knowledge, including cultural and embodied 
forms of  knowing. 
 149 
 
 
Figure 28 Above, the South book and software frames subjective evaluation as a form of 
mutable, multi-linear fiction and performance, but also as an extension of surveillant 
technologies. 
 
By typifying readers into categories such as Criks, Lerqs, and Ums (the fictional types 
‘discovered’ by my character  Ivan Dâr) the South book aims to elicit a series of 
subjective experiences that challenge and negotiate the multiple and inherently 
contradictory ideas we hold about our own individuality and separateness. The aim is 
not to generate a definitive, new and final answer to these questions but to test out 
and reveal what Graeme Sullivan describes as ‘fuller dimensions of human processes 
and actions’ (Sullivan, 2005: 62). 
 
 
Algorithms  
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Figure 29 Above, the South book algorithms chapter. 
 
 Once readers have established the type they correspond to on any given day, they 
can then navigate through the exercises presented in the text as a series of 
algorithms. These algorithms form a sequence of subjective experiences generated by 
the reader’s interaction with the South Book, they are offered as re-useable and 
evolving encounters, in which the environment itself functions as an extension of 
psychometric technology. The algorithmic processes draw upon a wide range of 
references including surrealist games, divination methodologies, the Theatre of The 
Oppressed38, self-help and populist spiritual exercises, (of the type one might read 
about in magazines such as Body+Soul, Experience Life and O, The Oprah Magazine) 
including meditation exercises and visualisations and, as I shall explain, my own 
research practices.  The activities also at times resemble the traditions of the flâneur  
                                                 
38 The ‘Theatre of the Oppressed’ was a movement developed by the director Augusto Boal from the 
1960s onwards, the central premise of the movement was to make political theatre in which the 
theatre became a force for social transformation with an active audience reframed as spect-actors.  
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and of psychogeography39, in which the city is framed as a site of investigation into the 
inter-relationships between the urban environment and subjective experience, 
described by Guy Debord in 1955: 
 
Psychogeography could set for itself the study of the precise 
laws and specific effects of the geographical environment, 
consciously organised or not, on the emotions and 
behaviour of individuals. The adjective psychogeographical, 
retaining a rather pleasing vagueness, can thus be applied to 
the findings arrived at by this type of investigation, to their 
influence on human feelings, and even more generally to any 
situation or conduct that seems to reflect the same spirit of 
discovery. 
(Debord, 1955). 
 
 Research practices, or as Debord puts it, ‘a spirit of discovery ‘, are assembled 
around the South Bank, the South book and its software systems. In this 
configuration readers are not defined as co-authors, but rather as reader-
researchers engaged in a discourse of localised and inter-subjective investigations. 
Paul Carter in (2004) explains at length both the difficulty and contingent radicalism 
of reframing research in these terms, writing that: 
 From the seventeenth century, at least, the guardians of 
knowledge and their political masters have stigmatised 
poetic wisdom as a rebel against reason. The rise of modern 
science encouraged a critical rationalism whose categories, 
general principles and facts have created an illusion of 
stability but are unable to explain ‘the reality of epistemic 
change’. 
(Carter, 2004:  9).  
                                                 
39 Psychogeography does not end with Debord, more recent exponents such as Ian Sinclair and Peter 
Ackroyd have focused upon London as a site of experimental exploration strategies, see Merlin 
Coverley’s book Psychogeography. (London: Pocket Essentials, 2006). 
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The processes generated by the South book are enmeshed with my own practices, 
which constitute a form of materially-based research, but they are at odds, as Carter 
observes of many arts practices, with conventional epistemic schemas that have 
separated knowledge from actions, senses and materials: 
What should be said first is that the disciplinary separation 
that undermines an understanding of creative processes also 
inhibits the emergence, even locally, of a discourse coeval 
with those processes rather than parasitic on it, often 
offering nothing more than a rather pretentious post hoc 
rationalisation. 
(Carter, 2004, 9). 
 In the complex formation represented by South, the knowledge generated by the 
reader in engaging with these algorithms is not separable from the processes that 
form that knowledge. Hence, the emphasis on re-formulating radically different 
experiences dependent on local and subjective conditions. The South book and its 
readers, like the volatile content of the Thames itself are inherently unstable and 
localised, at least in my conception of them.  The interdependency of each algorithm, 
and its direct relationship to the subjective state of readers, enables the book to also 
at times deliberately limit the mobility of users, emphasising the idealisations as much 
as the realities at play in this work.  
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Figure 30 Above, a page from South.  The South book also limits the mobility of readers 
dependent on their ‘scores’ and psychometric evaluations. In conjunction with the South 
software and egg, readers can also find their choices limited or expanded, depending on an 
ongoing assessment of overall responses. 
 
 In conjunction with the South software and egg, the book takes on an even greater 
degree of contingency, issuing instructions that have been generated in response to 
economic and meteorological events as well as my own subjective changes. It is 
significant that in this largely mutable configuration it is the overtly fictional content, 
the stories I have written about Ivan Dâr and his subjective disintegration that retain 
the greatest degree of stability. Ambiguity, tension and mystery, if they exist at all, 
emanate from the experiences readers generate for themselves in the materiality of 
their research into the site and their own subjectivity. 
 
4.2: Treacherous blue books: South stories 
4.2: Treacherous Blue Books 1 
 
 It was clear that crossing the forest had cost each of us the 
power of speech. 
(Calvino, 1977: 4). 
 
Woven into the algorithmic procedures embedded in the South book are a series of 
fictional narratives, these narratives and meta-narratives enjoy varying degrees of 
convergence with reader experiences and with the narratives readers themselves 
enact through their exploration of and response to the South Bank.  The protagonist 
of my own fictions is a character called Ivan Dâr; his story articulates questions of 
authenticity, separability, normalcy and ‘natural’ language. These questions are  
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embedded within my own cultural and socio-historical background. My grandmother, 
who was profoundly deaf did not learn sign language but instead attempted to lip-
read (with, as I remember it, little success). This may be viewed within a wider 
historical context in which ‘oralism’ (the use of spoken language) was emphasised 
over the use of sign-languages, not least for it normalising significance in relation to 
the majority hearing community. In Van Cleve (1999) Anne T. Quartararo’s chapter 
on deaf identity and French republicanism succinctly expresses the relationship 
between language and ‘civilisation’, and the motivation for making the deaf speak like 
the hearing as opposed to using manual sign languages: 
 
The goal was to make deaf people more “human”, or, like 
the rustic peasant forced to learn correct French, make deaf 
people more “civilized” through the use of the ”spoken” 
word.  
(Quartararo in Van Cleve, 1999: 45). 
 
In 1880 the Second International Congress on Education of the Deaf was held in Milan. 
The congress infamously ruled that oral education should prevail over sign language. 
This resulted in the widespread promotion of oralism (including lip-reading) over 
manual languages, arguably motivated by a strong desire to make deaf people appear 
‘normal’. While I do not wish to portray my grandmother as a victim of these 
policies, I think it is arguable that the normalising sensibility underpinning these 
rulings did have an agential role in her ability to communicate and by extension to 
many wider aspects of her life. 
 
 In a different, though not unconnected form, my paternal grandfather also 
experienced constraints upon his language. Although he was born and brought up in 
South Wales (like my grandmother, in the early twentieth century), he was not 
allowed to speak Welsh. This fact exists within the wider historical context of Welsh 
language suppression which reached its apotheosis in the so-called ‘Welsh-not’. The 
Welsh-Not was a wooden block that children were forced to wear as a punishment 
if they were caught speaking Welsh at school. The denigration of the Welsh language 
was supported by the infamous ‘Treachery of the Blue Books’ (Brad y Llyfrau  
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Gleision), an influential report into the state of education in Wales commissioned in 
1846 and presented in 1847. The report enforced a notion of Welsh culture as 
inferior and the speaking of Welsh as educationally and socially detrimental. In my 
grandfather’s case it was his own Welsh mother who enforced the prohibition, 
based on the idea that the Welsh language was ‘common’ and a language for 
peasants, an idea that had been widely reinforced and apparently absorbed by many 
Welsh people as a result of  the 1847 report.  In light of the fact that some of my 
grandfather’s relatives on the Island of Anglesey (Ynys Môn) were reputedly 
monoglot Welsh speakers, the prohibition could be interpreted as effectively 
severing him from those family relationships. 
 
!Welsh 
 
 
 
Figure 31 above, the ‘Welsh Not’, worn as a punishment by Welsh children if they spoke Welsh at 
school. The Welsh Not illustrated above can be purchased as a gift from the site welshhistorystories 
.com, adding one might argue another layer to the wider narrative of the Welsh language. 
http://www.welshhistorystories.com/artefacts.html 
 
The fictional protagonist of South, Ivan Dâr, experiences a breakdown in which he 
can longer speak his own language but instead reverts to a broken form of Russian, 
this echoes the fact that, in addition to the restrictions imposed upon my 
grandfather’s childhood mode of speech, in the early 1930s in London my 
grandfather experienced a twelve month psychosomatic ‘breakdown’ in which he 
could not speak at all.  This inability to speak is framed within my re-telling as a silent 
articulation of some of the tensions inherent in the hierarchies of value faced by 
migrant and colonised communities in relation to their ‘mother tongue’, even  
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(perhaps especially)  if their own mothers collude in its suppression. Ivan Dâr 
experiences an even more bewildering lack of groundedness, loosely based on a 
condition known as ‘legendary psychasthenia’, in which people cannot locate 
themselves, or differentiate themselves in relation to the wider world, which one 
might conceptualise as the environment beyond the boundaries of their own skin. 
Roger Caillois in 1935 described this condition as one in which space becomes an 
annihilating agency acting against subjects: 
 
Space pursues them, encircles them, digests them in a 
gigantic phagocytosis. It ends by replacing them. Then the 
body separates itself from thought, the individual breaks the 
boundary of his skin and occupies the other side of his 
senses. He tries to look at himself from any point whatever 
in space. He feels himself becoming space, dark space where 
things cannot be put. He is similar, not similar to something, 
but just similar. And he invents spaces of which he is "the 
convulsive possession." All these expressions shed light on a 
single process: depersonalization by assimilation to space, 
i.e., what mimicry achieves morphologically in certain animal 
species.  
(Caillois, 1935). 
 
 The South book attempts to reconstruct some of these experiences and assimilations 
to space, both in its structures and in the exercises readers are invited to take part 
in. Ivan Dâr, the central character of South is framed as a man literally in search of 
himself, struggling with both ‘breaking the boundary of his own skin’ (as Callois puts 
it) and of physically locating himself. The paradoxical and borderless Klein bottle, 
(illustrated overleaf) is an apt representation of the condition Callois describes, and 
which Ivan Dâr endures, ‘a space where things cannot be put’, because he has no 
location in space. At times the book deliberately aims to bewilder or undermine its 
own readers,  hinting at the possibility of space as an annihilating agency working 
against them, generating a hostile space by means of its aesthetic strategies and by 
asking readers to undertake paradoxical or impossible tasks, lying to them, issuing 
contradictory instructions or leaving exasperating lose ends.  
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 Andrew Haslam (2006) describes the way in which the design of books can facilitate 
‘emotionally ‘repositioning’ the reader’ (Haslam, 2006: 26). In South the visual 
language of the book is deployed to communicate and, indeed to manipulate readers, 
as much as its written language. Concepts such as ‘chunking’, ‘mimicry’ and ‘self-
similarity’, explicated in for example Lidwell, Holden and Butler (2003), and drawing 
upon the Gestalt theories of Max Wertheimer40 have been used within the 
formulation of South to generate meta-narratives through non-verbal means. These 
are narratives of dislocation and spatial ambiguity that reflect the wider concerns and 
fictional themes of the South project.  
 
 
Figure 32 Above and next page, pages from The South book.  Readers are invited to 
explore the extent to which one can be the ‘author’ of ones own narrative if one’s choice of 
language is defined by others. In a wider sense the book asks how language influences our 
experience of the world and the stories we tell. Are there other ways of telling available to 
us? Are our stories and means of communication inevitably symbolic and do computers have 
to operate under the same limitations? 
 
                                                 
40
 Max Wertheimer (1880-1943) was one of the founders of Gestalt psychology.  The Gestalt laws of 
similarity and proximity established by this school are often used in the design of interfaces, South has 
been more overtly concerned with not deploying them in order to disorientate its readers.  
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Summary   
 
The South book asks to what extent space is enmeshed with culture, are they 
separable or mutually constituting elements? Does a censoring culture (such as the 
one that limited the linguistic freedom of my grandparents) inevitably generate a 
repressive space, how does this operate within the spatial dimensions of cultural and 
linguistic artefacts, including books? The true story of my grandfather (and also of my 
grandmother) and his fictional counterpart Ivan Dâr has echoes in Italo Calvino’s The 
Castle of Crossed Destinies, in which a group of travellers lose their ability to speak, 
but instead use the imagery of Tarot cards to communicate their stories. South 
explores various means of communication, including the visual, the aural the 
corporeal and ideas of supernatural or intra-psychic communication. The verbal and 
non-verbal stories embedded in South are framed as a form of generative research 
practice. Readers are invited to extend the themes of these stories through the 
various exercises and encounters generated by their navigation of the South Bank. 
The autobiographical references are part of a process that involves a productive  
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uncovering of my own subjective and partial perspective within both the analogue 
and digital South systems.  My own subject specificity is also framed as in many ways 
historically and culturally conditioned. The importance and meaning of locating my 
own subjectivity as well as various design strategies deployed within the layout of the 
South book are explored in the next section as well as the wider historical context of 
artist’s books and multiples. 
 
 
 
4.3 Artist’s books and meta-criticality 
4.3 Artist’s books and meta-criticality 1 
The continuum of artists creating books goes back to the earliest days of book 
production, indeed Johanna Drucker cites the fact that: 
 
Many printers, typographers, and publishers were acutely 
aware of the book as a form and displayed this awareness 
through their production. Aldus Manutius’ Hypnerotomachia 
Poliphili (1499), Geoffrey Tory’s Champfleury (1529) and 
the Firmin Didot Virgil (1798) are examples of highly self-
conscious productions of work in book form. 
(Drucker, 1995:  21).  
 
 But, as Johanna Drucker explains (1995) an exquisite concern with production 
values is not the same as a critical work that engages with and challenges the book 
form. This section will look at the provenance of the South book, briefly surveying 
the historical context of the artist’s book as an established form while addressing 
some of the ways in which South diverges from the multitude of artist’s books 
created from the 1960s onwards. I will also discuss the problematic and complex 
role of what Drucker calls ‘Self-reflexivity in book form’ (161), in terms of both the 
book’s structure and issues of situatedness and subjectivity. Finally I will discuss the 
specific aesthetic strategies that I have applied to the production of South in order to 
expand its narratives beyond the lexical and the explicative. 
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Artist’s books  
 
 Many of the earliest artist’s books, (more correctly known as livre d’artiste), were 
produced to extraordinarily high specifications, but they were often not designed by 
artists but by artist’s agents wishing to extend their commercial reach.  Johanna 
Drucker identifies the artist’s book as we currently perceive it to be a mid-twentieth 
century conception: 
 
There is no doubt that the artists’ book has become a 
developed artform in the 20th century. In many ways it 
could be argued that the artist’s book is the quintessential 
20th-century artform.  
(1). 
 
 While Johanna Drucker acknowledges the diversity of works that fall under the 
aegis of artist’s books, she also identifies key features that distinguish the artist’s 
book from earlier lexical works; these represent a critical ‘zone of activity’ (1) and a 
high degree of engagement with the philosophical significance of books.  Joanna 
Drew in (1976) pinpoints a preoccupation in artist’s books with ‘written text and 
photographs which has become a byword of the art of the 1970s’ (Attwood et al, 
1976: 7). While Drucker is more nuanced in her attempts to describe the form, 
asking whether it is enough for a work to integrate the ‘formal means of its 
realization and production with its thematic or aesthetic issues’ (Drucker, 1995: 2). 
These issues, for Drucker, only raise more questions, such as ‘Who is the maker?’, 
and ‘Does it have to be a unique work?’ (2); both of these questions are highly 
relevant to my own work, in which the physical construction of the book is 
distributed between myself and those who produce it. As I expect my readers to 
write and draw in my books one might ask if they are also complicit in their physical 
construction, or merely ‘interacting’ with them.  
 Drucker concludes that none of these questions can be easily resolved.  Alternative 
book structures such as multiples only add to the ambiguity of the form. In the 1970s 
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Dieter Roth produced complex works such as Snow, (1970) that deployed 
‘overlapping pages whose structures in his early works served to sculpt the books 
intricate interior space’ (74). Roth also deployed random content as a  disturbance 
of orthodox means of mass production, while other artists such as Ed Ruscha, 
deliberately adopted more conventional forms, for example his ‘Twenty-six Gasoline 
Stations’ (1962), ‘Various Small Fires and Milk’ (1964) and ‘Nine Swimming Pools’ 
(1968), all conform to the same format.   
 Drucker describes Ruscha’s approach as ‘designed to neutralize the physical and 
structural features of the books by making them as conventional and inconspicuous 
in material terms as possible’ (75). Daniel Buren’s documentation of his own 
sculptural work is an interesting example of site specific artist’s books, in which a 
complex interrelationship is established between the work, the site and the book 
form, as is Jan Dibbet’s Robin red breast’s territory/sculpture 1969 (1970), which ‘with  
the aid of text, maps and photographs conveys to the reader the sculptural idea, 
which was to alter the form of the bird’s territory, as well as its realization’ (Atwood 
et al, 1976: 35-36). Other ideas within the domain of artist’s books such as textual 
art, represented for example by the group Art and Language (1968, Terry Atkinson, 
David Bainbridge, Michael Baldwin and Harold Hurrell), also have philosophical and 
aesthetic resonance with my own interests, though it should be noted that Art and 
Language endured an ambivalent reception, their output was described by Attwood 
et al (1976) as ‘strikingly unsuccessful’ (52). In the catalogue to the Arts Council of 
Great Britain’s Artist’s Books exhibition of 1976, Atwood et al write: 
You knew it was supposed to mean something, and you 
even sensed that sometimes it succeeded in meaning 
something…..As with a semi-foreign script or lay-out of half 
comprehended ideograms, the units of meaning could be 
dimly made out but seldom the syntax which bound them 
together. 
(55). 
 
 Art and Language, like the first hypertext fictions writers, may have suffered from 
attempts to embody philosophies of language in an all too literal and laboured 
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fashion. Ian Breakwell’s textual and photographic works, on the other hand, 
represent a highly engaged, diverse and searching practice that goes beyond the 
notable failures of Art and Language. His work resonates deeply with the South 
project. Breakwell’s diaries, for example BC/AD [Before Cancer/After Diagnosis](2004), 
embed subjectivity and embodied identity into the book form, through drawings, 
words, digital images and collage, laying open his experience of inoperable cancer (as 
my character Ivan r does in relation to his own illness). Breakwell’s political and 
autobiographical concerns and his interest in the relationship of photographs and 
cinematic forms to texts are brought together in works resonant of mass 
observation, and also therefore of market research and surveillant practices, which 
my work also addresses.. Breakwell’s works such as Seeing in the Dark (1990), and 
Brought to Book (1994), are a valuable and affecting reference to this project, not least 
of all for his ability to locate his own life within these works without indulgence or 
narcissism, arguably advancing it beyond flâneury or the closed systems and self-
referential failures of Art and Language. Ian Breakwell’s negotiation of both 
autobiographical content and site-specificity exist within a larger context of artists 
rooting their practice and theory within their own experience. This is frequently 
referred to as ‘reflexivity’, but as the next section will show, it is a practice that 
comes with its own potential difficulties and obstructive conventions. 
 
 
Verso and recto: multiple reflections and conceptual spaces 
 
 As I have stated earlier, the use of autobiographical references in the South book is 
not intended as a solipsistic form of self-revelation. Auto-biographical material is 
embedded as part of a wider commitment to framing my own subjectivity as a 
location within the South project and to undermining any illusions of neutrality in this 
work41. Such self-placing is often described as ‘reflexivity’ and it is important to 
acknowledge that many artists and writers have (particularly since the 1970s 
onwards), brought a high degree of reflexivity to their practice, in which they have  
                                                 
41 As I have explained elsewhere in the thesis my own subjective responses are embedded in the 
software as quantitative factors that influence the way the software generates content and its overall 
emotional tone. The software will be parsimonius and sarcastic with users who are signifcanntly 
different from me. 
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analysed and critiqued their own creative processes and assumptions (noteably 
reflexive book artists from the canon of late twentieth century book art include 
Emmett Williams (1984), Helen Douglas and Telfer Stokes (1987)). But this term, as 
identified by Haraway (1997) and Barad (2007), is complex and contentious. 
Haraway and Barad (among others) frame reflexivity as problematically directed in 
orthodox, circular, notions of cause and effect. Haraway writes of the limitation of 
reflexivity, ‘which seems not to be able to get beyond self-vision as the cure for self-
invisibility’ (Haraway, 1997: 33). Haraway frames reflexivity as symptomatic of the 
problem it aims to address, that of the invisibility or spurious neutrality of the  
scientist. ‘Reflexivity is a bad trope for escaping the false choice between realism and 
relativism’, Haraway explains (16). Instead she proposes a ‘diffractive’ methodology, 
in which ‘the production of difference patterns might be a more useful metaphor for 
the needed work than reflexivity’ (34).  Diffraction suggests a less solipsistic form of 
knowing than the reflected understanding implied by reflexivity, it suggests the 
possibility of generating new knowledge without negating our own embedded 
perspectives and experiences. 
 
 
 Despite the stringent critiques of reflexivity outlined above, the essential idea that 
research observations are not independent of the observer is still important within 
this thesis, both for the reasons defined by Graeme Sullivan, who frames ‘reflexivity’ 
as acknowledging the ‘positive impact of experience as a necessary agency to help 
frame responses and to fashion actions’ (Sullivan, 2005: 62), and as the bedrock for a 
more ethically centred practice, as defined by Haraway and Barad.  
 
 An alternative to reflexivity posits the need to account, where possible, (given the 
paradox of this undertaking) for ones own epistemic systems and wider agential 
forces. The recognition of extended notions of agency arguably takes reflexivity 
beyond the circular systems proposed within social theory. However, Johanna 
Drucker’s point in (1995) is specific to the form of the book. While I arguably 
extend Drucker’s notion of reflexivity to include the necessity of exploring my own 
socio-historical relationships to language and reading, I have also deployed a range of 
strategies to investigate the form of the book, which, as Drucker establishes, is a  
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salient feature of many artist’s books. Such a meta-critical book can, 
according to Drucker represent a: 
 
self-conscious record of its own production – it can simply 
examine itself as a proposition – one laden with specific 
ideas about the ways a book can embody an idea through its 
material  forms. There are really two subtexts here. One is 
the “idea of the book as idea” – The self-reflexive creation 
of books which are about being books, or what a book can 
be as an idea in form. The other is the “idea of the book as 
art idea” - which takes these investigations of the book into 
a dialogue with the concept of art, and shows that books are 
an art idea. 
(161). 
 
 The meta-criticality described by Drucker has some resonance with the problematic 
notion of art embodying theory which I discuss at length in relation to early 
hypertext writings in the literature review. Such self-reference must be handled with 
great care if it is not to collapse itself into ever tighter circles of self-contemplation. 
An artist’s book such as Helen Douglas’s and Telfer Stokes’s Real Fiction (1987) is 
cited by Drucker as ‘not merely about its own making, but also about its own 
conceiving’ (195). Similarly the egg shaped interim object deployed in conjunction 
with the South book and software may be seen as a means of performing the birth of 
an artist’s book, readers must physically perform certain functions to complete their 
own version of the book. Real Fiction is important for its attempt to frame the book 
as a spatial entity, bound by protocols which are deeply naturalised in orthodoxies of 
book design and production. On the other hand, a book such as Emmett Williams’s 
Chicken Feet, Duck Limbs, and Dada Handshakes (1984) satirises stereotypical 
constructions of self-referential creativity within artist’s book form, or as he puts it 
“the new genre for lightweights” (cited in Drucker, 1995: 193). My own attempts to 
interrogate the ‘book’s identity’ are approached with  a degree of circumspection 
over the potential for “strikingly unsuccessful” (Attwod et al, 1976: 52) works 
evoked by Art and Language and by George Landow’s (1992) declarations over 
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hypertext and post-modernism’s idealised symbiosis. South does however deploy 
aesthetic strategies to draw attention to both its literary conventions and departures 
and to reinforce a range of authorial positions throughout the text. 
 
 
 
Figure 33 Above left, the golden canon used in South. On the right the ‘van de Graaf’ or ‘secret canon’ 
is not so secretly used in the South book. The left-hand page in a book is called the verso and the right-
hand page is called the recto, these are traditionally scaled and sized identically while the principles of a 
design canon are applied to specific features of the page such as the position of margins and print 
spaces. The geometrical constructions depicted above are also suggestive of certain psychogeographic 
themes relating to London, such as Iain Sinclair’s ideas about the architect Nicholas Hawksmoor and 
the geometry of theistic Satanism. 
 
 The canon of orthodox principles for Western book design is relatively narrow, 
with a few very clearly delineated (though often unarticulated) systems such as the 
Golden canon, and the Van de Graaf canon, (also known as ‘the secret canon’), as 
well as more contemporary divisions of space. The canons are designed to elicit 
concepts such as harmony and balance in the design of book pages and to emphasise 
content over form.  At times the canonical features of book design are destabilised 
within the pages of South, conveying narrative and critical positions where necessary, 
at other times canonical features are highlighted as expressive and conceptual 
aspects of the South system. The book designer and writer Andrew Haslam likens 
the design of books to stage design, authors, he writes ‘provide a score and the 
designer choreographs the performance’ (Haslam, 2005: 30), this is an appealing 
comparison and one that makes sense in light of my own attempts to relate the 
spatial and performative aspects of books to wider notions of what constitutes an  
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environment. Other aesthetic strategies are also used within certain pages to create 
imbalance and tension.   
 
 Another approach I have engaged with is the use of the architectural concept of the 
prospect and the refuge, the notion that ‘people prefer environments where they can 
easily survey their surroundings and quickly hide or retreat to safety if necessary’ 
(Lidwell et al, 2003: 156).  Throughout South there is a balance between pages that 
are open and easily navigable and pages that are more secretive, these are often the 
verso, or left-hand pages.  Other devices that can aid or undermine the readability of 
a page are the gestalt principles of similarity, difference and continuation, in which 
information can be grouped to aid its legibility or to confuse readers by grouping 
unrelated elements and ideas. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34 Above, a page from the South book, it uses the gestalt principles of similarity, difference 
and continuation to direct and misdirect the reader. Continuation is the idea that the eye can be 
compelled to follow a certain path.
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Figure 35 Above, a mock contents page from South. The chart traces the associations 
generated by the word ‘book’. The example destabilises canonical notions of linear and 
logical visual hierarchies as navigational aids for readers. Though the chart is still hierarchical 
it is arguably not spatially indicative of where readers can find further information, it is more 
like a map of undiscovered territories than a useful representation of significant divisions 
within the book. Disorientation is a key theme within the fictional writing and algorithmic 
procedures of South. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 South works in conjunction with tailor made software and an egg that carries 
dynamically generated narratives, in the form of messages and instructions. The 
narratives generated by the South system and book are multi-layered.  By using 
psychometric evaluation and the form and composition of the book as narrative 
mediums South aims to establish a complex relationship between books, their 
readers and the spaces which they navigate. The author of the South book is also 
framed as an overt presence within the South system and as an extension of the idea 
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of a location. The fictional stories and exploratory practices generated by the book 
are enmeshed with many aspects of my own cultural and socio-historical values and 
references, this, I argue is an important aspect of a located and situated practice 
which bears a relationship to Johanna Drucker’s idea of meta-criticality in 
relationship to the book form. South also operates within a continuum of artists 
working with books and investigating the meaning of books as both physical and 
conceptual spaces. This section has explored some of those historical practices and 
has outlined the ways in which South shares some of the key themes of artists 
working with books and other ways in which my practice departs from many 
previous types of artist’s book, most importantly in its relationship to computation 
and its deployment of an agent based system, outlined in chapter six. 
 
 The South book and egg work together in ways that have clear resonance with a 
number of the works I have referred to in this chapter, however, the specific 
processes brought to the book and egg via computation, represent a quite different 
form of mass production, randomness and site specificity than that of the artist’s 
books I have mentioned. The egg may resemble a multiple, but it is a mass produced 
factory object that has not been designed by me. Though the content I generate for 
the egg is mutable and in some ways indeterminate, it is specific to sites and subjects, 
algorithmic in nature and, through the software I have written for it, capable of 
conveying some insight into itself. The South project therefore shares formal aspects 
of earlier works, including Sol LeWitt’s algorithmically generated books, such as Four 
basic kinds of straight lines (1963), which follow strict generative procedures, but the 
South project also presents quite distinct features, most notably those features 
facilitated by the use of techniques from the domain of artificial intelligence, such as 
data collection and analysis, and the ability to make evaluations and learn from 
readers and specific situations through its agent based structures.  Like many of the 
artists who have produced artist’s books, however, I am concerned with what 
Johanna Drucker identifies as ‘serious philosophical interrogations of a book’s 
identity’ (Drucker, 1995: 161). But the self conscious attention to book structure’ 
(161) or metacriticality Drucker describes is not without its own problems, not least 
of all problems relating to issues of subjectivity, authorship and epistemic agency.  
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This chapter has sought to ground the chapters that now follow on from it, in which 
the theoretical and pragmatic issues raised by the South project are emphasised. 
These, as stated above, are issues of agency, subjectivity and knowledge generation, 
as well as historical issues raised by previous digital fictions such as hypertext fictions 
and text adventures. The chapter highlights the relationship between my practice and 
its implications for a subjective and multiply agent-based form of literary 
computation, and its interplay with an analogue book. But, what, one might ask, are 
the implications of locating my own and my readers’ subjectivity within the South 
project?  What do I mean by subjectivity and how does it relate to questions of 
knowledge production and agency? The chapter following the South book case study 
aims to specifically explore the historical meaning of the subject and to relate those 
historical ideas to the critically challenging practices and methodologies used within 
the production of the South book and software.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
South: A Case Study 
 
Scenario 
 
The following scenario, (which could also fall under the aegis of a ‘user profile’ or 
‘persona design’) shows in narrative terms how a real reader, Mašinka Savić42, 
interacts with the South system, outlining and incorporating some of the cultural and 
contextual aspects of her interaction with this work. The goal of this scenario, as 
                                                 
42The name Mašinka Savić is a pseudonym. 
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defined for example by Gaffney (2000) is to provide concrete descriptions and to 
‘remove any unwarranted references to systems or technologies’ (Gaffney, 2000), 
while allowing for a clearer insight into the context and sequence of a user’s 
interaction.  
 
The following example shows how the South system works from the perspective of 
Mašinka, a 43 year old woman living in South London. The subjective experience of 
Mašinka is investigated and emphasised, emphasising that this system is concerned 
with the specific reactions and knowledge generating practices of individual subjects. 
Mašinka is a keen explorer of London who has a long-standing interest in fiction and 
theatre, she is fascinated by both established and newer forms of literature. As an 
‘early adopter’ of technologies and cultural innovations she is the archetypal South 
reader – curious, unafraid of technology and enthusiastic about London in all its 
diversity and intense liveliness. 
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User Profile: Mašinka Savić 43 
 
Mašinka Savić is a 43 year old Serb who has lived in London for over 17 years. 
Mašinka was born in Yugoslavia (as it was formally known) and raised in both Serbia 
and Western Germany (as it was then known). Her mother tongue is Serbo-Croat, 
(which, in relation to Serb speakers is usually now referred to as Serbian) but she 
also speaks German and English fluently. Mašinka is a technical consultant for a 
London-based software firm as well as a keen reader and photographer. I shadowed 
Mašinka as she interacted with the South system and asked her detailed questions 
about the experiences she had. 
 
 
 Above, Mašinka Savić on the South Bank, 16th May 2009. 
 
Name:  Mašinka Savić. 
Age: 43. 
Born: Yugoslavia (in what is now called Serbia). 
Lives: South London. 
Profession: Technical Consultant. 
Likes: Fiction, photography, theatre, film. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 Mašinka Savić is a pseudonym. 
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Excerpt from the South book, all readers, including Mašinka, should read 
this section. 
 
So what is South? South is an instrumental discrimination borne out of the fact that 
without a North there is no South. It is a navigational system created by your own 
networks of meaning. South is a reference axis emanating from the South Bank area 
of South London.  It is perfectly possible to find a slippery surface, lay this book down 
upon it and spin it round to create a new orientation; perhaps we could call it Weast 
or the South East Pole as my Grandfather put it. Whatever name you choose, the 
particular form that your journey to this destination will take is the subject of this 
book. The author and publishers wish you great luck on your journey, however they 
would also like to point out that they cannot accept legal responsibility for any 
strangeness, temporal or subjective dislocation, psychogenic slippages or other 
oddities that might result from it. 
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Excerpt from the South book, Story 2.  
Mašinka is specifically instructed by the software (via the egg) to read this story and follow the 
exercise at the end of it. The story is ‘written’ by the fictional protagonist of South, Ivan Dâr. 
 
Degrees of freedom 
 
 
If I am supposed to be writing an autobiography there is a fundamental flaw in the 
contract which my publishers have hitherto not noticed - there is no real ‘I’ to 
autobiographize. Although it is true I use this solitary symmetrical construction on a 
habitual basis. This ‘I’ of which there is no solid empirical evidence represents a vast 
number of un-useful habits – the continuous construction of un-resourceful 
representations, self destructive symbols, phobias and fear. Taking a small stroll 
through Borough Market will expose a cornucopia of such fears, the fear of not 
having material things and sensuous experiences, to name just two. You may retrace 
these steps yourself; beginning perhaps by the ship of avaricious cruelty we currently 
call the Golden Hind. A boat that represents every malignancy you can care to name. 
Start there, at this mendacious centre piece of Thames-side reverie. 
 
Have I lost you yet? Who are you anyway? Those of you who are expecting to read 
a scientific treatise should already be dismayed by the subjective slant of my writing 
today. Others may be wondering what on earth I am doing using such resources – as 
the phobia, the displacement, the un-resourceful representation. Are these 
theoretical resources? Are you interested? Do they fit into a programming language 
as remotely valid entities? 
 
My goal may once have been to make you all say a resounding communal ‘yes’ 
following a meticulous submission to the elegance of my logic. But there is no longer 
an ‘I’ to either persuade or be persuaded. 
 
We are largely sets of unobservable relations, to even use that term implies an 
anthropocentrism I cannot support, nor yet can I support any form of essentialism. 
This is the world as I encounter it today. Tomorrow I plan to write a chapter on 
differential geometry and group theory that will clarify my slippery realism. I will 
present the case for manifolds, transformation groups and vector fields as fitting 
processes for a differential morphogenesis that works across both time and space, a 
philosophical terrain that consists of both the singular and the ordinary. In short a 
multiplicity, a set of relations and a rate of change. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
Walk from the Golden Hind to Borough Market. You will surely become increasingly aware of 
gustatory representations. Can you resist them? What happens if you do? After 20 minutes suspend 
resistance, now what do you do? Write down exactly what happens. Describe before, after and 
during. Describe urges, flavours and regrets. Next time you come here do the same exercise. Note 
carefully any differences between each visit. In this way you will understand your own degrees of 
freedom. 
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Mašinka’s relationship to language 
 
In our initial interview Mašinka highlighted the importance of language in her life. 
Mašinka told me that her fluency with languages is both a pleasure and an advantage 
but also a source of existential uncertainty. When she returns home to Belgrade 
(Beograd) she sometimes forgets which language she should be speaking. If she has 
been on a recent business trip to Germany her grasp of language is even more 
confused, sometimes she will talk to me using English, Serbian and German words in 
one sentence. Mašinka hates speaking German even though she lived in and was 
educated for long periods there. ‘It hurts my tongue’ is one of her catch phrases. She 
cites the reason as a deep-seated resentment of the racism she experienced as the 
child of Gastarbeiter, though Mašinka does have a number of close German friends. I 
have known Mašinka for many years now, long enough to sense that she would be a 
valuable evaluator of the South software and book; confusingly I also think that 
elements of Mašinka’s personality and life experience have crept into my fictional 
depiction of Ivan Dâr. Far from representing a problematic loss of objectivity I see 
this as an enhanced aspect of Mašinka’s role as a case study and evaluator, but would 
Mašinka recognise or even find herself in the pages of South?  
 
How many languages can you speak? 
Three : Serbo-Croat, German and English, I’m also learning Spanish at the moment. 
 
Please describe what language means to you: 
It’s helped with my work, and I have a lot of friends and colleagues who I can speak to in 
their first languages, but I sometimes get confused about which language  to think in, I feel 
unsettled in some ways, I don’t know where I belong’, I feel restless in myself. 
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‘Who am I? A Yugoslavian, a Serb? But the languages mean I’m thinking in English and 
German too. It isn’t easy to explain, other multi-lingual friends of mine feel the same way, 
we can’t explain it to other people, we have all spent our childhoods between different 
countries. 
(Feedback from Mašinka Savić, May 2009). 
 
 
 
Relationship to technology 
 
Although Mašinka is a technical consultant within a branch of the computer industry, 
she is also cynical about computers and technology, she is particularly wary of the 
hype surrounding technology and is scathing, for example, about what she sees as 
the pretentiousness of Apple Mac users (this came out humorously in her 
exploration of the South algorithms) Despite her cynicism Mašinka has many gadgets, 
and is arguably what the technology industry might describe as an early adopter. 
 
 
Please describe your feelings about technology: 
 
I am in two ways when thinking about technology, I love it because it makes my life easier, 
more interesting and enables me to talk to my friend Dragana every day, despite the fact 
that she lives 2000 miles away. But when my technology lets me down, doesn’t do what I 
want it to do, then I can’t stand it. 
(Feedback from Mašinka Savić, May 2009). 
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Interacting with the South system 
 
 Mašinka’s exploration of the South book and software begins with a detailed 
psychometric evaluation, which could also be described as an investigation of her 
subjectivity and personality traits, current moods, needs and goals. The evaluation 
follows two modes, via the book and then via the computer software, which was 
distributed to Mašinka with the book. The first mode of assessment, via the book, 
establishes a notion of her type, based on fixed procedures, the second mode, via 
the computer, accommodates contextual changes and other dynamic factors, to 
generate a more subtle sense of Mašinka’s defining characteristics and their relation 
to wider forces.  As the narrative will show, these evaluations help the South system 
to generate up- to-date content for the egg (or effector44). 
 
 
 
The egg image-display device. It displays content which is generated by the software 
 and then uploaded into it. 
                                                 
44
 An effector, as its name suggests, generates effects or consequences, it is therefore agential, albeit 
to a limited degree; in this context it means that the egg will make things happen, it will give 
instructions to human agents who will undertake tasks and cause things to happen in the world. 
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Psychometric evaluation 
 
 
Above, the opening screenshot from the South evaluation software. The software takes 
Mašinka through a series of questions designed to identify her current mood and interests. 
 
 
After going through the evaluative exercises Mašinka discovers that she is defined by 
the South system as a Crik, (though she is also very close to being an Um).  A Crik 
is one of the so-called ‘personality types’ constructed by the fictional protagonist of 
the South book, Ivan Dâr (a psychologist with his own identity problems). The types 
defined in the book correspond to the more well known traits: Extroversion (Um), 
Introversion (Lerq) and Sociability (Crik). These traits are contentious; the South 
book treats them as opportunities to explore the notion of fixed and schematised 
personality types. 
 
Crik: A Crik is somewhere between an extrovert and an introvert, her evaluation as 
a Crik does not surprise Mašinka, she recognises in herself both sociable and 
outgoing traits and also a side of herself that is able to cope with being alone and 
indeed thrives on a small amount of solitude. 
 
Please describe your feelings about being classified as a Crik: 
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It’s true I do like being around people but I’m ok to be alone too, I mean it’s not the end of 
the world and I can enjoy it - but not for too long. Basically I like being around other people, 
I don’t like spending too much time with just myself, it gets boring! 
(Feedback from Mašinka Savić, May 2009). 
 
 
The computerised evaluation: 
 
The South software enables a more complex evaluation than the South book, on this 
occasion it has detected quite a lot of negative content on the web, financially the 
country (like the world) is in trouble, the expenses scandal in the Houses of 
Parliament has also been detected by the system and contributes towards  
generating a negative weighting. The weather is rather drizzly and unpredictable as 
well. On a more personal note the system asks Mašinka  to react to some CCTV 
images of the South Bank, and to current news headlines, this data is also assessed by 
the software agents that work within the South system. A language agent examines 
Mašinka’s vocabulary, looking for a ‘linguistic style’ that might reveal significant 
factors about her. 
  
Loading content into the egg: 
 
Having completed both the book based and computer based evaluations Mašinka can 
now instruct the software to generate content for her egg, she then loads it into the 
device via a USB cable. 
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Below left, loading content into the egg via a USB cable. The content consists of 
Images generated by the South software. The images contain written and image-based instructions 
(right). The instructions sometimes tell Mašinka which pages of the South book to read, or things to 
do on the South Bank. 
 
        
 
 
The egg content tells Mašinka (via its images) that the weather forecast is for rain 
and that the pollution levels are low. These facts are reflected in her tasks. 
 
 
Task example: What does wet grass smell like? What memories does it evoke? 
I remember the smell of wet grass around my grandfather’s dacha, up in the mountains; it 
smelt sweet and fresh. He would cut the grass with a huge old blade, a scythe? At night I 
would be frightened because I could hear wolves howling near the house, funny how a smell 
can remind me of this. 
(Feedback from Mašinka Savić, May 2009). 
 
Algorithms: Journey to the South East Pole 
 
Mašinka can now investigate the core components of the South book and egg which 
are its algorithms or activities. These are defined by the processes she has just 
undertaken. Depending on her ‘type’, and on the contextual factors detected by the 
software, each reader’s experience will follow a unique path.  
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The algorithms centre upon a journey to the mystical Axis Mundi or South East Pole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Above, Mašinka’s journey begins at the Golden Hind, St Mary Overie Dock SE1, the software 
chooses a location for her to explore and instructs her to go there through the image files she 
uploaded into the egg. 
 
 
 
 
 
Above, Mašinka’s first task requires her to spy on passers-by 
and choose suitable ‘expedition members’ to accompany her on her 
journey to the South East Pole, these individuals will not literally accompany 
Mašinka, but will be fictionalised in the South book through Mašinka’s own writings. 
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Algorithm Example: 
Mašinka is asked to choose expedition members to accompany her to the South East 
pole: 
Second-In-Command  
Name: David 
 
  
Above, a photograph taken by Mašinka. She chose the man from passers-by to be her fictional 
second-in-command. 
Age: 34 
Briefly describe this person: Physically he is lardy with a big beer belly, a bit clumsy 
because of his size. He is very tall. He would be handsome if he would do some fitness 
exercises and dressed more reasonably.  
 (Mašinka Savić, May 2009). 
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Epistemological investigations, Mašinka as a reader-researcher 
 
Mašinka took several photographs during her ‘psychometric text adventure’.  These 
images are now incorporated into the South Book, as well as the writing exercises 
generated from her interactions. Taking the photographs involved thinking about her 
relationship to the South Bank location, how did she react to certain textures and 
sounds? What can a location tell her about herself? South uses the environment as a 
form of psychometric and epistemological apparatus, asking and enabling specific 
subjects to investigate how they generate narratives about a location. The book and 
software explicitly asks subjects to ask themselves not only what they know about a 
location, but how they know. The South software can dynamically guide reader’s to 
forms of knowledge generation that they might not usually be conscious of, such as 
embodied and skills based knowledge, or more symbolic forms of knowledge 
generation, involving a priori hypotheses and conditional logic. The software does 
this by asking Mašinka to engage in tasks such as writing, describing, making certain 
types of movements, tasting and touching, in other words to use a range of 
epistemological options to explore both herself and the South Bank. 
 
 
Below, Mašinka’s photographs, the South software generated content for her, the content instructed 
Mašinka to take these photographs. 
 
 
Myself as a texture. 
(Feedback and image by Mašinka Savić, May 2009). 
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Something I like – the London Eye and the sky. 
(Feedback and image by Mašinka Savić, May 2009). 
 
 
 
 
Something I don’t like – rubbish. 
(Feedback and image by Mašinka Savić, May 2009). 
 
 
 
A female place – champagne bar. 
(Feedback and image by Mašinka Savić, May 2009). 
 
 
 
 
A male place – a concrete staircase. 
(Feedback and image by Mašinka Savić, May 2009). 
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Above, Mašinka engages in a range of activities suggested by the egg content, these often involve 
generating her own content for the South book through processes of observation and writing, as well 
as photography. 
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Subjective Relationship to space 
Many of the exercises are about Mašinka’s subjective relationship to space, these 
exercises involve exploring the area around the South Bank through a range of 
sensory engagements – listening, touching, and tasting, smelling and hearing. The 
exercises particularly focus on listening, a skill that Criks and Ums often need to 
refine. The photographs of Mašinka were taken as I ‘shadowed’ her interactions with 
the South system. 
              
      
 
Above, Mašinka at the South Bank, May 2009. 
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Above, Mašinka places dots in the South book (in which there is a map of the Thames) to indicate her 
feelings about different areas; she puts red dots on areas she feels are not very safe for her. The size 
of the dot indicates the magnitude of her feelings. Blue dots indicate areas of enjoyment and 
excitement. Green dots represent areas of relaxation. 
 
Outcomes 
 
What happened? 
 
I could come back and do this again and the experience would be completely different, it’s an 
unusual way of being somewhere – asking questions about the place and looking at my own 
reactions .I’ve never really  thought about how I feel about textures or sounds in this way. It was 
interesting – I think I’ll do this with other places, make up my own exercises….I do see some 
strange similarities with the character, Ivan, his name could be Serbian! When I read the stuff about 
him not being allowed to speak Welsh it reminded me of Balkan history – language has historically 
been used as a weapon somehow, to try and hurt  peoples Identity. Speaking another language can 
feel like a test, in Germany if you are an ‘outsider’ there’s always that chance that they expect your 
speaking of their language to be inferior, and then this is made to mean you are somehow inferior in 
their eyes, at least that’s how it felt to me, though I speak Hochdeutsch or ‘high’ German, which is 
posher then a lot of Germans! I understand why the character became confused – he just didn’t 
know who he was. 
(Feedback from Mašinka Savić, May 2009). 
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Summary 
 
 
New material 
 
 
 
Figure 36 Above, the South book in different editions, Mašinka’s content has been added to 
the book and represents a new edition. The updated book is available on the internet. 
Readers can submit new content via the South project website. Publish-on-demand 
technology makes it possible to rapidly update and re-issue versions of the book. 
 
 
 Mašinka took several photographs during her ‘psychometric text adventure’, and did 
a number of drawings in her book; these images are now incorporated into the South 
system, as well as the writing exercises generated from her interactions. Taking the 
photographs involved thinking about her relationship to the South Bank location, 
how did she react to certain textures and sounds? What did the location tell her 
about herself? South uses the environment as an expansion of psychometric 
apparatus, but the reader, in this case, Mašinka, is also reframed as a resource for 
expanding the book, both in terms of content and any new ideas or exercises she 
can bring to it. 
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 Mašinka’s interaction with the South system is not over. The system is designed to 
evolve in relation to readers and to incorporate their own contributions, research 
outcomes and any new practices readers originate. Mašinka has stated that she 
would like to return to the South Bank with her book and egg, perhaps in three or 
four months time to see how her feelings and perceptions might have altered. She 
also said that she might try some of the exercises in different locations, something I 
had not anticipated, and a welcome innovation on the basic South idea. Mašinka is 
free to expand the project in anyway she likes. As explained on the previous page if 
she wishes she can publish her own variation on the South Book. In this sense the 
South project is an Open Source project, both as a form of literature and technology. 
 
An additional level of user design is also solicited through the possibility of user 
based re-configuration or hacking of the South software. This is facilitated through a 
book within the South book called South Hacks. South Hacks enables readers to 
‘hack’ into the South software and transform it by accessing and rewriting my Java 
and Processing code. These ‘hacks’ can be resubmitted and incorporated or 
embedded into the South software for future readers, even at the expense of 
destroying the system. (South Hacks is embedded within the South book, as a book 
within a book, and is also available online here: 
http://www.doc.gold.ac.uk/~ma501ed/south/Hacking%20south.pdf.). Likewise 
participatory stories, photographs and drawings have become permanent elements 
within new editions of the South book.  On this occasion, however, Mašinka did not 
choose to hack into the South software. 
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Figure 37 Below, South Hacks, a how to book for ‘hacking’ into and transforming the South 
software via its Java and Processing code. The book examines the algorithms that form the 
South software and explains how readers can reformulate them. 
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Figure 38 Above, text generated by the South software for a specific reader. 
 
Chapter 5: A Psychometric text adventure. 
Navigating subjectivity along the South Bank. 
Chapter 5: A Psychometric text  1 
 
 
‘Apart from the experiences of subjects there is, nothing, nothing, nothing, bare 
nothingness.’45 
(A.N. Whitehead) 
 
                                                 
45 A.N. Whitehead (1927-1928, 1985:67) cited by Paul Stenner, A.N. Whitehead and Subjectivity, in 
Blackman et al 2008. 
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 Subjectivity and interactivity are the two key areas that inform my research and 
practice. The theoretical discourses around subjectivity that I have researched 
identify many problematic aspects in relation to the very notion of a subject, 
subjectivity and the supposedly diametrical construction, objectivity. The idea of 
individualism as a philosophical position (as opposed to an unquestionable 
phenomena) is now quite widely accepted, in, for example, the writings of Derrida 
(2002), Deleuze (1981), Hollway (1984, 1989), Foucault (1988) and Alcoff and Potter 
(1993). In these writings orthodox notions of the subject are held to be normative, 
static and solipsistic. The challenge of creating the South system has been to work in 
practical terms with these insights, to integrate new conceptions of the subject and 
subjectivising processes into my creative practice.  
 
 
This chapter will outline those criticisms and show how they relate directly to the 
South project. In addition to my own practice, useful examples of artists working 
with issues of subjectivity are found in projects created by, among others, Jeffrey 
Shaw and Graham Harwood, and the playwright Martin Crimp. Their work will also 
be examined in this chapter. Firstly, I will discuss the problems associated with 
Western notions of the subject and the tensions that these points of conflict raise in 
relation to my own work. I will show how the notion of a unitary, rational and 
essentially disembodied subject has informed many of the assumptions embedded in 
notions of interactivity.  My own work is particularly engaged with issues of 
evaluation, of constructing a model of a subject within my software and writing. I will 
explain the background to these problems and the way in which I have attempted to 
creatively destabilise evaluative processes such as repertory grids46 and psychometric 
tests.  
 
 The middle section of this chapter will explain new conceptions of subject-object 
boundaries exemplified by Barad’s (2007) idea of the intra-active, it will also look at 
the notion of situated knowledge proposed by both Haraway (1991) and Suchman  
                                                 
46 The repertory grid technique is based on George Kelly’s personal construct psychology, developed in 
the 1950s. It is a positivist form of personal assessment in which subjects delineate their own 
constructs or hypotheses about themes such as relationships and work. 
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(1987, 2006).  The later half of the chapter explores issues of embodiment and their 
implication for a new form of experiencing both narrative and computational 
interfaces.   
 
 Finally, I will expand upon how my practice has emerged in relation to theoretical 
ideas of the subject and subjectivity, illustrating in detail what I did, how I undertook 
my work, why this work is relevant and original, and what results or conclusions 
have arisen from it. As mentioned, I will look in some detail at the work of other 
artists concerned with subjectivity and subjectivising processes. 
 
 
5.1  Problems of subjectivity and evaluation 
5.1 Problems of subjectivity 1 
 The South system is designed to guide readers through an initial process of 
subjective evaluation in order to generate appropriate content, both factual and 
fictional, about the South Bank area of South London. The processes deployed in this 
evaluation are the result of research into psychometric techniques but also of 
research into critical thinking around the very notion of obtaining an objective, 
categorical and stable assessment of an individual’s personality. My research indicates 
that all of these terms and indeed, all of these practices are problematic, but my 
research also indicates that there is a call for an alternative form of investigation into 
subjectivity and subjectivising processes. The philosopher Rosi Braidotti  (2002) is 
energetic in her call for ‘more innovative and creative energy in thinking about the 
structures of subjectivity at a time in history when social, economic, cultural and 
symbolic regimes of representation are changing very fast ‘(Braidotti, 2002 : 73). But 
Braidotti also asks, is the ‘model of scientific rationality a suitable frame of reference 
to express the new subjectivity? Is the model of artistic creativity any better? How 
does it act upon the social imaginary? Will mythos or logos prove to be a better ally in 
the big leap across the post-modern void?’ (173). It is interesting to note that a 
writer who so keenly identifies the dangers of either/or thinking should create, albeit 
rhetorically, an opposition between scientists and artists, as if art can represent 
everyone anymore than science can.  Writers such as Braidotti, (2002) Alcoff (1993) 
and Hollway (1984, 1989) have cogently argued that Western notions of the subject 
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have been predicated upon universalising and damaging sets of dualisms, and in doing 
so these dualisms have shaped almost every aspect of Western culture, establishing 
entrenched, polarised forms, of knowledge production. Foremost in the oppositions 
established by a Western conception of the subject are the separations between 
body and mind and between the individual and their society. 
   
 
The Cartesian Cogito 
 
 My initial research into subjectivity pinpointed the centrality of the Cartesian Cogito 
in Western conceptions of the subject and of dualistic modes of thought. The Cogito 
is characterised as a unitary, rational and cerebral subject. Feminist epistemologists 
such as Alcoff and Potter (1993) and Grosz (1994) emphasise the historical 
identification of the Cogito with masculinity, and by implication with a polarised 
construction that frames the feminine as irrational and corporeal.  My practice aims 
to connect the problematic constructions of the subject I have identified to 
computational structures and conventions, in particular to some of the assumptions 
embedded within orthodox conceptions of interactivity and agency. These 
assumptions are also relevant to many computational works that generate and 
reformulate various types of narrative, in particular to works that make claims for 
the democratisation of writing, identified by Mateas and Sengers (2003) as works in 
which the computer is framed as a value free or neutral conduit for ‘utopian 
navigation’ (162).  
 
 The notion of neutrality is embedded in the empirical, positivist47 subject who 
emerged from the paradigm of the Cartesian Cogito. Such a subject is someone for 
whom the senses activate a solipsistic, singular ability to detect universal truths. The 
absence of this ability is framed as a systemic failure, such as the state of being 
female, non-white or in some other way excluded from access to a received 
conception of rationality.  If this appears to be an extreme characterisation of 
Western notions of the subject it is important to remember that this idea of the  
                                                 
47 Also referred to as the ‘empirical-positivist’ subject, by, for example, Code in Alcoff and Potter 
(1993). 
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subject is a limited conception.  Such a construction was also used to justify 
disenfranchising and enslaving subjects due to their perceived inability to reason. 
Within living memory British women were denied the vote on the grounds of this 
incapacity, indeed in Switzerland women did not get the right to vote until 1971; two 
conservative half-cantons, Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Appenzell Innerrhoden did 
not grant women the right to vote until 1989 and 1990, the argument being that the 
constitutional reference to citizens did not include women. Whether a person is 
characterised as a citizen or a subject my point is that these are not neutral or natural 
categories but historically and politically motivated constructions that have the same 
provenance as the supposedly objective or value free empirical scientific subject or 
knower.  
 
These constricted notions of the subject have informed scientific practice at many 
levels, and, as Alison Adam (1990) writes, this includes the field of Artificial 
Intelligence and Computer Science. The so called ‘view-from-nowhere’ identified by 
Thomas Nagel (1986) is predicated upon universal subjects, described by Adam as 
‘the archetypal knowers, authors of scientific research are supposed to be 
anonymous. The individual is always abstract and it is held that this makes no 
difference to the quality of the research’ (77). But, as Adam points out, this is based 
on an idealised construction of the knower: ‘these “subjects” are interchangeable 
only across a narrow range of implicit group membership. And the group in question 
is the dominant social group in Western Capitalist societies: propertied, educated, 
white men’ (77). 
 
 The misleading presumption of neutrality is a core theme of feminist epistemologies.  
These presumptions have obscured the wholly located and subject-specific nature of 
scientific practices. Writers such as Susan Hekman (1990), Evelyn Fox-Keller (1985), 
Alison Adam (1998), Alcoff and Potter (1993), Code and Harding (1993) have 
written at length about how, in Code’s words ‘such beliefs derive from conceptions 
of detached and faceless cognitive agency that mask the variability of the experiences 
and practices from which knowledge is constructed’ (Alcoff and Potter: 26). This is 
not to argue for a relativist epistemology (described by Harding as ‘anathema to any  
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scientific project’ (61)) but to argue for the appropriateness of looking at new means 
of thinking about subjectivity and, by extension, subjectifying processes. 
  
 Interdependencies between subjectivity, epistemology and interactivity are central 
to my practice, and to the writing that accompanies my research, but the issues and 
conflicts, and more importantly, the alternatives identified by writers such as 
Braidotti (2002), Hollway and Henriques et al (1984) uncover further difficulties 
which I will explore in this chapter, such as why, for example, certain facets of a 
subject appear to be immutable or resistant to change, and why companies and large 
organisations such as the army continue to use psychometric methodologies founded 
upon Western paradigms of the unitary subject.    
 
Evaluation practices 
 
I have focused so far on one particularly pervasive notion of the subject, the 
empirical subject who is able to detect truths through sensory input. This subject 
personifies the idealised scientific observer who is neutral and trans-historical.  But I 
do not want to give the impression that this idea of a subject has been uncritically 
accepted. The conception of the subject is contentious and has been the focus of 
many conflicting theories. Philosophers such as Nietzsche and Spinoza challenged 
Cartesian philosophy. Nietzsche (188748), rejected the presumption of humanist 
agency and rational intent, and Spinoza’s (1677) Monism was a direct attack upon 
Cartesian mind-body dualism49.  Likewise the processes of subjective evaluation 
developed from the nineteenth century onwards are the source of ongoing ethical 
and pragmatic disagreement. By and large I have chosen to work with, and critique 
dominant conceptions of the subject and the subjectifying practices that have 
emerged from those notions. 
 
  
  
                                                 
48 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (1887). 
49 See Grosz (1994) for her explanation of what she calls anomalous philosophers, those thinkers who 
‘self-consciously questioned the terms within which Cartesian dualism and all its offshoots are framed’ 
(10) including Baruch Spinoza and Friedrich Nietzsche. 
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My own work asks many of the core questions that personality psychologists hope 
to answer through assessment methodologies. Finding answers to these questions is 
also useful, if not crucial, for any writer trying to build a conventional dramatic 
characterisation. The core questions embedded in my software and writing consist 
of the following: 
  
• What are a person’s most important characteristics? 
• How do they adapt to specific situations? 
• What drives that person? What do they want? 
• What are their goals and how do they fulfil them?  
• What things does a person try to avoid and how do they try to accomplish 
such avoidance? 
• How do they cope with difficulties? 
• What is their overarching sense of their life’s meaning (if any)? 
 
 
 In creating a system to ask these questions I have been influenced by my 
involvement in predominantly commercial forms of subjective evaluation through 
intermittent work as a market research interviewer over a seventeen-year period. 
This work very often involved quantitative forms of subjective assessment. My own 
practice is aware of the conflicting and problematic issues at the core of subjective 
evaluations and personality psychology; it deploys evaluative methodologies with a 
view to generating critical engagement.  But why, I ask myself, despite the clear 
limitations of these practices and in light of a growing body of opposition to fixed 
notions of the subject, did my various employers continue to use these techniques, 
and perhaps more puzzling, why did their clients continue to pay for this research? 
 
 Wendy Hollway (1984) asks a similar question of occupational assessment:  
 
Does it work? The question immediately begs two others. 
First, what is ‘it’? Second, what constitutes ‘working’? In 
answer to the first question, it can be recognised more 
readily that psychological assessment is not a homogeneous 
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body of knowledge when we see it as a production in 
various diverse sites.  
(Hollway, 1984:  27). 
 
 Hollway frames the conception of the individual within occupational assessment as a 
‘social technology enabling the administration and regulation of employees’ (28). 
Within institutional assessment practices it is naïve in her terms to look for a straight 
forward ‘progress towards truth’ (27).  Hollway emphasises the historical motivation 
within what was then called occupational psychology, to aid organisations with ‘the 
complex problems of maximizing profitability’ (29).  It is important to note the 
connections between personal psychology and commercial interests, and in my 
work, to make overt the connections between psychological assessment 
methodologies and market research practices. 
 
 
Repertory grids and ‘Man the Scientist’ 
 
 An assessment practice that I have explored and indeed, deployed throughout my 
work has been George A. Kelly’s Personal Construct Repertory Test (1955), multiple 
examples of Kelly’s grids can be found in the first half of the South book. These grids 
involve the exhaustive formulation of bi-polar constructs from which hypotheses can 
be tested. Constructs are obtained through a systematic process in which triads are 
examined in order to select the two that are somehow similar and a third that is 
different. The source material for these processes may be, for example, significant 
people and places. Exhaustive construct elicitation is designed to reveal patterns of 
experiential categorization or cognitive styles; these may be singular or inter-
subjective. This type of personality assessment has been held up as a somewhat 
heterodox form of evaluation, foremost because Personal Construct Psychology does 
not incorporate notions of personality traits, developmental stages or unconscious 
motivations. The person being evaluated constructs their own sets of hypotheses 
with the aid of an experimenter or psychologist/counsellor. As such it may be 
tempting to view this system as an alternative to the normativising ideologies of 
other, more trait-oriented tests, such as Costa and McRae’s version of the Big Five  
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Test of Personality (1990), Cattell’s Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (1945) or 
Hans Eysenck’s Big Three Supertraits (1947), which are all predicated on more or less 
monolithic notions of personality traits such as extraversion-introversion, 
neuroticism and psychoticism. However, despite its seemingly unorthodox approach, 
Personal Construct Psychology does fit within an orthodox humanist tradition, framing 
its subjects as rational and innately able to identify and test hypotheses. In 1955 
George Kelly wrote: ‘The aspirations of the scientist are essentially the aspirations of 
all men’ (Kelly 1955: 43). Kelly’s approach is a precursor to cognitive theories of 
personality, in which an individual’s social-cognitive style or adaptation is the key to 
assessing their individual psychology.  It is an approach that is close to the 
information processing paradigms critiqued by Hayles (1999), Haraway (1991) and 
Barad (2007).   
 
 
 In framing ‘all men’ as tantamount to the idealised figure of ‘the scientist’ it is 
important to ask what types of knowledge and what types of men, or indeed what 
types of people this statement rejects. Secondly, it is important to remember, as 
Henriques states (Henriques et al, 1984), that Personal Construct Theory does not 
take account of the Experimenter Effect, in which the experimenter’s own feelings, 
attitudes or expectations effect the outcome, nor does it take any account of the 
irrational, seemingly self-defeating actions of certain individuals. Personal Construct 
Theory ignores inconvenient or messy variables that hint at a less than rational 
subject. Most significantly, Personal Construct Theory is based on a conception of 
the rational and unitary individual, who may be influenced by social forces or social 
contexts, but is nevertheless distinct and separate from their society. 
  
 I have explained how my work is concerned with investigating conceptions of 
subjectivity and subjectifying processes within the context of a system for generating 
both factual and fictional writing. My deployment of these methodologies is 
consciously problematic, as I will demonstrate in the final section of this chapter, I 
have used these techniques in a way that destabilises their core assumptions and 
seeks to reframe subjectifying practices as performative, situated and processual. The 
next section looks at the implications of working with new ideas around the knowing 
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subject. These ideas challenge the notion of the Cartesian cogito who is implacably 
separate from his society. In questioning scientifically orthodox ideas of who and 
what a subject is, the idea of the object is also examined, including the way in which 
subject-object boundaries are constructed or perceived in the conception of 
interactivity. 
 
 
 
 
5.2 New forms of knowledge  
5.2 New forms of knowledge  1 
 
 
 Rethinking the subject is closely linked to epistemology (or theories around the 
nature of knowledge), but in problematising Western notions of both the Cartesian 
and the Empirical subject or knower (who have arguably dominated Western 
epistemological schemas and scientific paradigms of knowledge production) what 
alternative forms of knowing can be formulated and what type of knowers might 
engage in this knowing? I have discussed how the orthodox Western subject has 
been narrowly construed, representing a particular group of people with their own 
expectations, agendas and historical specificities. I have also shown how the assumed 
neutrality of the idealised scientific knower has been challenged by writers such as 
Fox-Keller, Adam, Haraway and Henriques et al, and in fact that expectations of 
neutrality have been largely abandoned by these writers. Haraway is at the forefront 
of feminist scientists calling for a new type of knowledge that acknowledges the 
partial perspective and situatedness of epistemological processes. I shall explain how 
these ideas, in tandem with ideas about embodiment and skills-based knowledge, 
relate to my own practices around interactivity and to the construction of my 
computational structures. 
 
Situated knowledges 
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The writer Donna Haraway identifies the seemingly contradictory requirements of a 
so-called successor science, a science defined by Harding (1993) as a project that will 
address the systemic short-comings identified in particular by feminist 
epistemologists and scientists, failings which Haraway defines as the ‘hierarchical 
positivist orderings of what can count as knowledge’ (Haraway, 1991: 188).  Haraway 
frames this successor science as owning a ‘radical multiplicity of local knowledges’ 
(187). Such a multiplicity enables a new form of objectivity that can accommodate 
post-modern insights into knowledge production, particularly post-modernism’s 
emphasis upon power relations, and its attack upon the implicitly universalising, 
grand narratives of humanism.  
 
 A successor science proposes a new form of objectivity that Haraway describes as 
turning ‘out to be about particular and specific embodiment, and definitely not about 
the false vision promising transcendence of all limits and responsibility’ (190). The 
building of multiple and multi-linear accounts of individual and site specific narratives 
within my own practice is corroborated in the idea of a successor science. The core 
insights of Donna Haraway (1991), Sandra Harding (1986, 1991), Lorraine Code 
(1993), Lucy Suchman (1987, 2007), Karen Barad (2007) and Elizabeth Grosz (1994) 
are in many ways congruent with my own practical interest in creating transparent 
and openly partial structures within the South project.  Haraway writes: 
 
The moral is simple: only partial perspective promises 
objective vision, this is an objective vision that invites rather 
than closes off, the problem of responsibility for the 
generativity of all visual practices. 
(Haraway, 1991: 198). 
 
Using visual practices as an example Haraway emphasises the corporeality of this 
sensory system, which is undeniably embodied and not as she puts it ‘a gaze from 
nowhere’ (188). Despite this, vision has been used within Western scientism to 
somehow signify a transcendental and neutral observer, it has been allowed in other 
words to ‘represent while escaping representation’ (188). But Haraway is keen to 
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point out that her notion of embodiment and particularity also serves as a metaphor 
for non-human forms of vision, including vision in its varied technological forms: 
I would like to suggest how our insisting metaphorically on 
the particularity and embodiment of all vision (though not 
necessarily organic embodiment and including technological 
mediation) are not giving in to the tempting myths of vision 
as a route to disembodiment and second-birthing, allows us 
to construct a usable, but not an innocent, doctrine of 
objectivity. 
(189). 
 
Within my own software and writing I have embedded mechanisms for representing 
my own and my reader’s partial perspectives. Locating oneself and the particularity 
of one’s own vision represents an ethics of knowledge production, but also a more 
complex bringing together of subjects and objects, which, as I intend to illustrate by 
the end of this chapter, has opened up new possibilities for interactive literary 
processes within my work.  
Non-isomorphic subjects 
Throughout my practice I have used CCTV images (among other materials) taken 
from networked surveillance cameras located along the banks of the River Thames. I 
have used these images to generate subject and site specific narratives and to obtain 
supposedly psychometric assessments of individuals.  The gaze of these apparently 
impartial cameras is re-subjectified by a series of both analogue and digital processes. 
Within the digitally instantiated works these images are dynamically taken from the 
web, emphasising a mutable and nomadic form of subjectivity. No image is identical 
to another, and yet, on the surface they appear to be monotonously similar. I 
understand these images, whose overt use is for the control and regulation of traffic, 
crime and the flow of the city, as having a direct relationship to the nineteenth 
century institutional photographic practices described by John Tagg (1988) as ‘a 
proliferating system of documentation – of which photographic records were only a  
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part’ (63). On the surface these practices are stripped of partial perspective; these 
may be naively described as forensic or objective images. Their origins in scientific or  
penal institutions camouflage an underlying perspective and partiality. But as Tagg 
points out: ‘Like the state, the camera is never neutral. The representations it 
produces are highly coded, and the power it wields is never its own’ (63-64). 
Figure 39 following page, an algorithm from the South software that attempts to detect the 
presence of buses outside Borough tube station and below that, CCTV imagery of the South 
Bank (left) used within the South software to generate dynamic narratives (right). 
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/** 
*  
*detect the presence of buses  
*in a CCTV image of Borough 
*  
*  
@param null 
*  
@return void 
*/ 
public void redDraw() { 
 
image(arch, 0, 0, 352, 288); 
 
// slice where I’m looking for buses 
PImage grab = get(110, 25, 100, 80); // x, y width height 
aPixels2 = new int[grab.width * grab.height]; // 
fill(255); 
grab.loadPixels(); 
for (int i = 0; i < grab.width * grab.height; i++) { 
 
int cc = grab.pixels[PApplet.parseInt(i)]; 
 
float rc = red(cc); //Get the red value of pixel array 
float gc = green(cc); 
float bc = blue(cc); 
 
if ((rc >= 206) && (gc <= 169) && (bc <= 204)) { 
/*works on daytime  CCTV of  Borough, my birth place */ 
fill(255, 0, 0); 
 
rede2 += 20; 
redd = rede2; 
} 
} 
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 My practice engineers, where possible, an end to representing ‘while escaping 
representation’. An end, for example, to the power of CCTV cameras to escape 
such representation. Throughout the South software CCTV cameras and images act 
as proxy narrators (or narrative agents) bringing to the surface a range of desires, 
beliefs, agendas and motivations, factors that are suppressed in Western scientism 
and scientific notions of observer neutrality. Through the South software institutional 
CCTV images are deployed as story-telling mechanisms; this is not represented as a 
novel form of use for such cameras but their typically concealed métier. 
 Haraway’s application of both human and technological vision as a central metaphor 
in her notion of situated knowledges has pragmatic resonance with the South system, 
in which I attempt to pursue new forms of knowledge production through an 
epistemology that is embodied, non-neutral and always engaged with a view from 
somewhere. Haraway writes: 
 all eyes, including our own organic ones, are active 
perceptual systems, building in translations and specific ways 
of seeing, that is, ways of life. There is no unmediated 
photograph or passive camera obscura in scientific accounts 
of bodies and machines; there are only highly specific visual  
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possibilities, each with a wonderfully detailed, active, partial 
way of organizing worlds.  
(190). 
Within the South system the overt deployment of CCTV cameras as narrative 
conduits is a form of both situated story telling and subjectification. The mechanisms 
I have designed within this system negotiate and test new forms of objectivity while 
exploring subjective and inter-subjective responses to test materials: news headlines, 
CCTV and other images, smells, sounds and tactile experiences. By asking readers to 
locate and test their subjective responses against those of other readers (via reader 
contributed content in the South book) and also against established epistemologies 
(such as propositional knowledge in the form of personality types), readers may 
generate the forms of partial knowledge described by Haraway as ‘situated’. These 
mechanisms form an attempt to deploy a creative form of successor objectivity, the 
result, in literary terms, is an artefact and a process that generates multiple, 
concurrent threads of partial and locatable knowledges. As I have stated before, this 
is not to be confused with a relativist project. A relativist account according to 
Haraway is ‘a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally, the 
‘equality’ of positions is a denial of responsibility and critical enquiry’ (191). Haraway 
firmly states that relativism is also a denial of specificity, mirrored in its supposedly 
diametric construction, the authoritative, totalising claims of positivist science: 
Relativism and totalization are both ‘god-tricks’ promising 
vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully, 
common myths in rhetorics surrounding Science. But it is 
precisely in the politics and epistemology of partial 
perspectives that the possibility of sustained, rational, 
objective enquiry rests.  
(191). 
 I have pursued a practice in which an alternative form of objectivity is embedded. 
This objectivity is also connected to the perspective of other people, and is not 
‘innocent’ of its power in creating an evaluatory practice. In response to this 
realisation I have built in mechanisms to make my partiality as visible as possible 
within the system, but as Haraway points out:
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We are not immediately present to ourselves. Self-
knowledge requires a semiotic-material technology linking 
meanings and bodies. The boys in the human sciences have  
called this doubt about self-presence the ‘death-of-the-
subject’. That single ordering point of will and 
consciousness. That judgement seems bizarre to me. I 
prefer to call this generative doubt the opening of non-
isomorphic subjects, agents, and territories of stories.  
(191). 
 
Within the South system the apparent isomorphism between one CCTV image and 
the next is subject to a similar form of generative doubt. The South system 
automatically seeks out differences between images, these differences are 
interpreted in narrative terms, readers are invited to provide their own 
interpretation of what these differences mean. Readers are also photographed 
(subject to their cooperation) and according to data I have uploaded that day, 
(relating to my own state, a subjective index of mood, reactions, finances and other 
parameters), these I.D photographs are subject to a range of image processing 
effects. Images of readers are also overlaid with time-specific data generated in the 
moments of their interaction with the South system.  The result is a visual record of 
readers defined in overtly located and specific terms via my own shifting categories 
and responses. The fact that my own partiality is literally embedded in these images 
denies representation without being represented, which Haraway describes as ‘the 
cyclopean self-satiated eye of the master subject’ (191). 
 
Figure 40 following page, reader images from the South system convoluted with my own 
image. Temporally specific data is imposed upon the images. 
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 Interactionism 
 Haraway’s outline for a new form of objectivity also addresses the society/individual 
dualism described by many of the epistemologists I have referred to throughout this 
thesis. In a psychological context Wendy Hollway (Hollway, 1989) makes the 
connection between this society/individual schism and the notion of ‘interactionism’, 
identifying the ‘hopeless dualism’ (27) that separates an individual from their society 
in mainstream social-psychological practices. Interactionism has been used within 
social psychology to characterise the relationship of the individual to the social, it 
frames the individual as asocial and ‘inevitably reduces to biology and information 
processing mechanisms’ (28), bringing us back to a unitary, innately rational notion of 
the subject.  
Both Haraway and Hollway highlight for me the importance, as both a researcher 
and practitioner, of not falling in with binary positions in relation to agency, of not 
placing agency solely in the hands of an individual (and, for example, their biology) or, 
on the other hand, of characterising agency as a phenomena determined by social 
forces alone. Rational knowledge according to Haraway is a ‘power-sensitive 
conversation’ (Haraway, 1991: 196), a view that envisions science as ‘the 
paradigmatic model not of closure, but of that which is contestable and contested’ 
(196).  Likewise Hollway envisages a radically different relationship between 
researchers, their ‘subjects’ and the knowledge they generate: 
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My theorising displaces objective rationality from the centre 
of the human subject and produces radical possibilities for 
the use of subjective knowledge.  
(Hollway, 1989: 25). 
 
 Haraway states firmly that is not identity however that generates scientific 
knowledge (or science as she puts it), but critical positioning, her alternative form of 
objectivity: ‘A scientific knower seeks the subject position not of identity, but of 
objectivity; that is, partial connection’ (Haraway, 1991: 193). To make claims for 
knowing the identity of another in its entirety is to enact what Haraway frequently 
alludes to as the ‘god-trick’. My practice is wholly committed to the removal of any 
such ‘god-tricks’, despite the arguable presence of such master standpoints within 
many orthodox computational practices (not to mention psychological assessment 
methodologies). My own methodology and practice applies a conscious requirement 
to identify structures and assumptions that rely on the idea of an omniscient, 
idealised and un-represented, conquering eye.  Likewise within the evaluation 
processes I have used there is an overt indexing to my own perspectives. My aim is 
to create as high a degree of transparency as possible within the South System. The 
South software deploys charts, diagrams and disruptive photographic processes that 
are designed to locate and embed a critical self-representation. 
  
Haraway’s descriptions of an alternative objectivity have been key research 
references for this project; her notion of a locatable form of rationality is resonant 
with the South project and its software architectures. These architectures are not 
‘the products of escape and transcendence of limits, i.e. the view from above, but the 
joining of partial views and halting voices into a collective subject position that 
promises a vision of the means of ongoing finite embodiment, of living within limits 
and contradiction, i.e. of views from somewhere’ (196).  In this vision of collective 
subject positions the notion of boundaries between objects and subjects becomes far 
more mutable than in orthodox scientific epistemologies. ‘Boundaries’ Haraway 
writes ‘are drawn by mapping practices; ‘objects’ do not pre-exist as such. Objects 
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are boundary projects’ (201).  The indices to my own subjective evaluation within 
the South system (produced as instrumental weightings within the software) are also 
processual in nature and do not exhibit pre-existent states. They are defined by my 
own mutability and by the mutability of all the parameters within the evaluation 
processes, as such I would characterise the system as situated, both in the 
theoretical terms  Haraway describes and in Suchman’s (1987, 2006) conception of 
situated systems within computer-human interactions. 
 Lucy Suchman’s work is invaluable in offering both a radical agenda, in terms of key 
theoretical notions of who systems are designed for (epistemologically), as well as 
making a profoundly pragmatic contribution to understanding how these theoretical 
insights can be used within real-world systems. Citing the ideas of Barad and Grosz I 
will show how I have engaged with my own alternative and pragmatic forms of 
interactivity, which Barad calls intra-activity. This form of interaction is centred upon 
the notion of situated knowledge expounded by Haraway, but it also places emphasis 
upon the embodied and processual nature of all interactions, interactions, that, as I 
will demonstrate, are not predicated on the separation of individuals from society or 
the separation of mind from body. 
 
 
 
5.3 Interactivity and prior systems 
5.3 Interactivity and prior systems 1 
 
 Suchman’s (1987, 2007) radical reframing of computer-human interaction relates to 
the degree of pre-existent representation needed for computer systems to work 
satisfactorily. It is also significant that Suchman, in keeping with the epistemologists I 
have mentioned in this chapter, emphasises sociality as an alternative to orthodox 
models of the unitary cogniser (or cogito) as the locus of rational actions. Suchman is 
deeply critical of cognitivist models of interaction that are characterised by 
information-processing paradigms. These paradigms are predicated on notions of 
environmental stimulus and behavioural response:  
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The first premise of cognitive science, therefore, is that people (or 
“cognizers” of any sort) act on the basis of symbolic representations: a 
kind of cognitive code, instantiated physically in the brain, on which 
operations are performed to produce mental states such as “the belief 
that p”, which in turn produce behaviour consistent with those states. 
(Suchman, 2007:  37). 
Though there is contention within the domain of cognitive science as to the exact 
nature of these interactions, there is, according to Suchman, a general belief that this 
model of intelligent human agency does not merely have a resemblance or resonance 
with computational processes, but that it ‘literally is computational’ (37). The notion 
of human intelligence as tantamount to the management of symbolic representations 
is exemplified in rule-based computation such as expert systems and factory floor 
robotics. But as Suchman points out, these are narrow domains with a high degree 
of containment and predictability.  As an alternative to the cognitivist emphasis upon 
the unitary Cartesian cogito, (and the specific forms of rationality associated with it) 
Suchman, like Haraway, suggests that we instead pay attention to the 
specificities of knowing subjects, multiply and differentially 
positioned, and variously engaged in reiterative and 
transformative activities of collective world-making. 
(Suchman 2005: 3).  
Suchman challenges and inverts the cognitivist idea of similarities between humans 
and computers and instead asks how we might usefully understand, and 
instrumentally deploy, the significant differences between machines and people.  In 
part she asserts that the inscrutability of computers is a contributory factor in their 
reification as entities, rather than as complex arrangements of interacting parts. It is 
our own projection or ideas of intentionality that sustains the mystique of the 
computer as somehow personified. This sense of intention, Suchman implies, is part 
of the mystique of interaction, the idea that we are interacting with an intelligent 
entity rather than ‘just performing operations on it’ (Suchman, 2007: 42), but in  
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naturalizing objects as entity-like and intentional there is a danger that their human 
designers are neutralised.  
 
Figure 41  Below, a screen shot from the South software. Where possible the South system 
makes its embedded perspectives visible.  The differences between the reader’s and my own 
perspectives are used as a creative weighting within the system. The software can access a 
simplified mathematical model of my moods and attitudes. This model is compared against 
the attitudes and moods of each user. The model is regularly updated and accessed by the 
system online. 
 
 
 Removing the designer from view is very much in keeping with a scientific 
orthodoxy that seeks to neutralise the scientist or, indeed, to make him or her 
entirely invisible.  My software does the opposite, my presence as an artist and 
software writer is overtly embedded within and throughout the South system.  As a 
subject I am also arguably objectified: my practices, opinions and methods are 
commodified within the data structures and processes of my own software.  
Suchman places particular importance upon recognising these forms of boundary 
crossings, of  
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the ways in which it matters when things travel across the 
human-artefact boundary, when objects are subjectified (e.g., 
machines made not actants but actors) and subjects 
objectified. 
(270). 
But in recognising these border crossings it is important not to establish further 
dualisms and monolithic conceptions of agency in the machine-human nexus. My 
practice has been informed by conceptions of agency and epistemology that are 
characterised above all by fluidity.  These conceptions emphasise the processual 
rather than the more fixed territory of pre-given concepts. 
Idealised states and concrete circumstances   
One particularly rigid concept of interactivity identified by Suchman is that of real-
time control over the computing process, in which ‘the user can override and modify 
operations in progress’ (Suchman, 1987: 11). Suchman asks what other means of 
interaction can be instituted and what other notions of agency can instantiate these 
interactions. Suchman pinpoints language, or dialogic metaphors of interaction, as 
representing conventionally idealised forms of computer-human communication. This 
paradigm of verbal communication as the ideal model for interaction between 
computers and individuals has in large part been canonised by the Turing test. The 
Turing test posits that if a human and a machine can generate the same verbal 
responses in reaction to the same stimuli, then ‘regardless of the identity of their 
operations, one processor is essentially equivalent to the other’ (22). But Suchman 
(1987, 2007), Barad (2007), Hayles (1999) and Alison Adam (1998) (among others) 
deploy theories of embodiment and specificity to present a coherent challenge to 
this canonical form, not least of all, as I have shown, to that of the disembodied 
information-processing paradigm which arguably corresponds to the Cartesian 
Cogito. The Turing test, like the forms of rationality affiliated to the Cogito, has no 
interest in ‘bodily competences’ (Adam, 1998: 183); it deals only with symbolic 
representations. Continuing with the example of speech, Suchman challenges  
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another canonised model of interaction design:  that of means-end strategies or 
planning models. The idealised states represented by planning models, such as expert 
systems and task specific robotics, are the target of consistent challenges, not only 
by Suchman, but also by the writers cited in the previous paragraph.   
The infinitely complex, unpredictable contingencies of real-world environments are 
far harder to plan for, it is these situations that new paradigms of interactivity 
address. Taking the example of speech, Suchman argues that plans and goals ‘do not 
provide a solution’ (Suchman, 1987: 47), in fact, she argues, they may do the 
opposite.  The degree of a priori structures in any interactive system is an indication, 
in Suchman’s terms, of a system’s limitation and inflexibility: 
The dependency of significance on a particular context, every 
particular context’s open-endedness, and the essential ad hocness 
of contextual elaboration are resources for practical affairs, but 
perplexities for a science of human action…it is an intractable 
problem for projects that rest on providing in advance for the 
significance of canonical descriptions – such as instructions – for 
situated action.  
                        (48). 
Suchman’s central image (or metaphorical alternative) to a priori planning is 
embodied by the mode of navigation deployed by South Pacific Trukese sailors50, in 
which actions are taken in response to material and concrete circumstances and 
‘plans are subsumed by the larger problems of situated action’ (50). Suchman is not 
suggesting an end to all forms of planning, but is instead emphasising that it is crucial 
to respond dynamically to unfolding situations. Suchman’s point is that in complex 
real-world circumstances other forms of knowledge come into play, for example 
embodied forms of knowledge that are not easily represented in predicate calculus 
or propositional logic schemas. Suchman cites language as a form of situated action, 
as having an ‘essentially indexical relationship to the embedding world’ (60). To 
construct an interactive system that understands language requires not only an 
                                                 
50 PacificTrukese sailors use situated environmental data to make fluid and contingent choices while 
navigating their small vessels between pacific islands. Lucy Suchman (1987) contrasts this approach to 
Western navigators who rely on rigidly planned goals that are pursued step by step, without recourse 
to fluid, extemporised choices made in relation to waves, winds, and other environmental factors. 
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understanding of the specific situation in which that language is being generated, but 
also an infinite understanding of the underlying assumptions behind that language but 
not embedded, semantically within it. There are, unfortunately, no usefully invariant 
structures available to me as the originator of a largely language-based interactive 
system. Instead I have looked to the situated processes and ad hoc contexts of 
meaning-making, rather than altogether a priori structures or an infinite regress of 
rules or predetermined outcomes. I have, to a large extent, relied upon building a 
system that makes interpretation and significant language generation a joint 
endeavour (but this is not, I would like to emphasise, an ‘innocent’ negation of my 
own partial perspective within the South system). The task of interpretation is (albeit 
unevenly) distributed between myself and my ‘readers’ and the analytic properties of 
my software. I assign this aspect of the software a high degree of agency by virtue of 
the fact that, although written by me, it has a pattern finding ability that, in many 
circumstances, vastly surpasses my own. The South software can rapidly analyse 
texts, compare content numerically (for example it counts the number of words 
used by users and compares their verbosity to my own) and it makes an ongoing 
quantitative assessment of readers which is compared to its numeric assessment of 
my own psychometric scores. However, the understanding that the computer is 
capable of is far from symmetrical with a human understanding of language, this 
asymmetry is an unconcealed, and I hope, a creatively energising, artefact of the 
South system. 
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Figure 42 Below, content generated by the South software, misunderstandings between the 
computer and the user are used as a resource within the South system. They are a source of 
creative tension and a tool for investigating the differences between people and computers 
as well inter-subjective differences of meaning. 
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Questions of agency logically arise when orthodox notions of knowledge generation 
are confronted.  Alison Adam (1998) asks, what types of knowledge are denied by 
the conceptualisation of knowing as a symbolic representation within traditional AI. 
Adam writes of ‘epistemic hierarchies’ (Adam, 1998) that privilege propositional 
knowledge but denies or negates, other, typically less formalised, forms of knowing 
such as tacit or skills based knowledge. These other types of knowing are not 
separable from the experience of being embodied, as Adam writes: 
Rationalist philosophy has sidelined the body in giving the 
mind the primary role in the making of knowledge and 
rationality.  
(129). 
Adam, like Hollway (1989, 1984) and Haraway (1991) asks what social 
constructionism can tell us about physical embodiment, and concludes that it is not 
sufficient to explain our embodied selves as the sum total of discourses. This is no 
more satisfactory an explanation than socio-biologically reductive accounts such as 
those proposed by Edward O. Wilson (1975), in which all social behaviour is 
characterised as driven by evolutionary imperatives. Likewise traditional AI cannot 
satisfactorily account for the processes that make symbolic representations 
meaningful. What is missing from these epistemic schemas is a holistic account of 
what Haraway (1991) calls the ‘material-semiotic’, in other words a non-dualistic 
description of the processes through which meaning is generated.  
Agency in computer-human interactions 
The philosopher Karen Barad (2007) expands upon Haraway’s notion of the material-
semiotic with her conception of agential-realism, in which meaning is constituted from 
specific situations and actions or causal intra-actions. These intra-actions are socio-
material; they are not separable from society and its discourses or from physical 
materialities. Barad’s agential realism does not emanate from one location or from 
exclusively human sources, neither is it located in words alone. Barad’s notion of 
‘performative’ understanding (explained below, but essentially a form of meaning-
making rooted in events, practices and real-world actions) branches away from 
forms of representation that place us outside of the world, it places us firmly as part 
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of the ‘world in which we have our being’ (Barad, 2007: 133).  According to Barad, 
intra-action, unlike interaction does not presuppose ‘the prior existence of 
independent entities of relata’ (139). Barad does not take for granted atomistic or 
Cartesian separations between subject and object; instead she sees specific situations 
and actions as allowing phenomenological relata to emerge as specific causal intra-
actions.  
 The notion of entanglement is central to Barad’s distinction between intra and 
interaction, and the distinction between objects that are separable, and phenomena, 
which are inherently more fluid. Performative understanding is Barad’s central 
challenge to the power we have placed in language as tantamount to reality, as the 
main agent in systems of representation. Discourse, Barad writes ‘is not what is said, 
it is that what constrains and enables what can be said’. (146) Performative 
understanding defies the anthropocentric forces, ‘the seductive nucleus’ (135) which 
Barad describes as binding us to our anthropocentric theories. Barad’s agential 
realism specifically acknowledges and takes account of ‘matter’s dynamism’ (135). 
This approach is an opportunity to move away from the infinite regress of 
epistemological self-reflection and representation, to forms of knowing and 
knowledge generation that are rooted in practices and real-world actions, as such it 
has made a significant contribution to resolving a number of the problems raised 
throughout this chapter, not least in the idea of an alternative epistemology, a form 
of mutually constituted meaning that is not fixed but ongoing and multiply enacted.  
 Suchman also identifies the significance of Barad’s new conceptions of agency in 
relation to interactive system design: 
This intimate co-constitution of configured materialities with 
configuring agencies clearly implies a very different 
understanding of the human-machine interface. 
(Suchman, 2007: 26). 
 This arguably brings us back to Suchman’s question of the degree of difference 
between humans and machines, and the reification of computers as intentional 
entities. There are differences between machines and people but in identifying these 
differences one must not lose sight of their (and our) mutual constitution. However, 
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Suchman is anxious to point out that it is not necessarily a symmetrical process of 
constitution. Machines and humans do have significant differences but they do not 
negate critical and non-humanist conceptions of agency. Suchman reminds us of the 
need to examine the new meanings that occur in the dynamic transformations of 
material-discursive practices, for this dynamism, as Barad points out, is agency.  It is 
an agency that is present in ‘the ongoing reconfigurings of the world’ (Barad, 207: 
141).   
Though Barad does not mention either Henri Bergson or Elizabeth Grosz it would 
seem that she is describing a processual and material form of becoming that has 
many similarities with Bergsonian philosophy and with the ideas of Grosz (1994, 
1999, 2004), especially those concerning embodiment and epistemology.  These 
accounts of knowledge production present radically different paradigms of inquiry 
that have aided me in developing a reflexive and situated form of creative practice. 
 
Embodiment and the generation of meaning 
Elizabeth Grosz (1994) re-orientates subjectivity to the body, but this is not to frame 
the body as a-historical or pre-cultural, neither does Grosz adhere to holistic, 
transcendental, or what might be termed ‘new-age’, ideas of mind-body cohesion.  
Grosz frames notions of seeking mind-body cohesion as reliant upon a problematic 
binary conception.  In Grosz’s terms the mind and the body are like a Möbius strip, 
consisting of neither a dualism nor an identifiable whole. Though the body, in Grosz’s 
terms, is still a social, political and cultural location it is not satisfactorily accounted 
for in social constructionist discourse, which does not (according to Grosz) see the 
body beyond fixed and biologically determined parameters. Elizabeth Grosz frames 
the body, not as an object of representation, but as an entity in an ongoing process 
of becoming. Grosz supports this claim by exploring a range of so-called psycho-
somatic and historically specific conditions such as stigmata, phantom limbs and 
‘hysterical’ paralysis, in which culturally perceived notions of paralysis are manifested 
in the body despite their physiological inaccuracy. Grosz, like Haraway sees the body 
as: 
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a point from which to rethink the opposition between the 
inside and the outside, the private and the public, the self 
and the other and all other binary pairs associated with the 
mind/body opposition. 
(Grosz, 1994: 21). 
 Throughout the South system I have deployed practices that result in a rethinking of 
the gradations of relationships between a subject and an object, characterised by 
Grosz as the reversible positions of subject and object, between, for example, feeling 
and being felt. My practice has driven a performative exploration of the gradations 
between being evaluated as a subject and self-observing as a sort of object. Specific 
examples and exercises involving such self-observations can be found throughout the 
South book and software.   
Figure 43 Below, a screenshot from the South software, it depicts part of an evaluative 
process in which readers connect their subjectivity to site-specific textures, which they must 
find and experience through touch. This introduces an overtly embodied form of knowing 
into the epistemic schemas of the South project. 
 
 
A central concept used by Grosz is that of the body image, or that which provides us 
with a sense of ourselves within an environment and our sense of having identifiable 
body-parts: 
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The body image is not an isolated image of the body but 
necessarily involves the relations between the body, the 
surrounding space, other objects and bodies. 
(85). 
 The notion of the body image explains how consciousness can ‘establish a space or 
a distance between itself and its objects’ (91). Our bodies, according to Grosz, are 
defined by their relations to the environment, but also define the environment. It is 
an interchange highly reminiscent of Barad’s agential realism and differential 
intelligibility, but also of Haraway’s notion of the material-semiotic.   
Once the subject is no longer seen as an ideality – whether 
psychical or corporeal – but fundamentally an effect of the 
pure difference that constitutes all models of materiality, 
new terms need to be sought by which to think this affinity 
within and outside the subject. 
(209). 
 
 The need for such new understanding of the differences between elements is 
present in the writings I have cited of Bergson, Barad, Suchman and Grosz.  All these 
writers point to the need for systems that have a high degree of contingency and 
openness in their generation of meaning,  as I have shown (and will continue to show 
throughout this thesis) my practice has led me to explore contingent and open 
structures within the South system. Beyond the narrow domain of interactive 
systems, these writers are proposing alternative ways of knowing and of creative 
becoming that threaten dominant epistemological and subjective schemas. The 
schemas they challenge are wholly pre-determined, statistical, quantifying, fixed in 
reactive patterns of cause and effect. It is these schemas that I have sought 
alternatives to and will now describe in greater detail, also exploring work by other 
artists and writers whose creative interests intersect with my own. 
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5.4: Flexible data structures and flexible subjects: designing the South 
system  
5.4: Flexible data structures  1 
 
 
Each time I recall fragment 91 of Heraclitus,  "‘You cannot 
step into the same river twice”, I admire his dialectical skill, 
for the facility with which we accept the first meaning ("The 
river is another") covertly imposes upon us the second 
meaning ("I am another") and gives us the illusion of having 
invented it . 
(Borges, 1999:  323). 
 
 Isabelle Stengers asks, “What kind of practices do we create when we use the 
concept of subjectivity?” (Stengers 2008: 14). In a similar way questions of how 
computational works can engage with subjectivities are also embedded within the 
specific form of my own practice. How can this be done in previously unexplored 
forms?  What kinds of systems will result? I would like to frame the results of my  
research and practice around subjectivity as a series of cultural and pragmatic 
proposals. These proposals are embedded within my work, within the South system 
and within both the South egg and book. These three artefacts may be framed as test 
sites in which the ideas generated by my research and practice can be pragmatically 
evaluated in ‘real-world’ situations with ‘real-world’ readers. 
 
The rationale for the artefacts I have designed stem from my core findings, which are 
as follows: 
 
 
• Meaning (or intelligibility) in a situated system will not reside in an a priori 
model of the user (or their possible interactions), but rather in a relation 
between more generalised plans and specific circumstances. 
• Likewise subjective representation is problematic, it is more useful to 
examine dynamic and situated differences. 
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• Dominant modes of knowledge production such as those based on 
propositional logic, statistics and a priori notions of cause and effect 
(exemplified in rule-based systems) are fixed and reactive and as such are not 
ideal for generating new ideas or new texts. These forms also negate other 
types of knowledge, such as embodied, skills based, knowledge. 
• Open-ended methods are preferable within a system designed to encourage 
divergent forms of writing and divergent subjectivities. 
• The writings the system generates will, like the subjects who interact with 
them, be multiple, situated and multi-linear. 
• Where possible, my own partial perspective should be transparently present 
within the system, not negated or hidden by it. 
• The system should deploy knowledge generated through embodied 
processes, not only sight, but also smell, touch, taste and sound. 
 
 
From these core findings I can encapsulate my theoretical and practical rationale into 
the following two statements: 
 
• Interaction is a contingent process of shared and collaborative, ad hoc, 
understandings within the framework of generalised or more abstracted a 
priori intentions. 
• Difference and specificity are key resources in an interactive system working 
with subjectivities. 
 
 
 The South system is an appeal to tolerance of complexity and the assumption that 
readers are intelligent, contradictory and multifaceted. Creating language-based 
computer systems highlights the complexity of human language and also highlights 
the limitations in understanding currently inherent in computational systems. A key 
finding of my research is that the asymmetry of understanding between humans and 
computers can be framed as either a source of failure or a source of creative 
tension. Language-based interaction is most conducive to failure in cases where a  
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priori meanings are deeply embedded, precluding a dynamic understanding of situating 
circumstances and actions.  Giving computational systems extended access to such 
situating material is a core concern of my practice. To quote Suchman, situated 
interaction is characterised as ‘lively, moment-by-moment assessment of the 
significance of particular circumstances’ (Suchman 2007: 176). My practice deploys 
subjectivity and subjectifying practices as a form of situating resource or an expanded 
notion of an ‘environment’, but the fixed models of the subject present in the system 
(generated by schematised subjectifying practices) are designed to be decomposed 
and renegotiated by readers. 
 
Rivers of meaning: ArrayLists   
 
The river is a structure that retains its riverine identity because it is always changing; 
if it did not change constantly it would not and could not be a river. The South 
system emulates the form of a river and applies its flexible formations to the 
construction of subjectivity. Clare Colebrook in Grosz (1999) proposes a similarly 
flexible and processual approach to subjectivity. Colebrook describes Foucault’s so- 
called games of truth around subjectivity as a ‘transvaluation of philosophy’s own 
order: the self is produced in the inquiry it makes into itself’ (128). This is 
characterised as a reactive strategy.  Colebrook posits instead a non-reactive 
approach that would ‘affirm itself through the questions it asks about itself – not in 
passive recognition but through self-formation’ (128-129). This is close to the 
strategy I have adopted in designing the subjectifying processes deployed throughout 
the South system. Readers are invited to observe themselves in their own processes 
of self-evaluation and of evaluation by the system. In this way layers of subjectivity 
are generated, but they are, like Heraclitus’s river (cited in Borges, 1993: 323), never 
encountered more than once. The South system is embedded with flux, the 
networked or relational flux of subjectification and of situating circumstances, 
including the tidal transmutations of the River Thames itself. Arguably, the system is 
unable to generate immutable results. It is a network of meaning that is highly 
unlikely to repeat itself precisely. Though the system draws upon tide tables (tidal 
data is obtained by the system through a feed from the BBC Weather Centre), this  
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data is used to define, for example, the weight and range of the system’s core 
vocabulary). These predictions are themselves subject to a significant degree of flux, 
caused by the raising of the Thames flood barrier, surface run-off from heavy rains 
or winds etc.  
 
I have chosen to work with a flow of data that is essentially positioned between 
chaos and order, in this way I might define the South system as having, what, in 
Deleuzian terms, might be described as diagrammatic51 qualities.  Such qualities are 
contingent, nascent or diagrammatic. These are the conditions that Gilles Deleuze 
(1981) describes as being necessary for generating the new, his description is highly 
resonant of a river, ‘The diagram is indeed a chaos, a catastrophe, but it is also a 
germ of rhythm. It is a violent chaos in relation to the figurative givens’ (Deleuze, 
1981: 72). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44 following page, tidal predictions for London Bridge, obtained from the 
BBC Weather Centre, 06/11/08, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/weather/coast/tides/tides.shtml?date=20081106&loc=0113, 
accessed 06/11/08 
                                                 
51 Deleuze’s notion of the diagrammatic (or the graph) was influenced by the logician and semiotician C. 
S. Peirce (1839 – 1914) who developed a graphical syntax for logical graphs. Deleuze augmented, or 
indeed transmuted Pierce’s ideas by ascribing a far greater degree of contingency and chance to 
diagrammatic processes. The diagram in Deleuzian terms is an event not a representation. It facilitates 
(particularly in regard to painters) a means of navigation through chaos. 
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 The metaphor of tidal prediction is an apt one in light of my interest in the efficacy 
of planning and rigidly a priori systems. Suchman’s ideas (1987, 2007) have been useful 
in reflecting upon aspects of my own work. Suchman’s metaphors around planning 
and embodied interaction often allude to moving through water, including the 
navigational techniques of Trukese sailors and the image of a white water canoeist 
manoeuvring through rapids.  Unlike Suchman, however, my primary concern is not 
with the design of a user interface or the effectiveness of its instructions (she cites 
the example of an interface for a photo-copier machine) but with a dynamic and 
situated software and analogue system for the generation of text and performative 
experiences.  Despite these differences in intention, Suchman’s ideas of situated 
action have provided pragmatic examples of ways in which one might approach ad 
hoc text generation, and the creation of a system that has a minimal dependence 
upon a detailed and prior set of rules. 
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Figure 45 Below, an algorithm from the South software, words are fed into the system 
according to the height of the Thames at London Bridge. 
 
 /** 
 * action() 
 * shuffle amount of words defined by the Tide height 
 *  
 * @param  int ab 
 * @return String 
 */ 
 
 
 
public String action(int ab) { 
 
 Collections.shuffle(Arrays.asList(act_verb)); 
 for (int i = 0; i < act_verb.length; i++) { 
  String a = act_verb[ab]; 
 
 } 
   
      String a = join(act_verb, " "); 
   
      String listspli[] = split(a, " "); 
 
 return listspli[ab]; 
  
} 
 
 The South system has deployed some of the more conventional strategies described 
by Suchman (2007), such as obtaining a local and a global picture of user interactions. 
However, this does involve the analysis of specific tasks undertaken by a reader 
(such as their written reaction to a ‘live’ CCTV image), and an accumulating analysis 
of their general actions and responses, with direct relation to situating and locating 
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factors. More radically, I take on board Suchman’s notion of plans as resources for 
action rather than as controlling systems. These plans are loose and sketch-like, they 
represent abstracted generalisations for the sort of situated actions that will work in 
conjunction with them.  As Suchman writes, ‘the detail of intent and action must be 
contingent on the circumstantial and interactional particulars of actual situations’ 
(Suchman, 2007: 183). The vague representation implicit in such plans is 
complemented by situated actions that, although destined to be concrete and 
specific, cannot be fully represented in an a priori model. As ever Suchman finds 
analogies in human language, ‘in its efficiency’, Suchman writes, ‘language provides us 
with a shareable resource for talk about the world’ (183). But in citing language as an 
example, Suchman is not resorting to the problematic ideal of language as a model 
for computer-human interaction, but rather, looking at the use of language as an a 
priori structure that works effectively in conjunction with unpredictable 
circumstances: 
 
By abstracting uniformities across situations plans allow us 
to bring past experience and projected outcomes to bear on 
our present actions.  
(184)  
 
Suchman describes the way in which a priori formulations are deployed in tandem 
with unplanned circumstances and practices; her example of Pacific navigators 
(discussed earlier in this chapter) is an apposite paradigm. The archetype of water 
and navigation has also emerged within my own practice as an instrumental form. As 
my work is centred on the South Bank and the river Thames it was perhaps 
inevitable that riverine and liquid structures would materialise from it. Suchman cites 
Edward Hutchins52 (1983), in which the situated nature of Micronesian maritime 
navigation is described. The type of navigation Hutchins delineates uses both the 
familiar observational techniques of celestial navigation, but also takes cues from a 
range of environmental referents, such as the shape and colour of waves, clouds,  
                                                 
52 Edward Hutchins (1983), ‘Understanding Micronesian Navigation’. In D.Gertner and A. Stevens 
(eds) Mental Models (pp. 191-255) Hillside, N.J, Erlbaum. 
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birds and other local, yet unplanned interactions. This process is characterised by 
Suchman as ‘interaction between a representation and the particular, contingent 
details of the environment’ (185). Within my own practice it is this type of 
interaction that represents a significant break from previous notions of interactivity. 
In the context of a narrative generation system, (combined with the notion of 
subjective or psychometric assessment) my aim has been to create a radically 
contingent form of software that has a dynamic relationship to generalised goals. My 
software architecture has used mutable structures such as ArrayLists, a data 
structure in the Java programming language that can expand and contract to reflect 
ad hoc changes. ArrayLists are particularly flexible in allowing for duplicates and in 
having a potentially limitless capacity (subject to the power of the computer being 
used). Unlike a database structure, I distinguish the ArrayList for not relying upon a 
body of meta-data or a complex relation of further taxonomic structures.53  The data 
these ArrayLists accommodates consists of contingent variables such as news 
headlines, tidal highs and lows, weather and financial information and reader 
responses to embodied encounters within the South Bank area. These types of 
information work in the same way that Micronesian navigators use environmental 
referents, they are navigational resources, not for a user navigating an ‘interface’ but 
for a system configuring itself in reaction to unique circumstances that cannot be 
embedded as rigidly prior structures or rule sets alone. 
 
The narrative landscape: Jeffrey Shaw, Mongrel and Martin Crimp 
 
 In researching alternatives to rigidly determined forms of both subjectivity and 
interactivity I have examined the work of other artists who share these concerns. In 
terms of interactivity the artists whose work has most in common with my own 
goals are not primarily concerned with interactive narrative generation but with an 
embodied and often spatial form of interplay closer to gaming or site-specific art. 
Jeffery Shaw’s The Legible City (1989) and The Narrative Landscape (1985) are both 
eloquent examples of works that provide important frames of reference for my own  
                                                 
53 Using an inheritance hierarchy (arguably of course another form of complex structure), ArrayLists 
can hold a diverse range of tailor-made objects that can be fluidly transmuted. 
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practice. The Legible City is concerned with an embodied form of interactivity in 
which specific locations can be explored virtually by the action of cycling. Shaw’s 
audiences navigate city environments such as Manhattan (1989), Amsterdam (1990) 
and Karlsruhe (1991), which are constructed from three-dimensional texts instead of 
buildings. Like many hypertext narratives the audience can follow their own pathway 
through each city, following pre-determined texts54. The resulting work generates an 
embodied but deterministic form of narrative experience. Likewise Shaw’s Narrative 
Landscape (1985) involves the navigation by joystick of pre-determined but multi-
linear layers of visual and written digital artefacts. Where Shaw’s work enters 
interesting new realms of interactivity is when he allows for inter-subjective 
exchanges. The Distributed Legible City (1998) is a networked installation in which 
multiple users cycle through virtual cities, these users may be at different physical 
locations but are brought together virtually. In The Distributed Legible City audience or 
rather participant conversations and physical gestures augment pre-determined 
narratives. The Distributed Legible City represents a work that is far closer 
theoretically and pragmatically to the South project then Shaw’s earlier works.  
  
Mark B. Hansen has written at length about Jeffrey Shaw’s work, framing it in the 
context of his thesis or ‘Bergsonist vocation of new media art’ (Hansen, 2004: 12), in 
pursuit of which Hansen asks: 
 
First: how the image comes to encompass the entire 
process of its own embodied formation or creation, what I 
shall call the digital image. Second: how the body acquires a 
newly specified function within the regime of the digital 
image. And third: how this function of the body gives rise to 
an affective “supplement” to the act of perceiving the image, 
that is, a properly haptic domain of sensation and, 
specifically, the sensory experience of the “warped space” of 
the body itself (12). 
                                                 
54  Presumably Shaw’s bicycle riders can also fragment those texts by navigating their own ‘wrong’ 
route, away from Shaw’s intended narrative structures? 
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Though the South software also deploys images as epistemic artefacts or indeed 
agential presences, (such as CCTV pictures and reader ‘mug shots’) the South book 
and software also makes similar investigations into digital and analogue texts, asking 
how they might come to encompass embodied processes of generation. The South 
project is similalrly concerned with visceral forms of knowing and with alternatives 
to orthodox computational representations such as knowledge bases or ontologies.   
 Hansen also writes about another work that is overtly concerned with rigid a priori 
representations and clearly shares an interest in critiquing subjectifying practices. 
Colour Separation (1998) by the art group Mongrel deploys the inter-subjective 
relationships of its own members as a resource and reference point to construct 
eight rigidly schematised racial typologies. The work was distributed as Heritage Gold 
software, arguably critiquing the concept of both heritage and the commodification 
and classification of identity.  Similar critiques are found in digital works such as 
Diller and Scofidio’s Indigestion (1995), an interactive video in which viewers were 
able to choose from various stereotypical character traits to construct the two 
dining characters. This work aimed to expose the ‘rhetoric of choice surrounding 
interactive technologies and at individual choice in relation to the cultural 
construction of sexual and class distinctions’ (Graham, 1996: 32). Likewise Graham 
Harwood’s interactive installation, Rehearsal of Memory (1995), constructed an 
amalgam, visual identity from the collective identities of prisoner-patients in the 
Ashworth Mental Hospital. Rehearsal of Memory plays upon the subjective reductions 
such patients are defined by, in which they are pathologised as categorisations that 
describe behaviours and medical conditions but tell you little or nothing about their 
memories and lives. 
Dramatic categorizations 
The critique of subjective categorisations embedded in my practice also has themes 
in common with the work of the playwright Martin Crimp, typified in Attempts on Her 
Life (first performed in 1997), and No One Sees the Video (first performed in 1990). In 
light of my own experience it is interesting to note that Martin Crimp worked as a 
transcriber of market research interviews between 1980 and 1983, chronologically 
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close to my own initiation into the practices of market research55.  No One Sees the 
Video presents market research as a ‘parasitic activity that is at best of questionable 
value and at worst positively intrusive’ (Sierz, 2006: 33).  Martin Crimp describes his 
play as a ‘post-consumer play, dealing with the idea that markets and aspects of 
business are like the air you breathe’ (34). The play can be viewed as an attack on 
the naturalisation of evaluative practices and intrusions. Aleks Sierz writes: ‘These 
question-and-answer techniques, so suggestive of police interrogation, give the play 
an air of manipulative power games with uncertain outcomes’ (33-34). This 
statement might also represent the South system, which invites its readers to enact 
their own processes of manipulation and self-representation. As Martin Crimp 
demonstrates in the play, the processes of subjection do not affect the ‘subjects’ 
alone: 
Crimp is also interested in the way the job affects its 
employees. “There is a line in it,’ Crimp said, ‘where the 
man [Colin] is trying to persuade the woman [Liz] to take a 
job in Market Research and he says, “just acquaint yourself 
with the vocabulary and the rest will follow” [p.45], Once 
you have acquired the tools, then that becomes set in your 
mind and you behave in a certain way. 
(33) 
In manipulating and assessing my own readers one might ask what type of subjective 
transformation I am affecting upon myself. As Martin Crimp’s character Colin says, 
‘I’ll tell you something: we all turn, Jo, into the kind of people we used to despise’ 
(33). In a more positive light this may be rephrased as recognition of the participant 
observer and perhaps an inversion or variation upon the experimenter effect (in which 
the subjectivity of an experimenter effects the outcome of an experiment), one 
might rephrase it as a form of feedback loop in which the experimental methodology 
and its outcomes cumulatively re-effects or re-inculcates the experimenter.  To 
                                                 
55
 The era is significant, characterised as one in which materialism and notions of consumer choice, 
came to the forefront. Aleks Sierz observes ‘Crimp was clearly aware that the social and political 
climate was one in which most people naturally equated happiness with commodities’ (Sierz, 2006: 
34). Crimp’s other play Dealing With Claire (1988) also addresses the specific financial practices of that 
time, such as ‘gazumping’, in which a house seller would accept a higher price offer for their property 
even though they had verbally accepted an earlier offer from another buyer, at a lower price. 
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quote Claire Colebrook again, in Foucauldian terms ‘the self is produced in the 
inquiry it makes into itself’ (Grosz, 1999: 128), but, according to Colebrook, a less 
reactive self-position is possible, in which ‘the self it effects is not an essence but an 
event’ (132). This is a processual notion of the self, a mutable, nomadic assemblage 
who is invited to engage with and move throughout the South system, which is itself 
an assemblage, an event as much as, if not more than, a digital artefact or a set of 
encoded and prior structures. 
 
 
Figure 46 Below, readers construct icons to represent themselves visually to the system, 
these images are then embedded in the egg device and in future analogue versions of the 
South book. 
 
 
 
point to 5.5 1 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has shown how new accounts of epistemic processes and new ideas of 
the subject have the potential to rejuvenate interactive narrative practices. 
Specifically, my research into subjectivity and subjectifying practices has opened up 
new possibilities for the design of computational systems interested in the specificity 
of interactions and interacting subjects. Throughout this chapter I have sought to 
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rationalise my response to this research and to describe the outcomes of that 
research in relation to my own project and practices. These outcomes can be 
summarised in the following statements: 
 
 
• The South software and book frames subjective evaluation as a form of 
mutable, multi-linear fiction and performance. 
• The software I have developed deploys ‘live’ CCTV images as narrative 
agents. These images are both distributed (as part of a city-wide traffic 
camera system) and subject specific, ‘shooting’ the interacting subject at the 
time of contact. 
• Aspects of my own subjective and partial perspective are iteratively and 
longitudinally embedded into both the analogue and digital South systems.   
• Subjective self-embedding is part of both an ethical commitment to 
transparency and a pragmatic re-conceptualisation of subjectivity and 
partiality as a creative resource. 
• The South software and book uses generalised goals to work with specific, 
dynamically acquired, narrative materials and circumstances. 
• The material is designed to evolve. As a corpus it is continually analysed by 
the system, the results influence facets of subsequent content generation. In 
this way the project content is both singular and collective. 
 
These statements may be further summarised as taking aspects of interactivity and 
scientism that have been historically defined as problematic, such as the gaps in 
understanding between machines and people, the experimenter effect (and other  
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subjective positions encroaching upon an idealised notion of neutrality), and 
transmuting them into creative resources. This is an original contribution to the 
development of interactive fictions and to a form of game play that uses real life 
situations, subjects and locations to augment, or, perhaps more strongly, to define 
and to situate digital works.  
Many of the works I have cited (as well as aspects of my own work) share similarities 
to games as well as to fictions. These works also often have a clear provenance in 
the hypertext fictions that emerged from the late 1980s onwards and to early ideas 
about artificial intelligence, narrative and agency. The next chapter will expand upon 
these similarities, looking at early forms of text adventures and also at works that 
have used conversational software agents or chatbots, both as dramatic protagonists 
and as forms of user interface. In relation to my own practice the following chapter 
will examine my initial attempts to create a conversationally-based work using a 
software agent. It will describe the rationale for the choices I have made in pursuing 
that practice, as well as my reasons for rejecting the chatbot form in favour of more 
situated networks of agents. The chapter will also look at the historical provenance 
of artificial agents and of their wider conceptual presence in our culture, often as 
forms of servant, replicating historically problematic ideas of masters and slaves. 
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Chapter 6 
Chatbots, Agents and Agency 
Chapter 6 1 
 
Figure 47 Above, toy robot, collection of E. Dare. 
 
 The South system is able to situate itself contextually through the deployment of several 
software agents. These agents expand the agencies at play within the computer-human 
relationships forged through engagement with South56, opening the system to ‘live’ 
surveillance images, meteorological, financial, and other dynamic forces. This chapter will 
explain how and why I have used agents within my work, placing them in a historical and 
cultural context and highlighting the key issues I have had to negotiate in utilising them. 
The use of agents has supported the fundamental themes of my PhD practice and thesis; 
these are themes of subjectivity, epistemology and agency. This chapter will show how and 
why agents and agency relate to my core concerns, explaining the rationale for pursuing 
specific practices and theoretical issues, and reporting my key outcomes and inferences. 
 
 Agent technology, like the concept of agency, is a complex, contested and multi-
disciplinary field. Alison Adam (1998) is at pains to point out that the overlap of 
                                                 
56
 To recap, South is the broad heading for the three key components of this project, the digital 
interface, the analogue book and the egg device that forms a bridge between the previous two 
domains. 
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disciplines, in particular sociological and anthropological models overlapping with the 
domain of artificial intelligence has lead to problematic simplifications and unexamined 
assumptions about agency, particularly in regard to the notion of intentionality and 
knowledge generation. Adam writes, ‘AI’s focus on individual knowing, on intelligent 
agents whose minds operate by reasoning with symbolic representations, tends to deflect 
the possibility that cultural concerns might affect their ways of knowing and operating in 
the world’ (Adam, 1998: 64).  Hers is not the only voice suggesting the need for broader 
epistemological scope within the construction of agents and philosophical conceptions of 
agency. Sengers and Mateas (2003) also critique the atomistic design of software agents 
and false assumptions of ideological neutrality in idealised interactive systems.  
 
 Sengers and Mateas re-conceptualise AI as ‘an expressive medium’ (Sengers & Mateas, 
2003: 167), in which ‘expressive AI conceives of AI systems as cultural artefacts’ (167).  
Sengers and Mateas are core references for this chapter, between them they provide a 
conception of agent technology that is arguably more useful for artist practitioners, one in 
which systems are reframed as a performance, within ‘a performative space, the system 
expresses the author’s ideas. The system is both a messenger for and a message from the 
author’ (167). In this chapter I will explore this concept and some of the ways in which I 
concur with and expand upon the notion of agent technology as performative and 
expressive. Other writers, such as Andrew Leonard (1997), Sarah Kember (2003), Simon 
Penny (1999) and Joseph Weizenbaum (1976) have also provided constructive critiques of 
the core assumptions underlying constructions of agents and agency (in the case of 
Weizenbaum, in relation to the precursors of agents such as chatbots). The problems 
these writers highlight and the alternative structures some of them propose will form the 
grounding for the first part of this chapter, which is divided into three main sections.  
 
The first section of the chapter will also define some of the key terms I reference and 
highlight the major technological and philosophical issues I have been confronted with. The 
second section will investigate the specific ways in which I initially utilised agents,  
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particularly some of the problems encountered in my first attempt to construct a 
deliberative57 conversational agent. The third section will outline and rationalise my final 
strategies in constructing an agent-based architecture for South. The third section will also 
look critically at other practitioners and arts projects that have used agent technology; 
additionally this section includes a user profile, outlining how a real reader experiences the 
South software and its agents. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48 Above, toy Cyberman, collection of E. Dare. 
 
6.1 Definitions and Critiques of Agents and Agency 
6.1 Definitions and critiques of agency 1 
 
 
An agent is just something that acts (agent comes from the 
Latin agere, to do). But computer agents are expected to 
have other attributes that distinguish them from mere 
                                                 
57
 Deliberative is a term for agents that are embedded with ‘beliefs, desires and intentions’. 
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“programs”, such as operating under autonomous control, 
perceiving their environment, persisting over a prolonged 
time period, adapting to change, and being capable of taking 
on another’s goals. A rational agent is one that acts so as to 
achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the 
best expected outcome. 
(Russell and Norvig, 2003:  4). 
 
 
The simplest definition of a human agent is someone ‘that acts or exerts power’58, 
an artificial agent, as defined by Răzvan Florian requires ‘mechanisms that allow the 
agent to sense the environment and act upon it and do not require the intervention 
of other agents to be executed. A thermostat or a virus can thus be considered an 
agent’ (Răzvan V. Florian, 2003: 5). But simple definitions of agents and agency as 
many researchers acknowledge, (including Florian, Russell and Norvig) belie the real 
difficulties of defining these terms. Computer scientists Mark d’Inverno and Michael 
Luck (d’Inverno, Luck 2004: 3) acknowledge the complexity, in a computational 
context, of making an overarching definition of the term agent, and advise individual 
researchers and practitioners to make their own definitions. Likewise the notion of 
agency (as this chapter will show), is itself not clear-cut, as indicated in Barad (2007), 
Slack and Wise (2005), Adam (1998), Hayles (1999), Suchman, (2005) and Haraway 
(1991), among others cited in this thesis. What a significant number of theorists59 
and computer scientists do agree upon, however, is that these terms are not neutral 
and are in fact inherently problematic or ‘fuzzy’.  
  
 Aside from problems of meaning there are further issues arising from the 
characterisations and uses of actual agents, these have been explored in practice and 
in writing by scientists and artists including Simon Penny (1999), Phoebe Sengers 
(1998, 2003) Michael Mateas (1997, 2001, 2003) and Joseph Weizenbaum (1976). 
These issues will be discussed at some length in this section and related to my own 
practice. Theorists such as Alison Adam and Andrew Leonard highlight the way in
                                                 
58
 This definition comes from Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary: available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/agent, accessed 19/07/09 
59 Theorisers of agency emanate from fields as diverse as communication and control theory to 
feminism, social anthropology and computational arts. 
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which agent technology relates to, and in some cases duplicates, many of the 
problems inherent in earlier forms of AI. An understanding of these challenging 
issues and continuities has been an important part of my own approach to deploying 
agent technology and will be discussed later in this chapter. Slack and Wise (2005) 
offer a complex characterisation of the term agency that has usefully mirrored some 
of my own practices. I will begin this section by outlining their definitions. 
 
 
 
Defining agency and agents  
Slack and Wise in (2005) are at pains to distinguish agency from causality. Causality is 
characterised by these authors as restricted and one dimensional:  
The causal approach has a certain universal undertone to it, 
meaning that its purported causal effects are assumed to be 
the same under any-and–every-circumstance. The causal 
approach cannot adequately grasp the particularities of 
situations. 
(Slack and Wise, 2005: 116). 
 
Instead, Slack and Wise propose a complex view ‘that acknowledges the work of 
articulation’ (116). My understanding of the word articulation is the recognition and 
accommodation of the situatedness and relationality of states, a multi-dimensionality 
that is negated by simplistic delineations of causality. Slack and Wise write: 
What makes this approach richer is that it is sensitive to the 
contingent interplay of a wider variety of factors. To insist 
that the interplay is contingent is to recognise that culture 
(or technology) is not a set of stable, unchanging, and fixed 
categories and components, but rather a set of dynamic, 
changing, and interrelated connections or relations  
(116). 
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It is therefore a mutable, complex and layered set of relations, which we can 
associate with a situated and multi-dimensional concept of agency.  This definition 
may be at odds with orthodox conceptions of agency that frame ‘it’ as a power held 
by an agent and by implication with a notion of intentionality, in particular, human 
intention.  Slack and Wise (2005), Barad (2007), Braidotti (2006), Kember (2003), 
Adams (1998) and Suchman (2007), among others, all argue for wider interpretations 
of agency. 
The dictionary definition and popular usage reduces agency 
to a thing, a possession of an agent, rather than recognizing 
agency as a process or relationship. We propose two 
changes to this view of agency. First, agency does not 
require human intention, which means that technologies can 
be involved in relations of agency. Second, agency is not a 
possession of agents; it is a process and a relationship.  
(Slack and Wise, 2005: 117). 
 
 The agents I have constructed within South have been created with a view to a 
processual and relational framing of agency that is very close to Slack and Wise’s 
definition as outlined above. My reframing of agency in practice will be outlined in 
section three of this chapter, now I would like to explore some of the more 
complex and nuanced (but still problematic) definitions of agent technology outlined 
by practitioners such as Pattie Maes (2008) and the writer Andrew Leonard (1997), 
before moving on to discuss critical evaluations of agent technology.  
 
 Andrew Leonard (1997) is cynical in his description of what might constitute a 
chatbot (a form of proto-agent), or a ‘supposedly intelligent software program that is 
autonomous, is endowed with personality, and usually, but not always performs a 
service’ (Leonard, 1997: 10), whereas the computer scientist Pattie Maes (2008) 
proposes an optimistic definition of agent technology, albeit in contrast to a less than 
ideal evocation of previously ‘passive’ models of computer-human interaction: 
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Let’s first say what agents are. You see the term used in so 
many different ways. I use the word agent to mean software 
that is proactive, personalised, and adapted. Software that 
can actually act on behalf of people, take initiative, make 
suggestions, and so on. This is in contrast to today’s 
software which is really very passive, it just sits there and 
waits until you pick it up and make it do something. The 
metaphor used for today’s software is that of a tool. 
(Pattie Maes, 2008). 
 
 Maes’ description of agent technology evokes an idealised scenario of personalised 
and proactive helper software agents, working on our behalf to negotiate a complex 
and dynamic environment formed from constantly changing information, ‘where 
every user has a whole army of agents that try to help with the user’s different tasks, 
goals, and interests’ (Maes, 2008). Maes’ description, though on many levels 
concurrent with some of my own goals, is also symptomatic of more problematic 
constructions of human-computer interaction, particularly in regard to the notion of 
the agent as a form of servant, extending historically unequal relationships based on a 
master and slave, or service industry model, as described by Alison Adam (1998) and 
Andrew Leonard (1997). It is also a theme that emerged in my first attempts to 
create a conversational agent as part of my PhD practice, one that I will explore in 
section 2 of this chapter. The following section will look at other critiques of agent 
technology that relate to my practice and its core themes of agency, subjectivity and 
epistemology. 
 
You can never get the staff: problems with a service model and other 
criticisms of agent-technology 
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‘Read the instruction manual before bugging me’ 
 (Quote from the script for Road, conversational agent software, E. Dare, 
2008) 
 
 
The Czech word robota (or Robot as we have come to know it), means graft, labour 
or servitude in a number of Slavonic languages. The writer Karel Čapek first used 
this term in his play R.U.R (Rossum’s Universal Robots, which premiered in 1921).   
Čapek explored the notion of human-like, golem or android entities and their 
exploitation by human beings as slaves. Nearly ninety years later the theme of 
exploitation is still resonant, although an ethical critique of our practices as software 
producers may not always come from the inside (from the practitioners themselves), 
it is present in our cultural references to human-machine and human-clone relations. 
Relatively recent films such as A.I (Steven Spielberg, 2001) I, Robot (Alex Proyas, 
2004), The Stepford Wives (remake by Frank Oz, 2004) and The Island (Michael Bay, 
2005) amongst numerous others, confirm that Carol Čapek’s concerns  are still 
imaginatively and ethically significant. Referencing Čapek, Andrew Leonard describes 
the desire to control digital servants as a ‘theme of superiority inherent in the 
concept of automaton servants from the very beginning’ (Leonard, 1997: 84). More 
scathingly still Leonard describes the continuation of these desires within the 
attitudes expressed by some contemporary agent designers and exponents: 
 
Agent enthusiasts think it’s neat to have digitally indentured 
servants. MIT’s Nicholas Negroponte wants his digital butler 
badly. But what kind of illusions are we perpetuating when 
we dream of marshalling armies of bot soldiers to do our 
bidding? 
(Leonard, 1997:  84). 
 
 Although there are arguably just as many, if not more, films informed by our own 
fears of exploitation and attack by non-human and mechanical entities, (evidenced in  
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the success of films such as the Terminator series and its most recent offering, 
Terminator Salvation (McG, 2009)), the theme of the ethics of human-machine and 
human-clone interactions is one that still persists and is also present in my own work 
around computer-human relations, particularly my agent interface Road, (the 
forerunner to South, discussed in section 6.2). My point is that the software we 
create is not separate from ourselves; it represents our desires, from a wish for 
moderate control over the flow of our own data to fantasies of omniscience, 
invulnerability or immortality. Andrew Leonard writes:  
 
The dichotomy between “us” and “them” is false. We’re in 
this together. Software tools – whether we call them bots 
or agents, whether they are believable characters or not – 
are extensions of ourselves, prostheses that we use to 
manipulate objects outside our flesh–and-blood day-to-day 
life. 
                       (Leonard, 1997: 82) 
 
 Given the spuriousness of them-and-us splits between humans and their digital 
artefacts that this quote stresses, to what extent is the so-called anthropomorphism of 
agents, critiqued by Andrew Leonard, Simon Penny (1999) and Sarah Kember (2003), 
among others, avoidable?  Sarah Kember describes the way in which notions of 
intentionality and autonomy have ‘developed through a history of increasing 
anthropomorphism in computer science since the Second World War’ (Kember, 
2003: 195). This in turn resulted in a backward correspondence that ‘sought to 
realise the other side of the human-machine analogy in a computational theory of 
mind’ (195). As I have explained at length in Chapter 5, such a model has reinforced 
Cartesian views of the unitary individual and of mind-body splits that emphasise 
abstract mental processes over embodied actions. Joseph Weizenbaum, the inventor 
of Eliza (the first chatbot or conversational proto-agent), also recognised the 
temptation faced by computer scientists to humanise computational processes: 
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Scientists do suffer from the same sort of handicaps as we imposed on our mythical 
explorers, and cannot communicate with an omniscient observer who could, if he 
but would, reveal all secrets, it is not surprising that at least some scientists seek 
understanding of the way humans work in somewhat the same way as our explorers 
might have sought to understand the computers they found, that is, by designing 
computers whose input/output behaviour resembles that of humans as closely as 
possible. 
(Joseph Weizenbaum, 1976: 136). 
 
Weizenbaum also observed that these anthropomorphised models reduced and 
disembodied human processes and that in their reduction to rule-based 
formalisations, even in the case of something as seemingly abstract as grammars (or 
admissible sentences) there was an irreparable loss of meaning: 
 
They know them (to use Polanyi’s word) tacitly, that is, in 
the same way that people know how to maintain their 
balance while running. In both speaking and running, by the 
way, performance once mastered, deteriorates when an 
attempt is made to apply explicit rules consciously. 
(Joseph Weizenbaum, 1976: 137-138). 
 
In other words our knowledge of the word, in this case of correct speech, is in 
practice rarely reducible to a simple set of explicit, context-free rules. 
 
 There are further historically useful examples of critical dialogue from 
computational practitioners, Sengers’ Expressivator (1998) and the efforts of Philip 
Agre to ‘embody anti-Cartesian philosophy in agent design’ (Kember, 2003: 195), 
represent both critical and practice-based approaches to some of the problems that 
agent technology has inherited from artificial intelligence systems.  Kember writes of 
Sengers that she ‘begins to regard agents not as autonomous entities but as forms of 
communication between the designer and user. They become literal expressions of  
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subjectivity’ (Kember, 2003: 194). Negotiating these communications and inventing 
non-reactive strategies to explore both the significant differences and inevitable 
human projections embedded in agents is central to my own practice, as it has been 
to scientist-artists (or creative producers) such as Sengers, Mateas and Phillip Agre. My 
practice has emphasised the use of the research journal and diaries as a means of 
reflecting upon my practices and methodologies, and the values embedded in my 
work60. South, as I will explain towards the end of this chapter, has deployed agents 
that are concerned with embodied epistemologies and situated relationships with the 
world and with their human interactors.  
 
Sengers’ critique of agent design, however, is not limited just to the epistemological 
narrowness of agents that have inherited cognitivist models of knowledge 
representation, but also to the atomistic structures of such agents. Sengers states: 
`Artificial agents seem to be lacking a primeval awareness, a coherence of action 
over time’ (Sengers and Mateas, 2003: 259). Sengers’ critique homes in on the 
fundamental structures of computer programming, particularly the modularisation 
(and in Sengers’ terms the fragmentation) of object-oriented code. Andrew 
Leonard’s key point of criticism is that agents have taken over from the areas of 
artificial intelligence research that became unfashionable in the 1980s and that the 
hyperbole and wishful thinking that was once projected onto AI – in particular to 
expert systems and ‘general solutions’ has been transferred to the term ‘agent 
technology’.   
  
Agents as a medium 
 
My own work is mindful of these criticisms, but unlike Sengers or Leonard I have 
been concerned with using some of the embedded cultural artefacts (the historical 
and structural signs buried within agent design) as qualities that can act as 
protagonists, provocations and remediations of subjectivity. The use of medium 
specific qualities, whether they are problematic, accidental or ‘helpful’ within my 
work locates my processes in the continuum of practices engaged upon by the  
                                                 
60
 The South book contains a significant amount of material taken from those research journals. 
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48a 1Figure 48a PhD research journal entry, 01/01/09, E. Dare. 
01/01/09 
The background colour is sampled from a recent CCTV image of the Thames, the 
number of action verbs released from the arrayList is defined by the height of the 
Thames at London Bridge on any given day. Next stage is to construct sentences in 
the same way. Then work out a rationale for it... only joking. At last I’ve finished my 
second drafts for the two main chapters I’ll hand in for upgrade. I might have made 
everything worse with my amendments but at least it’s kept me out of trouble over 
Christmas. Not quite sure why the colours in the browser are so differant from the 
colours when I run it through the IDE, hmmm, I havent had that problem before, the 
image above is pink in the browser, as if the spirit of Barbara Cartland has risen out 
of the Thames dredge. ...Oh just sorted it, something to do with Filezilla. The image 
below is a screen shot from my program for getting the tide data and sampling the 
colour of the Thames. There isnt a CCTV image I can intercept of the River at 
London Bridge (that I know of), so this is the nearest clear shot of the water, I think 
it’s the most beautiful cctv image (second only to Streatham’s Dip).  
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makers of artist’s books, in which, as Hayles emphasises, the medium specificity of 
the book form has traditionally been revealed, challenged and acknowledged 
extensively. South, as I will demonstrate throughout the rest of this chapter, exploits 
and exposes fragmentation, rather than obliterating it.  
 
 
 
Figure 49 Above, Shelley Jackson’s Patchwork Girl (1995) 
 
Available at :http://www.brown.edu/Research/dichtung-digital/2004/1/Ryan/ryan-space_files/image012.jpg 
Accessed 01/07/09 
 
 
 The often fragmented nature of object-oriented code and multi-agent systems is 
symbiotic with the fragmentation of my protagonist, Ivan Dâr. In this way I would 
characterise my use of agents as structurally and thematically closer to a work like 
Shelley Jackson’s Patchwork Girl (1995), in which the specificity of her medium 
(hypertext), with all its shortcomings, is exploited to create a strong sense of the 
protagonist’s experience of the world.  Hayles identifies this symbiosis between the 
text and its materiality as a particularly potent feature of the artist’s book tradition, 
in which materiality has traditionally been emphasised. Hayles points to the 
importance of widening our analysis of materiality to include electronic texts, and 
pinpoints the significance of Shelley Jackson’s work in this regard: 
 
 The text that heralded the transition to second-generation 
electronic literature for Kaye was Shelley Jackson’s 
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Patchwork Girl. It presented itself as a rewriting of Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein in which the female monster, 
dismembered by a nauseated Victor in Mary’s classic tale, is 
reassembled and made into the text’s main narrator. 
Written in a later version of the Storyspace software that 
Joyce used for Afternoon, Patchwork Girl engaged the tool in 
significantly different ways. In an important innovation, it 
drew connections between the electronic text and the 
female monster’s fragmented body. 
(N. Katherine Hayles, 2002: 37). 
 
 Within the South software Ivan Dâr’s dissociated mental states, and his inability to 
distinguish the figure from the ground in the environments through which he travels, 
is similarly connected to the often dissociated structures of autonomous agents and 
inherent limitations in their ability to understand contexts and situations. The next 
section will describe my first attempts to work with agent technology, to eventually 
grasp the sort of medium specific qualities Hayles underscores and to work with the 
technology in such a way as to integrate it with my core concerns, which were to 
create software that had a meaningful degree of understanding of subjects, an 
epistemological base that was situated and a central character who challenged and 
satirised the service industry model of much agent design.  These attempts to work 
with agent technology were also frustrating and problematic, highlighting for me 
some of the limitations identified by Weizenbaum and Sengers, but also suggesting 
some of the significant facets involved in the dynamic remediation of literature 
between and within analogue and computational forms. 
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Figure 50 Above, toy robot, collection of E .Dare. 
 
6.2 Difficult Agents and Deliberative Conversationalists 
6.2 Difficult Agents and Deliberative Co 1 
 
 My first encounter with a version of Joseph Weizenbaum’s Eliza,61 though engaging, 
was hardly in keeping with the by now legendary story of his own secretary’s 
experience of this historically important program. The version of this encounter that 
has gained wide currency is of Weizenbaum’s secretary enjoying the illusion that she 
was having a private and meaningful conversation with an understanding but non-
directional therapist. Whether this story is true or not, Weizenbaum came to 
dismiss his own program, describing it, and other programs that purported to 
replace human conversation, as more or less fraudulent: ‘The question then arises, 
and it answers itself, do we wish to encourage people to lead their lives on the basis 
of patent fraud, charlatanism, and unreality?’ (Weizenbaum, 1976: 269). What 
engaged me about the program was the literary potential of those very features that 
Weizenbaum highlighted as problematic, for my intention was to use them, not as 
replacements for therapists or to fool people that they really were having a live 
conversation with another human being, but as a means for generating dynamic 
fictional characters that could respond to human interlocutors and to some extent 
                                                 
61
 The Eliza program was developed by Joseph Weizenbaum in the mid to late1960s and is credited as 
the first conversational program, or precursor of programs that later become known as chatbots. 
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appear to understand them. The following chapter will discuss my efforts to pursue 
this goal and what I now see as the errors in my initial approaches, these errors, as I 
characterise them, were however, both useful and ultimately instrumental in 
informing the eventual development of the South system. 
Subject Oriented Software   
The first months of my PhD practice were spent developing a software interface for 
accessing stories that could be interrogated by readers. I provisionally entitled this 
work Subject Oriented Software. Subject Oriented Software or S.O.S was informed by 
my previous research as an MSc student in Arts Computing, in which I deployed an 
expert system to match readers with apposite texts. S.O.S was a largely deterministic 
system, in which meta-data (data about data) was associated via XML files to each 
story in order to connect it to what I then thought of as situating data. This situating 
data consisted of information and media that I had gathered about contextual aspects 
of the stories I had written, such as weather and financial information, images and 
information relating to my own moods and physical status at the time of writing. 
Below, story3.xml, an example of a short narrative embedded in an XML file with meta-data 
(or data about data) relating to the narrative such as mood, news and meteorological 
information. Note that the frequently odd syntax is part of the materiality of the XML 
format. 
 
- <Astory> 
- <Story storyClass="paragraph"> 
  <Name>20/12/06</Name>  
  <News>They stand accused of creating perhaps the most audacious and incompetent 
forgeries ever. An international gang tried to defraud the Bank of England out of 28bn 
using fake 500,000 and 1,000 notes, Southwark crown court heard this week. There 
was one problem: 500,000 notes have never been produced by the bank.</News>  
  <FTSE>Down</FTSE>  
  <Mood>Neutral</Mood>  
  <Health>Neutral</Health>  
  <Temp>16</Temp>  
  <Paragraph>Report by Harshal Hatif: It is the last day of British Summer time, I am sitting 
in my room waiting for you to help me write this story; tonight the clocks go back so  
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        you have an extra hour to instigate a conversation, perhaps we will start before the 
new winter begins? If you do not contact me before midnight I will sit here alone 
feeling colder and more inert than the night before. Perhaps you did not know that 
my job is to write about you? What are you going to tell me about yourself to help me 
write this text? How can I write if I know nothing about you, my ‘subject’? I will wait 
here until Christmas if necessary. Contrary to what you might presume from the 
meagre words of mine you have read so far, it is largely an innate optimism that has 
sustained me. optimism is often at odds with the transmissions I receive and with the 
goals of my employers, who appear to have no interest in anything other than the 
prevention of so-called ‘volume crime’; Unhappiness, despair, elation have no place in 
my occupational reports and yet they underpin everything, they are the conclusions 
logic cannot reach. Ah, now I see you, at least I see your ink black Subaru Imprezza 
waiting outside the mini market in the middle of The Dip, I see it has been adapted by 
you to reach hyper-real speeds that it has never actually reached in the real world. So 
what does this abstract and unreachable speed signify to you? The inversion of the 
unfolding of time? The car as a palindrome, as a metaphysician might put it? Now I 
see the car is empty so there is no elucidating signal. I cannot continue this 
conversation. I will continue to wait. Perhaps you are inside that Lantra Saloon near 
the El Bled cafe, or behind the wheel of the red Audi 4 saloon disappearing over the 
railway bridge? Yes I can feel something definite now - you are driving a deep blue 
Ford Contour, in America this car was nicknamed the ‘Mercury Mistake’ due to its 
numerous mechanical problems. But I see this is not a time for such musings. On the 
back seat behind you there is an A4 envelope. You can think about nothing else, you 
are not aware of the single decker bus a few yards in front of you or the light drizzle 
covering the dip; it is the envelope alone that occupies your thoughts. I have little 
concrete sense of the content, only somehow that your life depends on it. I wonder if 
it is a test result, a letter finalizing a transplant operation. You park beside the Polish 
bakery, your mood lifts. Your mother always used to say all sorrows are bearable if 
there is bread. These words resonate inside you as the woman behind the counter 
looks towards the opening door. The people in this shop are invariably kind, we have 
both observed that. Such kindness and the platitudes inherited from your mother 
have kept you going through all these worries. Seneca said wherever there is a human 
being, there is a chance for a kindness, if this is so you have enhanced your chances of 
survival through exposure to kindness by maximising these encounters. But may I say 
in my experience wherever there is a human being there is a chance for chaos? For 
Inconstancy, Patience Untruthfulness, Faith. Sloth. Ah Make me stop now. I forgot to 
say Optimism. And yes: Unhappiness, despair, elation. Signal lost.</Paragraph>  
  <Health2>Bizarrely unable to locate any physical feelings</Health2>  
  <ParagraphM>Neutral</ParagraphM>  
  <HeadlineM>Neutral</HeadlineM>  
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  <Comment>Road is a sustained and scrappy investigation of digital phenomenology and 
the man/machine nexus, Lent has spent his entire working life immersed in the raw  
material of CCTV footage, extrapolating meaning from it, both forensic and epistemic; 
digital information is his business, his only resource, I’ve never known anything else Lent 
writes, I am what I see, I’m a pixel man, I’m a binary mensch, my lights are either on or 
off, there is no In between state, that’s what they mean by all or nothing signals, in fact 
you could say I’m a closed circuit (Road p 259). Lents obsession with creating an 
ontology of digital vision makes him an ideal subject for research, though his text is 
chaotic and often contradictory a structure can be imposed upon it, my own work is to 
extrapolate a taxonomy from Lents book, to break down its landscapes of jagged data 
into mineable seams.</Comment>  
  </Story> 
  </Astory> 
 
 Structuring data to my own custom specification enabled readers to select stories 
and also to investigate the background and contexts relating to those stories via my 
XML-aware Java interface (which effectively ‘reads’ the XML file), as well as allowing 
them to access additional meta-data such as images and meta-critical notes relating 
to each story. 
Figure 51 Below, the Subject Oriented Software interface for ‘interrogating texts’, menu and 
narrative, November 2007: 
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 Readers also have the option of listening to the larger sections of text via text-to-
speech, in this way the data is read out in different voices or characterisations, 
(discreetly suggestive of entrenched hierarchies and non-neutral structurings, the 
text-to-speech voices readily available for Java are male by default) a female voice 
reads the footnotes while an authoritative older male voice reads the news 
headlines, three different voices are used to represent the characters, who are all 
CCTV operatives.   
 The interweaving of voices, including a robotic proxy voice that represents myself 
both as the author of the software and the author of the fictional narratives, is an 
important facet of the interface, one that opens up notions of ‘performing’, or 
underscoring the form and identity of the book. But the interactions are still 
essentially static and deterministic, the so-called subject-orientation of the software is 
top-down, defined within my own fixed data structures and interactive buttons that 
(albeit unintentionally) epitomise the linear model of cause and effect outlined by 
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Slack and Wise, in which core factors are framed as ‘the same under any-and–every-
circumstance’, (Slack and Wise, 2005: 116), in other words  a ‘set of stable, 
unchanging, and fixed categories and components’ (116). My initial solution was to 
introduce a proto-agent or chatbot, a variation of Joseph Weizenbaum’s Eliza that 
included a few simple features that made the program a little less deterministic than 
the original Eliza.  
Figure 52 Below, Subject Oriented Software with the addition of a chatbot, or Eliza-style, 
conversational interface: 
 
 
By surveilling aspects of the reader’s interactions with the software, the system 
could make observations about the reader that appeared to offer some degree of 
insight into them, such as inferences about why a reader was predominantly 
choosing stories about one particular character over another, or stories that were, 
for example, marked as neutral, as opposed to negative or positive.  Though this 
strategy worked to a degree, the Eliza model was too limited and flat as a 
characterisation. At that time I had began to read Karen Barad’s ideas (2007) about 
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extended forms of agency which she called intra-activity, these ideas seemed to 
articulate some of my own frustrations about the tennis-ball like predictability of the 
flow of action and agency within my own and many other interactive works. I 
wondered what it would mean in practice to construct a less deterministic system, 
one that in Pattie Mae’s words would be ‘proactive, personalised, and adapted’ 
(Maes, 2008); a system that would emphasise processes and relationships rather than 
a fixed set of structures. 
 My next attempt to create a subjectively meaningful work would involve the 
construction of a more deeply characterised chatbot, or deliberative agent, with 
beliefs and desires of its own. This software would also consider aspects of agent 
design that were ethically ambivalent, such as the service industry or servant model, 
the digitally indentured servants Andrew Leonard evokes.  
 
The character I call Lent is both a software agent and the fictional protagonist of 
Road, which I would describe as an agent-based text adventure. Lent is not a helpful 
agent in the sense evoked by Patti Maes or Nicholas Negroponte, he is a 
troublesome servant, with his own needs, needs that are not always congruent with 
those of his ‘masters’, or readers. Lent is arguably closer to an un-idealised human 
servant, as opposed to an idealised software-servant or agent entity who would 
follow orders without complaint, conflict or fatigue. He is also closer to the notion 
of a believable agent as defined by Michael Mateas (1997), one that has a rich 
personality and social interactions that are consistent with his character, motivations 
and goals. Mateas is keen to emphasise that believable agents are not to be confused 
with truth telling, functional agents: 
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For many people, the phrase believable agent conjures up 
some notion of an agent that tells the truth, or an agent you 
can trust. But this is not what is meant at all. Believable is a 
term coming from the character arts. A believable character 
is one who seems lifelike, whose actions make sense, who 
allows you to suspend disbelief. This is not the same thing as 
realism.  
(Mateas, 1997). 
Lent was created in response to the failings of my work with a purely Eliza-style 
agent, my main technical frame of reference in attempting to construct a more 
stimulating, less deterministic character, was not so much the idea of a believable 
agent but the notion of a deliberative agent, or an agent with beliefs, desires and 
intentions62 as defined by Mark d’Inverno and Michael Luck (2004), Michael 
Wooldridge (2009), Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig (2002). To paraphrase Russell 
and Norvig, Lent makes his decisions based on the things he believes in and the things 
that he wants (Russell and Norvig, 2002: 584). Unfortunately for his readers the thing 
Lent wants most in the world is alcohol. Lent’s dependence on alcohol creates an 
immediate point of tension with his readers, who initially perceive him as a helper 
agent in the vein of Microsoft’s paperclip, ‘Clippy’ or Office Assistant (acknowledged 
by academics and even by Microsoft themselves as a source of widespread 
irritation63). Readers are lead to believe that Lent is this type of helper agent, one 
who can provide information and advice while they try to navigate the virtual world 
of The Dip, the mise en scène for Road, which is based on a real stretch of the A23 in 
Streatham, South-West London. 
Though Lent is an extremely simple agent I would differentiate ‘him’ from an even 
simpler reactive agent, (which reacts in a way that is almost reflexive to its 
environment) in that Lent maintains an internal state relating to ‘his’ levels of alcohol 
consumption. Lent is consistent with the requirements for a deliberative agent and 
with Wooldridge’s (2002) requirements for an intelligent agent, in that ‘he’ or it is:
                                                 
62
 I have chosen, however not to complicate matters by encompassing the vastly problematic attribute 
of intentions, despite this omission, I believe, and will argue in this chapter, that Lent still meets the 
specification for a deliberative agent. 
63 See Luke Swartz’s thesis: Why People Hate the Paperclip: Labels, Appearance, Behavior, and Social 
Responses to User Interface Agents, (2003) available at: http://xenon.stanford.edu/~lswartz/paperclip/ 
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• Situated – ‘he’ is embedded in an environment. 
• Goal directed – ‘he’ has goals that ‘he’ tries to achieve.  
• Reactive – ‘he’ reacts to changes in ‘his’ environment.  
• Social – ‘he’ can communicate with other agents (including humans). 
Lent believes he needs alcohol, this is different from the knowledge-base that was 
embedded in the expert system  I used for my MSc project, Noisemedia, in that Lent’s 
beliefs are subjective and do not have to be ‘true’, accurate, helpful or immutable. 
Lent also believes in a lot of information about The Dip. However Lent’s desires or 
motivations are conflicted; he ‘wants’ to talk to readers in a way that usefully 
conveys the information he knows but he also ‘desires’ alcohol and is motivated by 
the desire to steer his readers towards the pub, where he can top up his alcohol 
levels (as indicated by the central bar chart in the illustration below). The more Lent 
drinks the less coherent he becomes, the less servile and arguably the less useful as 
an indentured digital servant. The less he drinks, on the other hand, the more forceful 
he becomes in his efforts to make readers visit the pub. The speech that the system 
generates is modulated to reflect the current behavioural state of Lent. If he is 
‘drunk’ his speech will become slower, if he is agitated his speech will accelerate and 
its pitch is raised. 
Figure 53 following page, screenshot from Road, a deliberative agent interface that uses 
expressive text-to-speech: 
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 Although there are aspects of this prototype that I have found useful, such as the 
authoring of a less deterministic deliberative agent, the greater value of creating this 
prototype has been in enabling me to identify its weaknesses, and the weaknesses 
inherent in the conventions I have followed in producing the program. Although I 
take Michael Mateas’s point that believability is not the same as realism, I would still 
identify the central weakness of Road as an overtly anthropomorphised construction 
of an agent entity. In a sense, Lent’s anthropomorphised subjectivity is the central 
weakness of this program or indeed the disadvantage of its entire raison d’être. 
Why, I asked myself, was I forcing this program to exhibit purely human traits such 
as cravings, impatience and aggression? What would a program be like that 
attempted more profoundly to explore the asymmetries of machinic knowledge 
generation, the way for example, that machines reason and process language, instead 
of covering up errors and asymmetries of understanding between computers and 
humans? What would it be like to cultivate those qualities as cultural traits and 
medium specific, distinct materialities, of the agent medium?  
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PlayBots  
In order to explore these ideas and questions about the distinct materialities of the 
agent medium I began to write a far simpler program, one in which two agents, with 
their own particular beliefs and desires, would attempt to converse with each other 
and to understand human language on their own subjective terms, while still being 
situated in an environment. The result was a ‘play-writing’ program that to-date has 
produced about 30 ‘plays’ exhibiting varying degrees of coherence, monotony and 
other facets of what I think of as agent-based cultural articulation, or the 
appropriation of a particular form, (the play) by two deliberative software agents. 
 Written in Java and Processing (a derivative of Java) this supposedly play writing 
software or PlayBots program (I use the words with a necessarily modest degree of 
irony) would emphasise agents being more like ‘themselves’, with some attempts to 
situate them in a simplified environment. My main aim was to exploit the specificity 
of computational knowledge generation, specifically the ways in which some 
computer programs try to understand natural language (the language humans speak 
as opposed to computational languages).   
The PlayBots program begins by choosing a word randomly from the 100,000 words 
embedded in it via the WordNet ontology, an English lexical database produced and 
maintained by the Cognitive Science Laboratory of Princeton University. The 
database is organised into networks of meaningfully related words, propositional 
hierarchies and conceptual categories intended in part to aid natural language 
processing and computational linguistics: 
Nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs are grouped into sets 
of cognitive synonyms (synsets), each expressing a distinct 
concept. Synsets are interlinked by means of conceptual-
semantic and lexical relations.  
(From the Princeton University website, available here 
http://wordnet.princeton.edu/  accessed 08/07/09) 
 Although the WordNet database is designed to facilitate a more nuanced 
understanding of natural language, the peculiarities of applying propositional logic (of 
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the type IS A, i.e. : IS A WHALE ->IS A CETACEAN -> IS A MAMMAL-> IS AN 
ANIMAL etc) to two software agents attempting to follow a conversation with each 
other is far from naturalistic in human terms. Instead, I would argue, that allowing 
the agents to follow the logic of their own interpretation, without trying to correct 
or smooth out that interpretation according to my own cultural requisites, is 
establishing a meaningful articulation of the agent medium, perhaps even the 
beginning of an agent culture. The full text of one of the first PlayBots plays, 
Phellem.txt, is printed below. The ‘play’ is intended to be what it is and no more, a 
conversation between two software agents trying to understand each other: 
Below, full text of Phellem.txt, an agent based play: 
Agent 1: The geological horizon is shifting; a word is emerging from it. I can hardly 
see it yet, that word, what will it be?  It is coming into view now; yes I see 
something, a noun. 
Agent 2: yes I see now it is phellem 
Agent 1: phellem 
Agent 2: phellem like cascara 
Agent 1: What is that? phellem 
Agent 2: phellem cascara 
Agent 1: But what does it mean?  phellem 
Agent 2:  It means (botany) outer tissue of bark; a protective layer of dead cells 
Agent 1: We know nothing  
Agent 2:   a protective layer of dead cells 
 Agent 1: a protective layer of dead cells I heard that once. Oh it was years ago of 
Agent 2:   null 
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Agent 1: why this, why null 
 Agent 2: Because of a protective layer of dead cells 
Agent 1: We don’t really have anything to hold onto       
Agent 2: But we do have a protective layer of dead cells, of we can always rely on a 
protective layer of dead cells 
 Agent 1: And we have the weather  
Agent 2:  Yes we always have the weather       
Agent 1:  The rain ruins my hair. If I were running the world I would have it rain 
only between 2 and 5 a.m. anyone who was out then ought to get wet  
 Agent 2:  It’s raining men, halleluiah. Rain! Whose soft architectural hands have 
power to cut stones, and chisel to shapes of grandeur the very mountains   
 Agent 1:  The weather is rain 
Agent 2:  The weather is rain 
Agent 1:  null 
Agent 2:  The weather is rain 
Agent 1:  I dreamt of and stock taker phyllodoce 
Agent 2:  Why did you dream of stock taker and phyllodoce? 
Agent 1:  stock taker 
Agent 1: because null 
Agent 2:  stock taker null you are a mystery to me 
Agent 1: because an employee whose job is to take inventory 
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Agent 2:  an employee whose job is to take inventory that is a strange dream 
Agent 1: yes inventory stock taker strange 
Agent 2:  yes inventory stock taker strange 
Agent 1: I feel tired 
Agent 2: I feel devolve 
Agent 1: I feel tired and you feel devolve we compliment each other  
Agent 2: I meant to say I feel the opposite 
Agent 1: I feel devolve and you feel the opposite. We mirror each other 
Agent 2: I feel devolve and you feel the opposite. We have nothing in common 
Agent 1: I feel opposite 
Agent 2: You must feel opposite 
Agent 1: You must feel other 
Agent 2: you must feel delegate 
Agent 1: You must also feel delegate 
Agent 2: You must also feel promote 
Agent 1: You must also feel elevate 
Agent 2: You must also feel bump 
Agent 1: You must also feel designate 
Agent 2: You must also feel upgrade 
Agent 1: You must also feel assign 
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Agent 2: You must also feel task 
Agent 1: You must also feel relegate 
Agent 2: You must also feel depute 
Agent 1: You must also feel cast 
Agent 2: You must also feel demote 
Agent 1: You must also feel advance 
Agent 2: You must also feel place 
Agent 1: You must also feel break 
Agent 2: You must also feel mandate 
Agent 1: You must also feel post 
Agent 2: You must also feel transfer 
Agent 1: You must also feel reassign 
Agent 2: You must also feel regiment 
Agent 1: You must also feel raise 
Agent 2: I don’t know what I feel 
Agent 1: I know you are nasty today 
Agent 2: In what way am I nasty today?  
 Agent 1: I don’t know, you are just nasty.That is all I know 
  
The PlayBots program, which, in its current form, is no more than a proof of concept, 
clearly has much room for improvement, particularly in terms of situating the agents 
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and giving them more sophisticated goals, beliefs and desires. A long term goal would 
be to embed this program within two hardware robots and link the speech to 
environmentally-situated physical movements. In the short term, the experience of 
developing this work has revealed the possibility of an alternative form of believable 
agent, one that did not mimic a construction of human culture or human-like 
behaviour, but was medium-specific, allowing the particularities of the agent medium 
to come forward. My next step was to take the lessons of working in this way to my 
main practice, to the construction of a work that would explore and establish new 
types of dynamic interactions or intra-actions (as Barad re-conceptualises the term) 
between humans, computers and books. 
My main practical challenges were how to incorporate what I thought was a 
successful use of the medium-specific agent characterisation deployed in the PlayBots 
program, with a project that also aimed to accommodate the specific subjectivity of 
human readers, and the equally tough challenge of how to make agent-based 
software and a book that could address the historical emphasis in computation on 
abstract mental processes over embodied actions. The next section will show how I 
approached these questions and how other artist practitioners have created their 
own solutions to some of the problems that have been ingrained in agent technology 
and indeed, inherited by that technology via its historical provenance in artificial 
intelligence practices. 
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Figure 54 Above, toy robot, collection of E. Dare. 
 
6.3 Strategies in South & other arts projects 
6.3 Strategies in South & other arts pro 1 
‘The so-called situated movement aims to 
understand the workings of agents embedded in 
real environments with continuous sensory inputs.’ 
(Russell and Norvig, 2003:  27) 
 
 This final section will outline and rationalise my concluding strategies in constructing 
an agent-based architecture for the South software. I will show how a diverse range 
of agents, many of them with continuous ‘sensory’ inputs, have been deployed in my 
work, not just as ‘characters’ as many artists seem to use them but also as 
information gatherers and as analytical tools, working behind the scenes as it were, to 
help create dynamically situated and subjectively bespoke reading experiences. This 
section will first look at other individual artists and arts projects that have used agent 
technology and that have also been concerned with issues of agency, subjectivity and 
knowledge generation.  My research into these projects has aided me in constructing 
my own computational solutions but also at times in rejecting strategies that are not 
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in keeping with my own methodological and practical aims. Simon Penny writes in 
relation to the role of art in a scientific context, that: 
the holistic and open ended experimental process of artistic 
practice allows for more expansive inventive thinking, which 
can usefully be harnessed to technical problem solving (this 
has been the MIT Media Lab position). This approach tacitly 
recognises that certain types of artistic problem solving 
compensate for the ‘tunnel vision’ characteristics of certain 
types of scientific and technical practice. 
(Simon Penny, 1999). 
 
 While Penny’s paper was groundbreaking in many ways, particularly in linking 
software agents to artistic practice and in identifying the value of artists working with 
agent technology, it is also arguably does not acknowledge some of the ‘tunnel 
vision’ (as Penny puts it in relation to scientific practices), that can affect artists 
themselves (I should emphasise that I do not mean Penny). For example, when 
working with agent technology, as I have already intimated, many artists appear to 
view agents as little more than cartoon characters which in turn can lead to the 
imposition of anthropomorphic traits upon agent technology. Throughout this 
chapter, and indeed throughout this thesis as a whole, I have emphasised 
investigating the specific materiality of computational media, asking what are the 
medium specific strengths (aside from anthropomorphic, zoomorphic or biomorphic 
projections, to paraphrase Penny) of this technology and how can they be 
meaningfully deployed within my own work?  The following section aims to look in 
more detail at these questions while acknowledging, as Simon Penny puts it, that 
‘artistic solutions are often highly contingent and specific to a certain scenario, and 
may not generalise to general principles for a class of scenarios’ (1999). Such 
generalisation is not the purpose of my work and indeed it would be at odds with 
my methodological commitment to a contingent, mutable and situated practice to try 
and generalise the solutions I have created for South.  
 267 
Other practitioners and agent design, examples from Simon Penny 
Michael Mateas and Phoebe Sengers 
In the introduction to this section I described Simon Penny’s paper on Agents as 
Artworks (1999), and I should add, I would describe his practice, as groundbreaking, 
not only because of its exploration of the idea that artists could actually work with 
agent technology, but also because, from a practice-based position, he has brought 
to the surface the notion of agent technology as being culturally bound and culturally 
contingent. This notion is highly significant within my own practice, in which I have 
attempted to interrogate the complex relationships between subjective experience 
and culturally situated contexts in relation to agent based computational literature.  
 Simon Penny’s radical premise is that culture is always and already present in 
computational objects, including agents. An agent, Penny writes: 
is first and foremost, a cultural artefact, and its meaning is 
developed, in large part, by the user and is dependent on 
their previous training. This means that, in the final analysis, 
an agent is a cultural actor, and building an agent is a cultural 
act. 
 (Simon Penny, 1999).  
In contrast Michael Mateas (2001) emphasises what he defines as the crucial 
differences between different forms of AI such as interactionist AI (with its 
purportedly embodied agents) and the goals of artists or what he defines as cultural 
producers engaged in Mateas’s and Sengers’ explicitly cultural conception of AI, which 
they call Expressive AI (Mateas, 1997, Sengers, 1998). Mateas initially contrasts but 
then links the more situated practice of interactionist AI with GOFAI or Good, Old 
fashioned Artificial Intelligence, which was dominated by symbolic, highly abstracted 
knowledge representation schema: 
Both interactionist AI and GOFAI share research goals that are at 
odds with the goals of those using AI for cultural production. Artists 
are concerned with building artefacts that convey complex 
meanings, often layering meanings, playing with ambiguities and 
exploring the liminal region between opaque mystery and 
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interpretability. Thus, the purpose of, motivation behind, or concept 
defining any particular AI-based artwork will be an interrelated set 
of concerns, perhaps not fully explicable without documenting the 
functioning of the piece itself.  
(Michael Mateas, 2001). 
While I am wary of adhering to such an emphatic separation of artistic practices 
from those of AI practitioners, his identification of goal orientation or task 
competence as the unifying feature of different AI practices is useful, and certainly in 
relation to my own practice represents a meaningful distinction and a relevant point 
of contrast from the traditional focus in AI, which Mateas goes on to define as being 
focused on task competence: 
that is, on demonstrably accomplishing a well-defined task. 
To “demonstrably accomplish” means to show, either 
experimentally or by means of mathematical proof, that the 
AI system can accomplish a task. A “well-defined task” 
means a simple, concisely defined objective that is to be 
accomplished using a given set of resources, where the 
objective often has “practical” (i.e. economic) utility. In 
GOFAI, task competence has often meant competence at 
complex reasoning and problem solving. For interactionist 
AI, this has often meant moving around in complex 
environments without getting stepped on or stuck behind 
obstacles or falling off a ledge.  
(2001). 
The rigidity of a goal-oriented, or a task competence, focused practice, is in many 
ways at odds with my own interest in exploring alternative conceptions of agency to 
linear models of cause and effect, and therefore of embracing wider, more relational 
models of interaction (more in keeping with the ideas around computer-human 
interaction expressed by Suchman (1987, 2006)). However, as Sengers has 
extensively stated (2003, 1999, and 1998) there are also problems inherent in losing 
an overarching sense of narrative consistency. The problem therefore is of navigating 
seemingly conflicting intentions, on the one hand to acknowledge and work with 
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contingency (including cultural contingencies) and on the other to maintain a 
coherent narrative experience for readers, which might be characterised as in 
keeping with the more goal-oriented orthodoxies of artificial intelligence. Sengers’ 
work the Expressivator (1998) has been a valuable example of a project looking for 
solutions to similar types of questions that my own work addresses, in particular 
that of balancing the need for narrative consistency with situational contingency. In 
her PhD thesis of 1998, Sengers compares the modularised behaviours of software 
agents to institutional forms of alienation: 
I trace the problems in behaviour integration to a strategy 
called atomization that AI shares with industrialization and 
psychiatric institutionalization. Atomization is the process of 
breaking agents into modular chunks with limited interaction 
and represents a catch-22 for AI; while this strategy is 
essential for building understandable code, it is fatal for 
creating agents that have the overall coherence we have 
come to associate with living beings  
(Sengers, 1998).   
In response to the fragmented structures underlying believable agents Sengers states 
that ‘agents will be maximally comprehensible as intentional beings if they are 
structured to provide cues for narrative. I therefore build an agent architecture, the 
Expressivator, which provides support for narratively comprehensible agents, most 
notably by using behavioural transitions to link atomic behaviours into narrative 
sequences’ (1998). This is a radical alternative to the ‘post hoc special purpose 
explanation systems’ (Sengers, 1999) which many agents use, including my own, 
analytical agents64.  
 While Sengers’ emphasis on comprehensibility is an entirely cogent approach within 
the context of her own work, in which she stresses the communication of 
narratively coherent signs over internal problem-solving behaviours, my own system, 
as I have already intimated, has sought solutions that, although at times come close 
                                                 
64When South does use such post-hoc explanation systems, it is generally because the agents concerned 
are not ‘characters’, but analytical agents interpreting CCTV images and situating data, the narrative of 
their conclusions does not have to be framed in anthropomorphic or zoomorphic terms. 
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to Sengers’ prerequisites for comprehensibility, including the sort of believable 
behaviours achieved by constructing deliberative agents with transparent beliefs and 
desires, but at other times I have allowed a degree of ambivalence and 
incomprehensibility to emerge through the exigencies of the agent medium, 
particularly in response to the medium-specific asymmetries of understanding 
between human and computational agents.  
 My protagonist Ivan Dâr is not an inherently comprehensible character, his 
‘pathology’ is such that his relationship to the world does not follow conventionally 
rational patterns, as such his experiences and behaviours are often irrational or even 
surreal, utilising rather than rejecting the so-called schizophrenic traits Sengers has 
sought to correct in her own agent design. However Sengers’ emphasis on context 
dependency and the subjective experience of her human audience is a valuable 
variation on orthodox agent structures. The following section will outline in detail 
my own use of agents within South, highlighting the solutions I have implemented 
(which are sometimes congruent with Sengers’ solutions but at other times at odds 
with her strong emphasis on comprehensibility) and explaining their relationship to 
my core themes and methodologies. 
 In particular I will show how the South project in some ways returns to my earlier 
interest in expert systems, but with a significantly more critical outlook, and also 
how narrative consistency is partially achieved but also destabilised through the 
embedded notion of personality types, which might also be interpreted as a form of 
‘frame’ (a data structure for representing a stereotypical situation) as outlined by 
Marvin Minsky (1974) and assiduously critiqued by Hubert L. Dreyfus (1972). Like 
Sengers and Suchman before me, I will show how I have tried to reconcile the 
seemingly contradictory requirements needed for generating human-computer 
interactions that accommodate the complexity and contingency of human subjects 
while maintaining a pragmatic degree of coherence. 
 
Brittle agents: South and agent technology
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Even if all our lives were lived in identical stereotypical situations, we have 
just seen that any real-world frame must be described in terms of the 
normal, and that appeal to the normal necessarily leads to a regress when 
we try to characterise the conditions which determine the applicability of 
the norm to a specific case. Only our general sense of what is typical can 
decide here, and that background understanding by definition cannot be 
“situation-specific”. 
(Hubert L. Dreyfus, 1972: 60 (introduction to the revised edition, 
1992)). 
 
 This section will outline in detail how the use of AI practices from problem solving 
and expert systems to agent technology, generates medium specific attributes and 
how deeply these attributes are rooted in the specific epistemological and agential 
schema that support each of these varying forms. Throughout the South project I 
have sought to deploy the specific characteristics of my chosen media optimally, by 
discovering how specific technology engages in processes, observing their embedded 
attributes and re-conceptualising them, non-anthropomorphically, as ‘character’ or 
‘cultural’ traits, including errors, misunderstandings and eccentricities, such as those I 
deployed in the PlayBots program; these are utilised as creative, expressive and 
dramatically significant qualities within a complex narrative system. The end part of 
this section will show, via a case study or user scenario, how these qualities have 
specifically been deployed in South and also how the South project stages the 
relationship of AI practices in relation to the subjective experience of a specific 
reader, generating activities that investigate how that reader, and the computational 
agents activated on her behalf, try to act within and upon their respective worlds. 
I will now describe the ways in which agent technology relates to earlier AI systems, 
and ask, as Andrew Leonard (1997) does, if agent technology has replaced less 
fashionable AI projects from earlier eras and how significant the differences really are 
between agent-based and earlier forms of AI practice. Andrew Leonard is clearly 
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sceptical about these differences, which he characterises as superficial and subject to 
a great deal of obfuscating hyperbole:  
agent technology industry has rushed into the research 
vacuum of the AI winter. And today many of the same 
people who once boosted AI in the seventies and eighties 
have changed their tune. Now they boost agents. Those 
who would have labelled their research “artificial 
intelligence” five or ten years ago are now calling their work 
“agent technology”. What was once an “expert system” is 
now an example of “multiagent cooperation.” 
(Andrew Leonard, 1997:  55). 
 Though I concur with some of the broader points of Leonard’s statement, there are, 
however, significant structural and epistemological differences between these forms. 
The South software utilises and in some ways stages these differences as overt 
frames of cultural reference, much as an art historian might contrast Cubism with 
Futurism, looking at the development and provenance of those movements. In this 
way the historical and cultural provenance of code is not lost under the cover of 
scientific objectivity, for example, in the absence of learning components, an idealised 
expert system, in contrast to a deliberative agent, should be a stable artefact, 
immune to subjective whims and fundamentally unchanged by its users or its 
environment.  
 In its assessment of readers as personality types, South in many ways deploys aspects 
of an expert or problem-solving system, in that it attempts to represent expert 
human knowledge of a particular problem domain, personality types and locations, 
within a computational system. This knowledge is represented via the normative 
model of symbolic logic65. Like a classical expert system the South software can also 
reveal its underlying knowledge structures through post-hoc explanation procedures, 
though South is selective and controlled in such revelations. However South is not 
architecturally a typical expert system, it is not always programmatically independent 
                                                 
65
 This thesis has argued from its introduction onwards that disembodied, symbolically logical systems 
of knowledge representation have dominated Western epistemology and GOFAI (Good Old 
Fashioned Artificial Intelligence) as normative models for human reasoning. 
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of its so called problem domain. At times South embeds its knowledge within its own 
code and not just in external data structures, in this sense it is closer to a problem-
solving system, but, in deploying aspects of both these AI systems, and also of agent 
technology South is critically engaged with the materialities of these structures while 
also being disruptive of them.  
 A central facet of expert or problem-solving systems, and indeed of all explicitly 
programmed knowledge representation schemas deployed in AI, is the notion of 
brittleness, domain dependence or the fact there is a limit to the extent and 
generalisability of knowledge contained within these systems. Users of such systems 
cannot be sure of the limitations embedded within a knowledge base or rule set, and 
therefore cannot fully trust the answers that a system provides. In South the extent 
of its own brittleness becomes a form of both narrative and embodied adventure.  
Readers are invited to explore the extent of the system’s brittleness and the 
absurdities that may arise from its inherently incomplete knowledge.  
The software agents embedded in South are also brittle, but their brittleness is 
arguably less rigid than the parts of the system in which knowledge is explicitly 
programmed, however, these distributions are complex, mutable and there to be 
exposed by the reader-researchers who engage with South. In this way I would 
suggest that the relationship South has to some of the problems outlined by Sengers, 
Suchman, Mateas, Hubert L. Dreyfus and other practitioners and theorists is more 
opportunistic and materially engaged than a problematising approach can (or aims to) 
accommodate. South dramatically exploits and deploys the traits of both agent-based 
and expert/problem solving systems, especially those traits deemed to be 
problematic and unlike human or so called common sense reasoning. The co-
operating sub-programs embedded in South are present both as characters, (arguably 
the stereotypical use artist-practitioners have made of agent technology) but also as 
‘independent’ entities that work for me across distributed information spaces as data 
gatherers, analytical and narrative generating agents. 
 By inviting readers to test the boundaries of the South system in both its expert and 
agent bases, the notion of disembodied expertise is also critically challenged, 
particularly in relation to the concept of personality. Continuous sensory inputs, in 
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the form of CCTV images, reader interactions, temperature and other inputs or 
percepts, open the system up to a more situated, contextually-aware form of 
knowledge generation and, as outlined in the user scenario below, to broader  
notions of agency than those found in most expert systems of the 1980s. In 
describing the broader agencies at play in South I am not intending to idealise the 
South system or to make bogus claims for its superior efficacy in understanding 
human subjects and human situations, I am instead emphasising the materialities at 
play within this system and suggesting the significantly creative ways in which artificial 
intelligence and agent technologies can be deployed and re-conceptualised by artist 
practitioners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55 The South egg 
 
 
South Agents: A Case Study 
 
 In the same way that the scenario outlined in chapter four shows how a reader, 
Mašinka Savić, interacted with the South book, the following profile will show how 
Mašinka experiences the computational aspects of the South system and how the 
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agents within the system work to generate a situated and personalised narrative 
experience for her. The scenario will clarify the significant differences between the 
evaluations and exercises found in the South book and the content that is generated 
by the software. This content is dynamic and bespoke; it aims to support a form of 
inter or intra activity in which the agencies at play are complex, mutable, interrelated 
and intra-dependent. The use of the word intra (within) as opposed to inter 
(between), suggests a less linear conception of agency than that evoked by orthodox 
conceptions of interactivity. The scenario will show how software agents, in 
conjunction with human agents, open the South system up to a contingent, non-
determined, but not entirely random distribution of agencies. 
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Above, Mašinka Savić engaging with the South 
software, July 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Above, the South software collection is 
conceptualised as an egg box. 
 
 
 
User profile recap: 
 
 
Name:  Mašinka Savić 
 
Age: 43 
 
Born: Yugoslavia (in what is now 
called Serbia) 
 
Lives: South London. 
 
Profession: Technical Consultant 
 
Likes: Fiction, photography, 
theatre, film. 
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Interacting with the South system: The egg box 
 
 
The collective name for the South software collection is egg soft; its constituent 
programs are contained in what is referred to as the egg box. The egg box consists of 
nearly a dozen programs and sub programs with varying degrees of ‘agentness’ or 
classical agent-style behaviours and attributes as outlined by Wooldridge (2009). 
These programs and agents support the three core processes of the South software, 
which are as follows: 
• Data gathering and analysis. 
• Evaluation of readers as ‘types’. 
• Egg content generation. 
 
 
Below, the three distinct processes of the South software 
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Agents in South: 
 
 
The main agents deployed in South work with the three main processes involved in 
interacting with the South system, they are as follows: 
 
• Data gathering and analysis. 
• Evaluation of readers as ‘types’. 
• Egg content generation. 
 
 
The main agents are as follows: 
 
Web_gather 
 
A complex program for ‘scraping’ data from the web, & analysing it, and, if  needed, 
pre-processing it. 
 
egg_evaluator 
 
Puts readers through a series of popular psychometric evaluations and writing 
exercises, from this the reader is categorised as a ‘type’. The evaluation also 
explores Mašinka’s sensory biases – to discover which senses  she is neglecting or 
emphasising. 
 
 
egg_content_Generator 
 
Creates content for the egg based on the evaluation of readers and situating data. 
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Other agents used in the South Project: 
 
 
Paper_computer 
 
A narrative agent’s movements through London are defined by the height of the 
Thames and other factors such as the FTSE 100 index and news reports. 
 
 
 
Sluices 
 
Gets the latest tide heights at London Bridge and releases words from an array of 
words dependent on those heights. These words are released into the system’s 
vocabulary. 
 
 
egg_modes_film 
  
Grabs an image of the reader and puts it into a file containing other images of her, 
which will be overlaid with each other as a new, composite portrait.  
 
 
Above, the egg_modes_film software can keep a record of how Mašinka looks and feels each time 
she interacts with it, a portrait evolves over time. 
 
 
data_Evaluation 
 
Scrapes FTSE and news headlines from the web and decides whether the 
FTSE has dropped and whether the news is negative. Generates a weighting for the 
day. 
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South _Agent  
 
Analyses ‘live’ CCTV images of the South Bank area for narrative generation and to 
get  up-to-date, situated knowledge. 
 
 
 
Above, a screen shot from the Ivan software. 
Ivan 
 
A narrative agent is manipulated by readers; the agent observes these manipulations 
and reacts to them. 
 
The agents embedded in these programs and sub-programs work together to 
generate dynamically bespoke content for Mašinka. The programs are able to 
maintain state between interactions and to reflect on any significant changes in 
Mašinka’s behaviour and their model of her ‘personality traits’. 
 
These other programs in the egg box may be recommended to Mašinka, such as 
Paper_computer and Ivan, a program that uses an agent to represent South’s 
protagonist, Ivan Dâr. Aspects of Ivan’s behaviour are defined by his embedded 
‘needs’ and ‘desires’ but also by situating data such as the tides and the weather and 
by Mašinka’s own interactions. Paper_computer is similar but it generates more 
tasks. 
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Below, Paper_computer, in this program a situated agent represents Ivan Dâr; his behaviour is defined 
by the situating data. He recommends tasks and locations, ‘explanations’ are manifest as his 
behaviours, needs and desires. Post-hoc explanations of Ivan’s behaviour are displayed both as 
characterizations and ‘academic’ footnotes. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Below, South_Agent, a deliberative (see glossary) agent that analyses CCTV and generates narrative 
based on its subjective deductions.   
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Data gathering and analysis: 
 
 
The agents that find and generate data are contained in a program called Web 
Gather, Mašinka is encouraged by the evaluative software to maintain this program 
by ‘looking after it’, this means regularly executing the program so it can find and 
analyse data. The model for this comes from Japanese Tamagotchis, or handheld 
digital pets. Tamago, the root of this word comes from ‘egg’. The main character in 
South, Ivan Dâr is an oologist, or egg expert. Mašinka is also encouraged to regularly 
update the egg_modes_film program to keep a record of how she looks each time 
she interacts. 
 
 
 
 
Above, a Tamagotchi. The word Tamagotchi derives from the Japanese word for egg. The Tamagotchi 
was an important model for the South system, particularly the idea of software that you can develop a 
relationship with. 
 
 
By executing the web gather program the agents start their work. This initially 
consists of data gathering, web scraping and then pre-processing, or readying the 
data for analysis (and use) and evaluating the data to generate weightings and new 
material. Another agent embedded in the Sluices program gathers data about the 
height of the tide at London Bridge; it finds the information, removes unwanted tags, 
effectively ‘cleaning’ the data for further use. The height of the Thames will define 
the width of a ‘sluice’ that releases a vocabulary into the South system. 
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Evaluation of readers as ‘types’ 
 
The computerised evaluation represented by the egg_evaluator program is closer to 
an expert or problem solving system, in that it attempts to emulate human expertise 
in evaluating a reader according to their psychological ‘type’. Where it departs from 
conventional expert systems is in the subjective weightings that are generated upon 
each new execution of the program, and therefore of the situated and sensory inputs 
that can alter its evaluation of the reader.   
 
 
Above, the egg_evaluator program asks Mašinka about her reaction to news headlines, CCTV images 
and star sign assertions about her current mood and future activities. 
 
 
Mašinka’s language is analysed: 
Mašinka writes her own response to images and ideas put to her by the system. 
Language analysing agents try to gauge her ‘cognitive’ style by looking at her 
vocabulary. 
 
 
 
‘I feel cold and romantic when I look at this image, it reminds me of home’, (Mašinka, May 2009). 
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Content generation 
 
 
Above, the South egg displaying content. 
  
 
When the initial two stages have been completed the system is ready to generate 
content for Mašinka’s egg. The egg_content_Generator program will assess all the 
information that earlier programs and their agents have generated, this data has been 
stored and made available to the egg_content_Generator in a simplified variation 
upon a blackboard system, in which agents update a common knowledge base. 
 
 
 
Below, bespoke content generated for Mašinka in the form of image files, these are loaded into the 
egg from her laptop via a USB cable. 
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The egg content is designed to both complement and challenge her ‘cognitive styles’, 
suggesting exercises that open up new ways of interacting with the South Bank  
location, and new ways for Mašinka to generate knowledge of both the area and of 
herself. 
 
 
 
 
 
Above, bespoke content generated for Mašinka by scraping star sign readings from the web 
 
 
Mašinka is also told about her star signs for that day, and asked to try to act 
significantly upon this information while pursuing a specific task; today she is asked to 
observe the apartment blocks beside the Tate Modern, and to note the furniture and 
fittings in these homes, what can she deduce about these people by looking into 
their rooms? She writes a short narrative about a man she has seen in one of the 
apartments: 
 
The man in the apartment is in such a hurry, he opens one of those trouser press machines 
and puts the trousers in a small suitcase. To see this makes me feel lonely and almost 
desolate. His flat is so empty of soft things; there are few photographs or pictures or 
cushions or nice curtains, instead he has metal blinds and a metal framed mirror. I am 
reminded of my worst times. I want to look away, at the sun or at trees or anything that is 
alive and hopeful.  
 
(Writing generated by Mašinka, May 2009) 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 286 
 
More content examples 
 
 
Below, among other features the system observes Mašinka’s use of language during the evaluation 
process and reflects upon it in order to generate appropriate, bespoke content for the egg: 
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The system goes on to suggest that she could try to be a loquacious introvert like Ivan 
Dâr. Mašinka is instructed to go to the Festival Terrace and enact such traits while 
re-tracing some of Ivan’s steps in his journey to find the South-East pole or Axis 
Mundi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Above, via this symbol, top, (which she must find in the South book) Mašinka is instructed to read a 
passage in the South book that is relevant to this instruction, the passage also contains further 
instructions. 
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Below, the egg displays a picture of a nose: 
 
 
 
and a picture of a tongue: 
 
 
 
The cognitive styles or ‘representational systems’ Mašinka deploys are divided into 
sensory categories: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory (taste) and kinaesthetic 
(feeling, both emotional and tactile). These help the system to identify appropriate 
tasks, adventures and narrative experiences for her. 
 
The egg tells Mašinka that her representational style is lacking in the gustatory and 
olfactory qualities so beloved of Ivan Dâr and suggests she visits the part of the 
South Bank that was once infamous for it’s so-called ‘stink industries’. There she will 
itemise the smells she can identify and relate them to Ivan Dâr’s theories about 
sensory signals as aids to spiritual navigation. She is also instructed to find an item 
that tastes sweet and an item that is Umami, a Japanese taste quality that Ivan 
believed was significantly non-binary and mystical. 
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Post-hoc explanation systems: 
When South does use post-hoc explanation systems, it is generally because the 
agents concerned are not ‘characters’, but analytical agents interpreting CCTV 
images and situating data, hence the narrative of their conclusions does not have to 
be framed in anthropomorphic or zoomorphic terms.  
 
Above, narrative generated by analysis of CCTV, news headlines, weather and reader behaviours. 
The agents concerned with evaluating CCTV images, detecting duplicates in language 
segments, evaluating news headlines and weather information generate such 
explanations. The agents that represent Ivan Dâr frame their responses and the 
rationale for them in pseudo-anthropomorphic terms. 
 
 
 
Following page, a map in the South book works in conjunction with the egg content, the 
software has an internal model of the map and can therefore make meaningful instructions 
for readers to put themselves in particular locations.  Readers generate new names for the 
locations each time they use the software: 
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Outcomes 
 
 
It was certainly an unusual experience. At times it did feel 
like the egg was addressing me as a real person, but it also 
had strange ideas and made me do things that people 
wouldn’t usually do on a day out to London! Such as talking 
to fish in the London aquarium and going round smelling 
everything. I am interested in writing so I really enjoyed the 
writing exercises, this could be useful as a general tool for 
dealing with writing blocks and for generating new ideas. I 
will do it again in the winter, and maybe when I am in a bad 
mood! 
(Mašinka Savić, July 2009). 
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 Mašinka has experienced a range of evaluations or psychometric exercises and 
additional tasks to help the system assess her current moods and subjective states. 
These tasks were based around her sensory responses as well as situating data that 
the South system had retrieved and analysed prior to her evaluation. The various 
agents embedded in the egg_soft collection worked both behind the scenes and on-
screen to aid Mašinka in experiencing a meaningfully bespoke range of narrative 
experiences, these experiences were communicated to Mašinka via a set of images 
that she loaded into her egg device and also through pointers to relevant passages in 
the South book. If Mašinka could be conceived of as an ‘environment’, then the egg 
device or effector was agential in that it was able to change that environment via the 
tasks it gave her. Mašinka took the egg and the book to the South Bank and followed 
the egg’s instructions, some of these instructions effectively changed Mašinka’s mood 
and her knowledge of both herself and the location. Another outcome of her 
interactions as outlined in chapter four (the South book chapter) is that future 
editions of the South book will include her written and visual contributions.  
 
 
real 56 1 Figure 56 Above, toy robot, collection of E. Dare. 
6.4 Conclusions  
6.4 Conclusions  1 
  
 Narrative has multiple meanings and the construction of narrative presented within 
South is a complex, interdisciplinary system, congruent with the description of  
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narrative outlined by Mateas and Sengers, as a ‘family resemblance concept, a cover 
term for a rich set of ideas’ (Mateas, Sengers, 2003: 21).  The agents embedded in 
the South software accommodate a similarly rich set of epistemological practices with 
which they engage critically and playfully. In particular the South agents interrogate 
the rationalist traditions that underscore symbolic AI, offering alternative and 
meaningful challenges to the orthodoxies implicit in those practices. Alison Adam 
writes of how symbolic AI assumes that the ‘subject need not be made explicit’ 
(Alison Adam, 1998: 179), but in the narrowness of its implicitly rationalist subject, 
whom Adam also frames as an implicitly gendered, ‘man of reason’ (179), the 
possibility of an embodied and situated epistemology is also lost.  
 
South’s agents have been constructed with a view to offering a broad range of 
epistemological and subjective positions, asking what other types of knowledge 
agents can work with in addition to the conventional schemas proposed by a priori 
and formal representations. The epistemologies South’s agents initiate (in addition to 
propositional forms of knowing) are rooted in subjective, embodied and situated 
experience. As evidenced in the case study presented in this chapter, the South 
agents generate tasks that test the means and the degree to which knowledge can be 
codified or articulated, either inter-subjectively or between humans and computers. 
Readers discover for themselves the extent and means by which they can codify 
what they know but also the extent to which a software agent can understand 
something as complex and fluid as a human subject. 
 
 In working with agents South has also emphasised cultural situatedness as well as the 
physical, sensory or environmental situatedness conventionally implied by computer 
scientists when they refer to ‘situated agents’. By situating themselves in a dynamic 
network of environmental, cultural and inter-subjective forces, and thus establishing 
a less linear foundation for interactivity, the agents deployed in South are able to 
destabilise and meaningfully interrogate its core themes of subjectivity, epistemology 
and agency. The reasons for engaging in such an interrogation are both pragmatic 
and ethical.  
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 My rationale in looking for alternative subjectivities, epistemologies and agentive 
distributions has been rooted in the premise that electronic literature is in a 
significant crisis (as outlined in the introduction to this thesis) and that this crisis is 
symptomatic of electronic literature’s provenance in rigidly symbolic, a priori 
knowledge representations. These rigidly top-down and pre-determined 
representations have often resulted in stilted and predictable works that do not 
deploy contemporary, networked computation optimally. At the same time, broader, 
more relational framings of agential and epistemological processes are part of a 
methodological commitment to a multiplicity of perspective. In keeping with the 
tradition of artist’s books the materiality of specific practices is also emphasised, and 
in that emphasis a tendency to anthropomorphise or zoomorphise agents is 
counteracted in favour of allowing agents to ‘be themselves’ through the particularity 
of their medium. An emphasis on medium specificity and the other key outcomes 
and inferences I have formed in producing the South agents are listed below. 
 
Key outcomes and inferences: 
 
• Medium specificity also applies to AI practices: Such practices are 
specific mediums, not unlike dramatis personae with their own unique traits, 
capabilities and flaws. Many of these qualities would, in anthropomorphic 
terms, be framed as ‘mal-adaptations66‘ by agents to conditions beyond their 
‘ecological niche’. But such mal-adaptation is arguably an inherent feature of 
all agents, whether human or non-human, and as such a potentially creative 
resource. 
• South’s agents are also proxy researchers: The agents embedded in 
South engage in research on my behalf, we might therefore be described a 
structurally coupled. 
• South agents are non neutral: South and its deliberative agents deny the 
assumed objectivity of the Cartesian ‘man of reason’; the embedding of non- 
                                                 
66 In evolutionary terms a mal-adaptation, (or behaviour that makes survival in a particular 
environment less likely) is also an inevitable side effect of advantageous adaptation, for example, 
Dodos became fat to accommodate periods of famine, but this adaptation made them ill-suited to 
evading human predators. 
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neutral values is revealed via post-hoc explanation systems and access (where they 
exist) to knowledge bases. 
 
• The South system is supported by an ethical methodology: South 
aims to establish a plurality of practices and to accommodate a similar 
plurality of agencies. 
• A ‘situated agent’ is also a culturally situated agent:  As Mateas and 
Sengers have argued (2003) AI systems are cultural artefacts. They also argue 
that agents perform on behalf of their authors; these ideas are investigated 
throughout South. 
• South’s subjects are framed as environments: There is a meaningful 
degree of what might be called structural coupling or mutual influence, 
between the South agents and their environments (readers), but this 
mutuality is intended to extend beyond the binary, linear relationship, implied 
by the word coupling. 
• South’s agents are allowed to be graceless: Agents generate subjective 
weightings upon each new execution of the program, supported by situated 
and ‘sensory’ inputs that can alter the agent’s evaluation of the reader, this 
has some resemblance to simplified machine learning algorithms, in which 
agents observe situations and interactions  and attempt to detect patterns in 
order to act upon them. Janet Finlay and Alan Dix write that ‘issues of 
control and grace of interaction between agent and user are common to any 
system that involves learning user actions’ (Janet Finlay and Alan Dix, 1996: 
233). However, South is also interested in contesting orthodox notions of 
interactivity, and thus of exploring what a ‘graceless’ system might be like, 
whether in fact there are power struggles or creative asymmetries at play.  
• South’s agents are embodied: But to talk of embodiment in relation to 
wholly software agents is complex and contested.  
The final statement acknowledges the difficulty of describing South’s agents as 
embodied. These artificial agents do not have a direct physical presence in their 
environment (aside, perhaps, from the phosphorescent physicality Hayles writes of 
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(1999)). However, my agents are, in extended terms situated in their environments, 
which I define as the subjectivity of the South readers, the computational 
environment and the more conventional sense of an environment represented in my 
system by inputs relating to tidal flows, weather patterns, atmospheric pollution and 
temperatures.  I would therefore venture to define these agents as both physically 
and artificially embodied by virtue of a meaningfully dynamic relationship to their 
environment. Computer scientists might characterise this as a form of structural 
coupling. Such a structural coupling, however, as outlined for example by Maturana 
and Varela (1987), suggests a loop of agencies, in which the artificial agent effects the 
environment (a reader) and the environment, or human agent effects, in turn, the 
artificial agent. The idealised conception of the South system aims to be looser, less 
linear then the notion of structural coupling or loops of cause and effect might imply.  
South attempts to open its structural relationships to a wide and distributed network 
of agencies, including human agents, such as readers and myself, artificial agents and 
other types of non-human or hybrid agencies, from forces of nature to economic 
forces that have complex agential foundations.  
The following, and final, chapter will expand upon both the limitations and 
possibilities inherent in the South project and its agents. It will make the case for the 
originality of both the South book and software and for the broader notion of 
subjectively and environmentally situated programming. The conclusion will relate 
the solutions I have devised to the research questions and aims outlined in the 
introduction to this thesis. 
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Figure 57 1Subject-specific content generated by the South software. 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 1 
 
We confront our own opacity through these artefacts – or 
rather, we co-become with them to inventively make 
problems about what ‘we’ might become. 
(Beaver et al, 2009: 6) 
 
 
When my PhD practice started in October 2007 there was a long list of questions 
that I wanted to explore. These questions were expansive and complex and yet I  
 
eleanor, the software 
says this to you: 
leisure time is 
a gigantic  
smoke screen 
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found them energising, they were relevant to my ongoing practice as a fine artist 
working with both computational and analogue materials. It felt that attempting to 
answer these questions would generate the type of situated and dynamic art-works, 
specifically artist’s books, which I had long wanted to experience but had not yet 
encountered. These questions were: 
 
 Can the artist’s book be meaningfully remediated within a computational 
framework? 
 Can computers generate both fictional and non-fictional writing? 
 Can they also understand their readers and generate worthwhile insights into 
them? 
 To what extent must computer programs depend upon a priori rules and how 
rigid do those rules need to be? 
 Would it be possible to create a computational artist’s book that reacted to 
people dynamically and interestingly? 
 Does electronic literature have to be ‘Aristotelian’ in form?  
 
 
 In the complex and rich domains of HCI, electronic literature and artist’s books 
there were no pre-fabricated methodologies to help answer these questions. 
Throughout the last three years it has been necessary to invent my own strategies 
and methods in order to tackle these questions and to establish meaningful solutions 
and findings. This thesis conclusion will establish the significance of those findings; it 
will summarise how I have dealt with the research problems outlined in the thesis 
introduction. The conclusion will also acknowledge the inevitable gaps and 
contradictions embedded in aspects of the knowledge I have generated, as well as 
the possibilities that this research (including those gaps) has offered for further 
investigation. These include the four projects I am currently engaged in and the 
proposals generated via my involvement with the Goldsmiths Research Incubation 
Transfer (GRIT) program, in which concrete and feasible propositions for projects 
that extend this doctoral work have been developed.  
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 This conclusion synthesises the key terms and concepts represented in the thesis. It 
articulates the re-conceptualisations that the thesis proposes, framing them as 
significant contributions to the field of both electronic literature, arts computing, and 
HCI (Human-Computer-Interaction). These closing deductions are drawn in light of 
a critical reading of the relevant literature and a practice-based engagement with 
inter and intra active writing and the broader domain of HCI. This conclusion 
outlines how the thesis findings have been disseminated and received within a wider 
research community, referencing several collaborative and independent projects, 
papers and presentations that I have undertaken in London, Bradford, Copenhagen, 
Berlin and Stockholm. These papers and projects support the claim that my PhD 
practice has generated viable solutions and valid methodologies, and that these have 
been acknowledged within a broad community of researchers and arts practitioners. 
 
The first section will now summarise and synthesise the main concepts presented 
within the thesis, while the subsequent sections will clarify the significance and 
contribution of this PhD, relating it to background readings and bringing closure, 
where it has been possible, to the main thesis questions, while evidencing the 
possibilities for further research and knowledge transfer generated as a result of this 
intensive three year apprenticeship. 
 
 
7.1 Summary  
7.1 Summary  1 
 
From the very start of my PhD research the formation of dynamic relationships 
between individual subjects and books was a central goal of my practice. In order to 
pursue this objective, my theoretical research focused upon ideas relating to 
subjectivity and by extension to issues of epistemology and agency. My background 
research addressed the question of what a subject is and how such an entity 
generates knowledge about the world. This research also addressed the question of 
agency, particularly in the context of configurations involving humans and computers,  
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asking what makes things happen in such a configuration, and where do subjects and 
objects begin and end?  While these conceptual questions have been central to a  
philosophical understanding of the field, I have also had to formulate real-world, 
pragmatic solutions that work with these concerns. These solutions are co-
constituted from both theoretical and practice-based knowledge; the theoretical and 
indeed ideological principles I have researched and formulated are enmeshed with 
the materiality and specificity of mediums, as well as my own subjectivity and 
situatedness. The solutions that have been generated in response to the overarching 
aims of my PhD practice are summarised below: 
 
Aims    
 
 Create dynamic relationships between humans and books. 
• Produce a digital and analogue artist’s book that tries to understand 
human subjects, even if that understanding is flawed by asymmetries of 
understanding between computers and humans. 
• Make the software and book as reflexive, situated and transparent as 
possible. 
 
  
 The entanglement of practice and theory described above has arisen from 
formulating aims that demand real-world solutions. What, for example, might a 
computer program be like that concurs with Bourdieu’s notion of being in-the-game 
(Bourdieu, 1990), ‘in moving beyond traditional objective/subjective binaries that 
have tended to separate the arts and humanities from the sciences’ (Jefferies, 2009: 
5). How, specifically, does one generate workable programming structures that 
encompass the subjectivity and relationality of knowledge and the particularity of 
experience? At the same time, how might such a program acknowledge the broader 
structures and situating agencies at play in any computer-human configuration? As 
this conclusion will emphasise, the significance of my PhD practice is evidenced in the 
way these issues have been tackled and by formulating workable solutions in relation 
to them. 
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Figure 58 1Above, examples of subject specific content generated by the South software 
 
 
Throughout this thesis subjectivity, agency and alternative notions of the inter, or 
rather, the intra-active have been referenced. The thesis has also discussed the 
notion of the artist’s book and related it to the less familiar and less documented 
conception of digital or even ‘intelligent’ books. In keeping with the tradition of many 
artist’s books, (though at first not consciously so), it has been the specificity of the 
computational mediums and structures I have deployed that have grounded my 
practice, combined with a pragmatic engagement with situatedness, intra-activity, 
agency and subjectivity. I have deployed these key concepts and terms not merely as 
catch phrases or solely as ideological constructions, but as the central tools for 
answering the thesis questions and for producing software. 
 
Main question 
 
The main question: ‘How can subjectivity be reconfigured within software that 
generates dynamic, intra-active, artist’s books?’ is embedded with the core 
conceptual and pragmatic goals of the South software and book. By working critically 
with the notion of the subject and by allowing a high degree of questioning and 
exploration to enter into the framing of the subject within this work (in both its 
analogue book and software book forms), an alternative notion of interactivity is also 
conceived. The intra-active software I have written, as it name suggests, encompasses 
a multi-linear form of computer-human configuration as opposed to the linear 
causations stereotypically at play in the construction of the inter-active. The 
etymology of these words reveals their different agential emphasis: inter – means 
between, while intra means within. The South software seeks relational agencies in 
making its decisions. These agencies, though often asymmetrical, do not favour the  
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human over the computational or the environmental over the subjective; they do 
not presuppose an a priori separation between the subject and the object.   Instead 
South frames such separations, if they do exist, as contingent to the specificity and 
locatedness of particular factors, in both their spatial and temporal situatedness.  
 
The emphasis upon the temporality of human-computer configurations is a significant 
response to the research aims and a key conceptual aspect of the intra-active 
structures formulated in response to the thesis questions. The solutions presented 
through this work are offered here as significant contributions to a re-
conceptualisation of both interactivity and previous artist’s book forms. In support of 
this claim I would like to refer to an exhibition that was held halfway through my 
PhD in the spring of 2008.  The exhibition was entitled Blood on Paper and was held 
at the Victoria and Albert Museum67 (from the 15th of April to June 29th, 2008). The 
exhibition professed to represent the current state of Artist’s Books, aiming to 
‘show the extraordinary ways in which the book has been treated by leading artists 
of today and the recent past’ (V&A Blood on Paper website, accessed 25/11/09). 
While I am not disputing the fact that many of the works in this exhibition were 
extraordinary, innovative and important, it also seems significant that there were no 
computational book-works on display and no reference to the possibility of such 
works, indeed no digital exploration of the book form was included.  The website for 
the V&A artist’s book collection also makes no reference to computational artist’s 
book forms, rather they are presented as anathema to the form and somehow 
irreconcilable or threatening to analogue books. The possibility of remediation or a 
more nuanced, non-polarised interplay between analogue and digital constructions is 
also not considered: 
 
 At a time when the notion of the book is challenged by the 
advent of the screen and computer, this exhibition aims to show 
the extraordinary ways in which the book has been treated by 
leading artists of today and the recent past. Blood on Paper will 
focus on new and contemporary work and on books where the  
                                                 
67
 V&A Web page describing the exhibition available here: 
http://www.vam.ac.uk/collections/prints_books/features/artists_books/definitions/index.html  
Accessed 25/11/09 
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artist has been the driving force in conception and design. The 
past twenty years have seen outstanding work by some of the 
most influential and respected artists of our time. 
(Web site for the Blood and Paper 
exhibition:http://www.vam.ac.uk/collections/contemporary/bloodo
npaper/index.html) 
 
The background reading outlined in the literature review articulates the apparent 
scarcity of technologically significant, computerised book forms; this is also 
supported by other forms of research, such as the disassembly (or reverse 
engineering, where legal) of existent digital forms. Though there are certainly many 
interesting works at large, there have arguably been few works that significantly 
deploy computational structures and medium specificities in the way that book 
artists have historically interrogated analogue book forms. Likewise my reading 
supports the claim that much of the work (with some striking exceptions referenced 
in the literature review) described as digital or interactive literature is also not fully 
engaged with the evolving specificities and dynamic potential of computational 
structures or the social, historical, aesthetic and ethical implications of HCI. This is 
not a prescriptive statement; clearly not all writers are concerned with exploring the 
full potential and implications of digital forms. This thesis does not aim to establish an 
orthodoxy stipulating what writers engaged with digital processes ‘should’ be 
interested in. However, in addressing the problems identified in the literature review 
for this thesis, an important recommendation is the meaningful application of 
computational resources in a way that creatively deploys their specific capabilities.  
 
 The next section will expand upon the significance of the background reading, 
drawing upon its key aspects and exploring the ways in which my own findings have 
concurred with or contradicted the ideas found in these works. 
 
The literature 
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The background research was structured according to the core themes of 
subjectivity, agency, epistemology and electronic literature. In the case of electronic 
literature the tools I have developed do address some of the failings and assumptions 
embedded in previous writing systems and their outputs, as identified for example by  
Aarseth (1997),  Tabbi (2002)  Sengers and Mateas (2003) and J. Yellowlees Douglas, 
(2000). However, though these critiques have formed a vital foundation for 
understanding this field, my emphasis departs in some important ways from the main 
themes of these works. Identifying and highlighting the asymmetries and potential 
misunderstandings inherent in differing epistemologies (such as rule-based 
computational knowledge schemas or the tacit, embodied and situated knowledge of 
human subjects), has been one of South’s core strategies.  
 
 In keeping with the works cited, the asymmetries of understanding between 
computers and humans could be problematised, but instead they are deployed in 
South as sources of productive tension and creative possibility, much as human 
character flaws are deployed as core individuating and motivating elements in many 
fictional works. Likewise, though Mateas and Sengers (2003) do address the issue of 
partiality, and the positivist fallacy of neutral computation, an important conception 
in this work is the creative articulation of both my own and my reader’s subjectivity 
via the South software and book. This, I assert, is a distinctive facet of the South 
project and an original contribution to the field of interactive narrative and artist’s 
books. Both subjectivity and epistemology are framed as fluid agencies in the 
continuous co-becoming intrinsic to the notion of an ‘intra-active’ book. 
 
Subjectivity 
 
Research into subjectivity and the notion of a stable, originary, subject has opened up 
a significant, and it must be said, an intrinsically problematic area of tension within 
this work. Whereas the psychometric tests I have drawn upon largely seek to ignore 
the philosophical tensions at play in a fixed, predictable, a priori model of the subject, 
the South book and software opens up these unstable structures for further 
examination. The uncertainties and historical framings of the subject are presented in 
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South, not as inconvenient variables, but as rich sources of creative potential. The 
types of possibility held in these conflicts and contradictions are transformed into  
forms of potential literature, potential sources of temporally situated agency and 
potentially performative explorations of the subject. 
 
 Background reading into the use of psychometric (or personality measuring) 
mechanisms has left an impression that the critiques of such forms (particularly those 
of Hollway (1984) and Henriques et al (1984)) do not fully answer the question of 
why these tests and these notions of testable personality types endure (and why 
many organisations still spend money performing such tests). Rather than fully 
concurring with these critical works and rejecting outright the notion of static 
personality traits, the South project addresses these paradoxes, providing novel 
mechanisms for readers to formulate their own theories about the stability or 
otherwise of personality traits and their own subjectivity. This also represents an 
ethical commitment to identifying unhelpful polarities, or examples of ‘either/or’ 
thinking, in which readers would be forced (or encouraged) to take an entrenched 
view of these issues. 
 
Epistemology, agency and situatedness: how do subjects and objects 
generate knowledge? 
 
 At first sight Sandra Harding’s notion of standpoint epistemology (Alcoff and Potter, 
1993) seemed to offer attractive alternatives to the problems inherent in 
universalising knowledge claims, and may have presented a solution within South to 
the difficulty of reconciling generalisable knowledge claims with subjectivity, and yet 
the idea of privileged standpoints seems ultimately to open further ethical and 
pragmatic difficulties. More workable conceptions of both the subject and agency are 
accessible from writers who engage with the contingency and temporality of 
‘meaning’. Barad (2007) describes a complex but pertinent sense of the continuous, 
ongoing, unfixed process of differentiating subjects from objects.  There are also 
further useful critiques of fixed representations available through primary and 
secondary readings of Henri Bergson (1911), and, though their arguments address 
different issues, readings of Dreyfus (1972, 1992), Adam (1998) and Suchman (1987, 
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2007) have been essential in supporting a critique of a priori representation, but it 
should also be stated that I have not taken an entrenched position on this matter in  
my own programming. There are rules (or a priori representations) within the South 
system. As Suchman has done (2007) I would also defend myself from the suggestion 
that I am proposing we abandon all plans or prior structures in interactive programs 
or that it would be possible to do so.  
 
The core issue in my work concerns the degree of a priori planning necessary and the 
flexibility or otherwise of such structures in my computation. South should be framed 
as providing tools for an exploration into these distributions and to our ongoing 
understanding of human-computer-interactions. In both its software and book forms 
the project presents flexible apparatus for negotiating and testing these relationships. 
The following section will clarify the significance, originality and contribution that 
these solutions make within the domain of computational literature and the broader 
areas of both artist’s books and HCI. 
 
 
7.2 Deductions and solutions, significance and contribution  
7.2 Deductions and solutions 1 
  
 
Alternatives to rigidly predetermined and unvarying interactive software 
programs: 
 
The South project has resulted in alternatives to rigidly predetermined and unvarying 
interactive software programs. It fosters a tolerance of both complexity and multiple 
interpretation, while bearing in mind that ‘designing systems to support a rich range 
of interpretations does not abdicate the designer from responsibility for the eventual 
success of the system’ (Gaver and Sengers, 2006: 7). Environmentally and sensorily 
situated programming sustains a creative sensitivity to the temporally and socially 
entangled agencies that are always at play in complex systems of human-computer 
communication. Using environmental factors (such as the tidal flow of the Thames, 
meteorological data and CCTV images of London’s roads) as logic gates within the 
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South software, has enabled the South project to maintain and emphasise a 
networked rather than a top down, centralised system. Giving readers the 
opportunity to ‘hack’ into and change the South software also emphasises a 
contingent as opposed to a rigidly rule-based, black-boxed system. Similarly this 
practice deploys subjectivity and subjectifying processes as a form of situating 
resource, or an expanded notion of an ‘environment’, while inviting readers to 
decompose and renegotiate the fixed models of the subject potentially present in the 
hard-coded sections of the South project. 
 
real 59 1Figure 57 Below an algorithm from the software that uses string matching to 
evaluate information about the weather at the time of interaction, following page, a screen 
shot from the South software. 
 
/** 
 * evalWeather() read in weather data, split string 
 *  
 * @param Strimg 
 * ss, String actions, int aa, int bb aa and bb = location of 
 * text to print actions = text to print ss = String to match 
 * @return void 
 */ 
 
public void evalWeather(String ss, String actions, int aa, int bb) { 
 
String weth = readText("web_Gather/weather/weather"); 
 
String a = " "; 
String[] list = split(weth, " "); 
 
//make into general method for matching 
 
 for (int i = 0; i < list.length; i++) { 
 
  a = list[i]; 
  if (a.equals(ss)) { 
   text(actions, aa, bb); 
  } 
 
 } 
} 
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Figure 60 1 Content generated by the South software. 
Situated agents 
 
The notion of ‘situated’ agents is referred to in much of the background literature 
concerned with software agents that has been researched, however the meaning of 
situated, in for example Brooks (2002) and Wooldridge (2009) is not the same as my 
own interpretation of this concept. Brooks situates his robots (such as ‘Genghis’) in 
their immediate environment, where they can react to the presence of walls or 
other objects, describing them thus: ‘A situated creature or robot is one that is 
embedded in the world, and which does not deal with abstract descriptions, but 
through sensors with the here and now of the world, which directly influences the 
behaviour of the creature’ (Brooks, 2002, 52-52). South’s agents are situated in a 
much broader physical and social sense that is closer to the situated knowledge(s) 
described by Haraway (1991), Suchman (2007), Barad (2007) and myself. Haraway 
describes situated knowledge(s) as a form of embodied objectivity that 
accommodates ‘particular and specific embodiment’ (Haraway, 199: 190). 
Acknowledging and making visible our partiality of perspective in Haraway’s terms is 
taking ethical and scientific responsibility for the knowledge we generate.  
 
 
This wider sense of situatedness in the South software is supported by a range of 
techniques and factors including web scraping, observing reader actions, analysing 
news headlines, my own subjective data, and environmentally situated ‘percepts’ or 
sensors that detect weather, financial and tidal states. The subjectivity of readers is 
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also framed as a situating factor in a sense that departs in some ways from Suchman’s 
conception of situated programs. The South project frames subjects themselves as 
forms of environment, including my own subjective presence within the software 
structures I have written. 
 
Relational agents and knowledge generation: 
  
The South software is built around a series of agents which perform analytical and 
interpretive tasks. A commitment to a reflexive practice emphasises the exploration 
of the proxy and in many ways subjective role these agents play on my behalf. 
Consequently the agents are both structural tools and unorthodox protagonists 
within this work. The limitations inherent in these agents, and the asymmetries of 
understanding between them and human readers, are framed as creative resources. 
The rigidity of computational language analysis is framed as a ‘cultural’ trait. The 
awkward yet amusing efforts of computational agents to understand the input of 
human readers is preserved rather than smoothed out by an endless regress of rules 
or ready-made language structures. All of the agents engaged with South, whether 
human, computational or environmental, challenge the notion of autonomy, instead 
they collectively engage in a form of continuous, dynamic co-becoming. 
 
The South book and software supports an explorative engagement with different 
forms of knowledge generation. The ‘sensory modalities’ of readers are identified by 
the evaluative software and are presented as a challenge or provocation to readers, 
who are invited to explore the validity of this categorisation. Readers are also guided 
through a range of epistemological engagements, from rigidly pre-set rules to 
embodied explorations that are embedded in the physical and cultural terrain of the 
South Bank area. I will now outline a representative sample of the ways in which 
these ideas have been disseminated within the wider research community, 
supporting the argument that they represent viable, valid and original contributions 
to my field. 
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A sample of papers, projects, presentations, installations and 
performances: 
 
• London, Goldsmiths February 15th 2008: `Non-linear narrative in twentieth 
and twenty-first century artistic practices’, this was a symposium between 
doctoral students from Goldsmiths, Berlin and Copenhagen Universities. My 
paper, entitled `Questionable Texts’, outlined an ethical and pragmatic case 
for situating interactive fictional works in the subjectivity of the programmer-
writer. I also demonstrated Subject Oriented Software, a prototype Java 
interface using xml files to enable readers to `question’ and to situate the 
short stories embedded in my computer program. 
 
 
• Copenhagen University, June 2008: ‘Copenhagen Symposium on Art and 
Research: New Interfaces’: Following on from the previous presentation this 
paper, ‘Subject Oriented Software’, expanded upon the use of my own 
subjectivity as an ethical and situating factor by describing the ways in which a 
new version of the software could accommodate the subjectivity of readers, 
and also of wider situating events, through web scraping and the monitoring 
of reader interactions. The paper also acknowledged the possibility of 
mutable subjects and entangled agencies, offering a theoretical critique of 
originary, trans-historical subjects. 
 
• London, Goldsmiths, November 20th 2008: ‘The Thursday Club’, Goldsmiths 
Digital Studios. Supported by Goldsmiths Graduate School & the Department 
of Computing. This involved a presentation with Alexandra Antonopoulou. 
My part of the presentation was entitled Cybertexts.  The presentation 
discussed the dangers inherent in imposing naturalised literary terms onto 
new forms of textuality, showing how my own work is concerned with the 
 310 
specificity of different mediums.  I also discussed the place of the subject in 
digital literary works, asking how relevant long-held ideas of agency and 
‘reception’ are in the reader-writer nexus within a dynamic and networked 
writing system. 
 
Details available at: 
http://doc.gold.ac.uk/~ma701pt/thethursdayclub/?page_id=14  
Accessed 29/11/09 
 
• London, Goldsmiths 24th September 2009:  My methodology was presented 
to the new practice-based Goldsmiths PhD cohort. The case was made for a 
non-passive research design that uses self-reflexive journals and embodied 
knowledge generation (see page 122 for more detail about these practices). 
The Kavad, or mobile methodology box was also presented as a processual 
and evolving tool for investigating and developing a practice-based 
methodology and matching it to appropriate methods.  
 
• Berlin, Freie Universität, Graduiertenkolleg "InterArt" International Research 
Training Group "InterArt Studies". 16-18 November 2009. Alexandra 
Antonopoulou and I presented a paper, our artist’s books and an installation. 
Our paper, entitled ‘Phi Books Research Territories through Narrative’ 
presented our work as a partly fictional, visual and sonic performance. In 
keeping with my PhD methodology the case was argued for fiction writing as 
a valid research process, balancing determinism with subjectivity through the 
use of an algorithmic approach to collaboration and to artist’s book 
production.  Our installation solicited writings from the participants.  These 
writings were re-incorporated into new editions of our artist’s books and an 
online journal. The Phi Books journal is available here: 
http://phibooksland.blogspot.com/ 
 
• Stockholm, the Research School of Aesthetics at Stockholm University, 
February 2010, symposium on ‘Aesthetics and History’. I presented my paper 
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Robot aesthetics and analogue interventions: humans and machines in the 
incunabulum’. The paper expanded upon some of the themes discussed in 
chapter six of this thesis, relating to robots and software agents. The paper 
recommended the need for exploring a computational aesthetic for software 
agents and electronic literature, and for producing programs that  both 
tolerate and exploit the ways in which computers try to comprehend natural 
(or human) language, framing then not as misunderstandings, but as an 
emerging aesthetic or ‘robot literary culture’. I also presented a ‘live’ robot 
play. This play was computationally embedded in the environment in which it 
was presented, responding dynamically and uniquely to the moment of its 
performance.  
 
 
• London, March 2010, Goldsmiths University of London – Inter-Art 
symposium with Berlin and Copenhagen Universities. Alexandra 
Antonopoulou and I presented a paper and our films, which are called the 
‘Phi Meta-films’. My own film was embedded in a computer program I wrote 
in the Processing programming language. In keeping with the methodology 
developed for my doctoral work the film was situated and dynamic, 
responding to the specific temporal and social agencies at play at the moment 
of its screening, and also mixing ‘live’ images of the audience back into the 
original film during its screening. This paper proposed and performed a 
rigorous engagement with the expectations and meanings of audience 
participation and collaboration. 
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Figure 61 1Below, screen shots from the Phi MetaFilm, the colour on the left was the colour 
of the river Thames sampled from CCTV at the time of the film’s screening. 
  
 
Bradford, May 2010, Graffiti Sounds, a project directed by Shabina Aslam, involving 
site specific sonic narratives created by marginalised teenagers in Lister Park, 
Bradford. My writing maps, or heuristic tools for generating writing, were used in 
workshops to help the participants generate material for this project. I designed and 
edited a book to accompany the project, containing materials generated by the 
participants. The project is funded by Media Box. (http://www.media-
box.co.uk/about/what-is-mediabox). 
Figure 62 1 Below, ‘writing maps’ produced for the Graffiti Sounds project, March 2010. I used the 
idea of articulated subjectivity as a heuristic or writing tool for teenagers in Bradford. 
 
• September 5- 8th 2010, a collaborative paper presented with the curator Lee 
Weinberg at the Brunel University DRHA 2010 Sensual Technologies: 
collaborative practices of interdisciplinarity conference. Our paper was about 
VAINS, the Visual Art Interpretation and Navigation System. The paper was peer 
reviewed by a panel at Brunel University. VAINS involves the construction of 
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an online gallery that reacts dynamically to individual visitors, enabling them 
to make and preserve radical changes to the gallery design and content. The 
project is an opportunity to extend my ideas about situated, bespoke and 
subjectively grounded computation. The Website for VAINS is available here: 
http://www.wix.com/Vains_Pro/VAINS  Accessed  12/09/10 
• November 2010, the 8th International Conference on the Book, St Galen 
University, Switzerland. I will present my paper ‘Post-desktop publishing:  
future books in an era of ubiquitous digitality. The Implications of intelligent and 
pervasive book forms’. The paper is about my PhD Research. 
• June 2011, the 14th Annual International Creative Writing Conference, 
Imperial College, London. I will present a paper on SouthThese papers, 
projects, presentations and artworks represent the means by which a well 
structured methodology has helped answer the core questions presented in 
this thesis and further questions proliferating from my research, such as 
issues of ‘creative’ collaboration and a priori constraints. These activities 
evidence the ways in which the main aims have been met while 
acknowledging the processual and evolving nature of this work. These papers 
and artworks have specifically contributed to the resolution of issues relating 
to the construction of a dynamic and situated artist’s book. This book can be 
characterised as significantly intra-active, original and therefore a work that 
contributes to the generation of relevant new knowledge within the domain 
of HCI and to meaningful new forms of artist’s books. However, it is 
important to acknowledge the inevitable limitations present in this, as much 
as any other research project. The following section will elaborate on some 
of those limitations, identifying ongoing issues and relating them to problems 
that many researchers in this field continue to address before moving on to 
the final section which will discuss the possibilities for further research, some 
of which are related to the limitations identified next. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
Validity and generalisation  
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 Chapter three of this thesis (the methodology chapter) identifies some of the 
complications many artists have articulated in relation to notions of validity and 
generalisation. There are useful responses to this question in Gaver and Sengers 
(2006), Wilkie and Gaver (2006), Sullivan (2005), Carter (2004), Penny (1999) and 
Wilson (1996). These authors support alternative logics of practice that do not 
polarise explicit and tacit forms of knowledge. In relation to the associated problem 
of evaluation I have embraced multiple interpretation as a response to my own 
critique of singular, idealised outcomes. Nonetheless it is reasonable to anticipate 
valid refutations of this approach. Perhaps the strongest rejoinder is to highlight the 
transfer I have affected from electronic literature to analogue text, to film making 
and teaching by means of my methodology. However I would pinpoint the question 
of validity and generalisation as an ongoing area of debate, particularly in the context 
of works that operate at the intersection of the arts, humanities and sciences. James 
McAllister (McAllister in Slager, 2004: 10) identifies networks of validity68 that 
operate within the arts, comparing them to forms of validation found in scientific 
contexts. I have evidenced my own papers and artworks in support of the notion 
that this PhD practice has been validated within those extended networks and 
epistemic communities. 
 
Order and chaos, subjectivity and fragmentation 
 
The double bind of anchoring this work in subjectivity entails the benefits of an 
ethical and located project but also a degree of subject and site specificity that has 
the potential for narrative fragmentation. However, this thesis also challenges the 
validity of a universal interactive work. These issues are not straightforward or easily 
resolvable (and are not ones that I have significantly focused my energies upon). 
Instead I offer the intra-active program as a solution to the static and rigidly linear 
                                                 
68
 The networks of validity James McAllister describes are analogous to scientifically validating networks 
or laboratories. James McAllister boldly states that artworks do ‘contain knowledge about the world’ 
(McAllister in Slager, 2004:10) But, as he points out the networks of validation artists experience 
include other artists, ‘galleries, curators, critics and so on’ (11). McAllister suggests that 
‘communication of an artwork would also count as an empirical success’ (12) but that research does 
not consist of ‘think-pieces to accompany works of art or exhibitions. Rather the research exists in 
the works of art themselves’ (12). 
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works critiqued in this thesis, while acknowledging that my own work must strike a 
very precarious balance between order and chaos, subjectivity and fragmentation. 
This is a balance that is not limited to my own output. Sophie Calle’s exhibition 
(October - January 2009) at the Whitechapel Gallery, ‘Talking to Strangers’ 
exemplifies the delicacy of this balance and is a reminder that it is not one that is 
limited to my own practice. I would also identify Sophie Calle’s work as grappling 
with the inter-textual, inter-medial and interdisciplinary, striking, as South aspires to 
do, a complex balance between literary, narrative elements and less easily graspable 
features, such as visual documentation, performance and speech fragments.  
 
 
‘Participatory’ art works 
 
 The notion of participatory artworks and interactivity per se can too easily be 
subsumed in hype and idealisation (see the literature review and Lister et al (2003) 
for a detailed analysis of these points). Claims for neutrality or symmetry in works 
that invite participation are potentially naïve; it is my contention that a more feasible 
position is to make as transparent as possible the presence of the author and the 
power relations at play in any participatory configuration. This is proposed and 
implemented throughout the South project. For reasons of space and containment I 
have held back somewhat from engaging head-on with the complexities of these 
debates, however, within the last few months of my doctoral research I have 
presented a joint paper with Alexandra Anotonopoulou, exploring these issues in 
relation to this PhD practice and to the Phi Books project (a collaborative writing and 
research project). In this paper we proposed an engagement with the expectations 
and meaning of participation, asking our audience to gauge the extent to which they 
felt ‘part’ of the work we presented. As the next section explains, any further 
research I undertake in this field will clearly require a continuing engagement with 
these issues.  
 
Further research 
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 The methodology developed for my PhD practice has now been applied to a range 
of projects, from generating electronic literature to paper-based story-telling, artist’s 
book production, curation, film making and teaching. Through involvement with the 
Goldsmiths Research Incubation Transfer program I have developed viable proposals 
for post-doctoral research and funding. This further research aims to establish a 
conceptual and pragmatic framework for the development of a computational 
creative writing mentor and heuristic device. The main focus of this ongoing 
research is as follows: 
 
• To develop a set of computational and analogue tools to facilitate challenging 
and lively computational creative writing practices. These tools will support 
publicly engaged, culturally diverse and inclusive experiences of interactive  
           and analogue writing programs. 
• The research will investigate the significant expectations around technology 
and ‘interactive’ writing of potential users. 
• The investigation will also encourage (and instigate) a productive debate 
about the future of interactive writing tools, while interrogating the very 
meaning of the word ‘interactive’. 
 
 
The notion of articulated subjectivity will continue to be investigated as a productive 
foundation for the users of a computational creative writing mentor and of other 
projects such as VAINS, an online Visual Art Interpretation and Navigation System (in 
collaboration with the curator Lee Weinberg). In keeping with my methodology, 
situating data and subjective experience will be framed as ‘an intellectual resource, 
rather than a defensive audit’69.   
 
In formulating a detailed proposal for further research it is clear that the completion 
of this PhD has entailed the development of considerable expert knowledge. This 
knowledge resides both in a material and theoretical engagement with my field, 
enabling the establishment of appropriate structures and priorities for continuing 
research. If the PhD process may be characterised as a form of apprenticeship it is 
                                                 
69
 192, Payne, Geoff, and Payne, Judy (2005) Key Concepts in Social Research, Sage. 
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my assertion that I have completed this PhD a more capable and informed artist, 
working with computational and analogue materials with coherent and valid 
methodologies developed throughout the PhD process and informed by my ongoing 
practice as a fine artist and writer. The core aims I set out to achieve have also been 
realised, as recapped below: 
 
 Create dynamic relationships between humans and books. 
• Produce a digital and analogue book that tries to understand human 
subjects, even if that understanding is flawed by the asymmetries of 
understanding between computers and humans. 
• Make the software and book as reflexive, situated and transparent as 
possible. 
The methodology I have generated is physically and culturally situated, temporally 
sensitive and committed to making visible its embedded values. The South software is 
also environmentally or ecologically ‘aware’.  This is a workable methodology that 
has been applied to other forms, including the presentation of papers, creative 
collaboration, film making and formulating research algorithms in teaching situations 
with post-graduate and other students. This methodology (and also some of the 
specific computational methods developed throughout this PhD) is applicable to my 
further work as an artist, lecturer, programmer and writer, both within and outside 
the academy.  The ideas and practices produced by my research engender many new 
questions, but they also equip me with significant new tools for generating further 
new knowledge within the fields of electronic literature, artist’s books and human-
computer-interaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 318 
 
 
 
Appendix 
Appendix 1 
Appendix 1 
‘I think it’s a grown up culture game, where facts and fantasy determine the game journey.’ 
(Informant 1, 16/01/10). 
 
    
Figure 63 1 Above, evaluation of the South software and egg, December 2009 – March 2010. 
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This appendix contains information and results relating to the evaluation and usability 
surveys that were undertaken between 2009 and 2010. The appendix also describes 
other tests that the South software was subjected to as well information about 
obtaining and installing the software. The appendix briefly introduces the three core 
classes of the South system which are fully documented on the South website. The 
site also provides the full code, ready for installation: 
http://www.doc.gold.ac.uk/~ma501ed/south/south_Download.html 
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Appendix 1: The sample and surveys 
Appendix 1: The sample and surveys 1 
 
The sample 
 
The sample for the two core surveys described in this appendix was obtained 
opportunistically and through referral by other informants. However, I did take 
measures to balance the sample when it became top-heavy with students, seeking 
more non-student and non-technically specialised informants, though only two 
informants described themselves as ‘uncomfortable with technology’. Two thirds of 
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the informants might be described as naïve informants, while the remaining third 
have a high degree of familiarity with computational technology. One informant, for 
both surveys, was an expert on interface design. 
 
 
Interpretation survey and results  
 
The interpretation surveys, as their name implies, invited multiple interpretation of 
the egg object, both conceptually and physically. The resulting interpretations were 
diverse and ranged from open hostility to a desire to own and experience the output 
of such a device. As I have emphasised throughout the body of this thesis 
(particularly in the Methodology chapter, chapter three), the interpretation and use 
of these results is not straightforwardly instrumental. However, the diversity of 
interpretation served as a valuable reminder that the meaning of my work is, in many 
ways beyond my control.  The egg was described at the beginning of the survey, see 
below. 
 
 
Figure 58 Below, interpretation survey for the South egg 
Date______ Consent to take part, (please sign):__________________________ 
Your answers will not be linked to your name; your name will not be used at any 
point in this research. 
age 
 
Gender Occupation Are you 
comfortable with 
technology? 
(tick beside Y or N 
below) 
 
   Y:                      N: 
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Someone gives you an egg shaped object that seems to understand you. When you switch it 
on and take it to your favourite location, it starts to ask you quite deep questions. It also 
gives you suggestions for things to do, knowing somehow that you are, for example, shy or 
overconfident, it asks you to do exercises that give you insight into how you typically react 
to places and situations and other people.  
 
You follow the exercises, the egg asks you to pretend to be various other people, again 
knowing how you work psychologically each task is really suited to you. It asks you very 
personal (but never embarrassing) questions, enquiring about things you might never have 
asked yourself before.  
 
The egg also asks what you think about events that are happening in the world around you, 
such as what you feel about the news headlines that day or a famous person who’s been 
involved in a scandal. It asks you to write and draw and smell things and imagine new ways of 
being you.  It never seems to run out of ideas. 
Questions for you: 
 
What is it for? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What role could it play in your life? 
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If you used this egg what do you think it would mean about you? 
 
 
 
 
What would it mean about your social group? 
 
 
 
 
And your society? 
 
 
 
Or your culture? 
 
 
 
 
Where would you like to use this egg? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results of the interpretation surveys 
 
Interpretation Surveys: n= 21 
 
Figure 59 following page, tables showing key responses (un-coded) to the egg 
interpretation survey, October 2009 – December 2009 
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Coded results 
 
The responses were reviewed and divided into ‘orthogonal’ categories, small sets of 
(ideally) non-overlapping types, which could then be coded. The coding process 
identified core themes, positive qualities, potential problems, and further questions I 
needed to answer.  
 
 ‘Orthogonal’ categories relating to ideas about what the egg is for: 
• Data collection 
• friend 
• religious 
• therapist 
• Self-knowledge 
• Twin (‘another me’) 
• Annoying machine 
• conversation 
• Thinking machine 
• Counter loneliness 
• filter incoming data 
• mentor 
• Life coach 
• pet 
• Self-expression 
• Don’t understand concept 
 
Coded categories 
Figure 60 Below, coded categorisations of the interpretation survey results: 
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Category Category 
number 
Number 
of 
responses: 
Data collection C1 2 
Friend C2 6 
Religious C3 1 
Therapist C4 3 
Self-knowledge C5 5 
Twin (‘another 
me’) 
C6 2 
Annoying 
machine 
C7 1 
Conversation C8 2 
Thinking 
machine 
C9 1 
Counter 
loneliness 
C10 2 
filter incoming 
data 
C11 2 
Mentor C12 2 
Life coach C13 1 
Pet C14 1 
Self-expression C15 1 
Personal 
Surveillance 
system 
C16 1 
Flattering C17 1 
Comfort C18 1 
Affirmation C19 1 
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Implications of the results 
 
My understanding of the results and responses to the egg interpretation survey are 
summarised below, I wrote these responses in early 2010: 
 
• The results reveal potentially problematic areas – that the egg could be 
perceived as ‘nerdy’, ‘solitary’ or anti-social. 
• This is not my intention. I will modify the framing of this work, emphasising 
its ability to engender social interactions as well as personal reflections. 
• The surveys also reveal what I might call some of my own unconscious 
motivations for this research – certainly to provide companionship and 
reassurance. 
• The survey answers are often poetic, they reveal potential I had not 
considered for this project – such as aiding people to decode strange 
environments, and to conduct their own research. 
• I have used quotes from these surveys in my methodology chapter, to 
emphasise the value of consultation, and to emphasise that this is a dynamic, 
socially engaged project with a high degree of participant design. 
• I recognise that I should re-design the ‘interface’ to the system with a much 
greater degree of participant involvement. User interpretations do offer a 
richer set of heuristics for me to work with other then just my own. So I 
want to go back to the most basic aspect of the project and work in detail 
with potential users. The fundamental programming structures are in place – 
web scraping, language and image analysis, the gathering and evaluation of 
situating data from the wider ecology of the program. 
 
 
Main conclusions 
 
• The project may be perceived as a re-enforcement of self-interest and 
insularity instead of the dynamic, entangled self-mediation I had envisaged. 
• Therefore I need to emphasise my epistemic commitment to a break from 
notions of self-presence and ‘authenticity’ – in favour of my intended  
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emphasis on temporal, dynamic and situated agencies and narrative 
‘becomings’. 
•  I’ll now draw upon potential users to re-design an interface that can attempt 
to accommodate the richness and complexity evidenced by the interpretation 
survey. 
 
The main result of conducting the interpretation surveys was a confirmation of the 
need to involve ‘readers’ or ‘users’ more closely in redesigning the ‘interface’ to the 
South software. I then designed a survey script around which I could aim to gain a 
deeper insight into ‘user’ engagement with the South project. The depth survey (as I 
have named it) was designed to be completed after informants had gone through 
every stage of the prototype evaluation software, an engagement which took 
between 30 minutes and just over an hour and a half. While informants interacted 
with the software I observed them and documented their responses. The script for 
that evaluation process is printed in full and discussed below. 
 
Depth survey (usability testing) 
 
 
Figure 64a 1Below, South usability survey for depth interviews and observation: 
 
 
South software usability testing 
 
 
Questionnaire  
 
Participant name: 
______________________________________________________________ 
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About this questionnaire: 
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to help gain an understanding of the people who 
will use the South software and to get any additional feedback or comments about 
the software.  
 
This information will be used to try to ensure that the South software meets the 
needs of the people who will be using it.  
 
All the information you provide is confidential. Your name is not stored with the 
results of this questionnaire, and the information you provide will not be used for 
any other purpose.   
 
About you  
 
1. Age: _________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
2. Occupation: _________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire  
 
5. Would you describe yourself as comfortable with technology?  
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
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About the South software:  
 
7. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements.  
 
The software is easy to use (ring the word you agree with): 
 
 
Strongly-Agree     agree    Neutral      disagree   don’t know 
 
   
 
 
I always know where I am in the software:  
 
 
Strongly-Agree       agree    Neutral      disagree   don’t know 
 
 
 
It’s easy to get lost: 
 
Strongly-Agree       agree    Neutral      disagree   don’t know 
 
 
 
Learning how to use the software is difficult: 
 
 
 
Strongly-Agree       agree    Neutral      disagree   don’t know 
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I didn’t get enough training: 
 
 
Strongly-Agree       agree    Neutral      disagree   don’t know 
 
 
 
 
 
The guidance provided is useful: 
 
 
Strongly-Agree       agree    Neutral      disagree   don’t know 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. If there were three things you could change about the software, what would they 
be?  
i) 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
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______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
ii)  
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
iii) 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
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______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Do you have any comments or suggestions?  
 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
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Many thanks for your help 
Eleanor Dare: 
Ma501ed@gold.ac.uk 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
/ 
 
Results of the depth survey 
 
n= 4 
 
A range of very clear and often pragmatic suggestions were generated by the depth 
survey. These include: 
 
• Highlight the text boxes more clearly 
• Provide back buttons in case answers were left out or changed 
• Provide error messages 
• Have a help button or sound information or pop up windows with help 
• Explain the relationship between Ivan’s texts and the software more clearly 
• Make the modality section easier to understand 
• Correct spelling mistakes 
• Provide more detailed feedback 
• Provide a simple user manual with a quick start guide 
 
In addition to explicit suggestions made by informants my observations generated a 
number of deductions. I was particularly concerned with assessing how easy users 
found it to navigate the system, and how legible the instructions were.  The following 
deductions were made as a result of observing readers/users interacting with the 
South software: 
 
• Provision of a ‘back’ button 
• Clearer text boxes 
• Fail-safe data entry on every form 
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• Clearer instructions on the modality form 
• Corrected spelling errors 
• Changed size of fonts in places where informants had found the text hard to 
spot. 
• Embed mechanisms to prevent the software from being used more than once 
a day. 
• Correct a minor bug that meant two of the modes went back to previous 
modes after incorrect validation instead of remaining the same until correct 
input was obtained. 
 
However, upon further observation I decided to remove the ‘back’ button as it was 
confusing informants about their navigation of the system, and was also leading to 
confusion about whether they should use the ‘enter’ button or the ‘back’ arrow to 
change their text entries. Form validation addressed the need to go back through the 
modes. I would argue that changing answers by going backwards is also against the 
spirit of the (generally) spontaneous responses solicited by the system. 
 
Figure 65 1following page, coded results of the depth survey, separate observation notes 
were also kept, as evidenced above. 
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Appendix 2 
 
The software 
Appendix 2: The software 1 
Validation  
 
Validation is the ongoing process of checking software works as it is supposed to 
work. It also conventionally involves evaluating if the system functions in the way 
that readers/users want it to. However, as this work has effectively been both 
commissioned and written by me this is not such a straight-forward process, hence 
my emphasis upon soliciting multiple interpretations. Validation has been assisted by 
the concept of ‘revisiting’ my initial requirements and also of examining software that 
has some conceptual or pragmatic resemblance to my own. In addition to the works 
reviewed in chapter two, I have also looked at heuristic (or ‘creative’) and writing 
software such as yWriter5 and Imagination Engineering (see bibliography). My analysis  
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of the structure and methodology represented by these programs has confirmed the 
assertion that the South software offers a significantly alternative interactive and 
heuristic creative system.  
 
Acceptance testing 
 
Acceptance testing, or the testing of the software in a ‘live’ environment by ‘real’ 
users, has been effectively covered by the depth survey described in this appendix. 
As the depth survey  involved no interventions or directions from me about using 
the software and no time constrictions upon users, it is reasonable to claim that the 
software has been exposed to acceptance testing, as described by Christian Dawson 
(2009):  ‘with real data and performing in real time under normal working pressures’ 
(Dawson, 2009: 138). 
 
Regression testing 
 
Testing the system after I had made non-trivial changes to it encompassed the 
process of regression testing. This process ensured that I had not introduced any 
new bugs into the system (as indeed I did do on several occasions). Regression 
testing is typically applied to group projects where individuals may not understand 
the workings of code they are not involved in writing, however as the South project 
was developed by me over nearly three years it was equally valid (and necessary) to 
ensure smooth integration of new code over time with consistent regression testing. 
 
Installability 
 
Though the South Hacks section of the South book does show readers how to 
generate a Linux and a Mac version of the software if they wish, the South software is 
currently released for Windows operating systems only (though this may change in 
the future). Intsallability on Windows systems has been tested by installing the 
system on a range of computers at different locations. The system works well, even 
on relatively older, less powerful, machines. The effect of the tide pushing against  
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readers is increased on less powerful systems. All systems must have high-speed 
internet access for the South software to function properly. 
More detailed information and advice on how to install, use and hack the software is 
contained in the ‘South Hacks’ section of the South book.      
 
Recovery testing 
 
Recovery testing was undertaken by observing how well the software coped with 
incorrect or inconsistent data. The South system crashed completely and inexplicably 
on only one occasion during testing. This took place when a range of other programs 
were running in the background, so it is hard to diagnose a precise cause. The 
system’s ability to cope with ‘bad’ data (or incorrect entries) has largely been 
mitigated by validation algorithms embedded throughout the evaluative modules of 
the software and also throughout the ‘web gathering’, or data collection software. 
 
Software development methodology 
 
The software development methodology used was incremental. A schema for the 
high-level program requirements was clearly established before programming 
started. This enabled the South system to be partitioned into three core modules, or 
intermediate working sub-systems: data gathering, reader evaluation and content 
generation.  Having a partially working software structure, or system kernel, at an 
early stage, allowed me to solicit user/reader involvement before moving on to 
develop the next module(s), details of the software were modified by means of user 
involvement but the high-level model was preserved throughout the writing of the 
South programs.  
 
The programming languages I used to write the South software were determined by 
a subjective estimate of how a range of languages might meet my criteria. The 
criteria specified were: maintainability, technical support, re-usability, supporting 
libraries and the potential for cross-platform release. This pointed to an object-
oriented, cross-platform language. C++ or C (with any sort of GUI) are not cross 
platform, I therefore chose Java and Processing (with some additional PHP scripts).  
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In the future I am considering writing a windows release in C++ with a more 
conventional Windows GUI. However, I am satisfied with the simplicity of the 
current GUI; its efficacy is confirmed by the usability tests, in which the majority of 
informants reported that the system was easy to understand and to navigate. 
 
 
Quick start user manual 
What does the South software do and who is it for? 
The South software generates tailor made content for individual readers or users, 
the content is designed to be used in combination with the South book. The book is 
available to purchase as a hard copy or to download for free in an electronic version 
at this address: http://www.lulu.com/content/paperback-book/south-a-psychometric-
text-adventure-iv/7337498 
The South software is designed to be easily useable by anyone who wishes to interact 
with it, no special skills are required to install, use or hack the software. 
To run the software readers should install the free Java plug-in (if they do not 
already have it) many computers do have this plug-in, but those without can 
download it here: http://www.java.com/en/download/index.jsp 
 
Platform requirements:  
The South software is currently released for PC only, though users who wish to 
download the source code (readers who may want to explore hacking their 
software) can export the software for Linux or Mac operating systems with a 
minimal amount of effort.  
No special memory requirements are necessary to use the software, though readers 
will need a high-speed (Broadband) internet connection for it to work properly. 
 
Installing and starting the South software. 
The software is available for free here: 
http://www.doc.gold.ac.uk/~ma501ed/south/south_Download.html 
There are two versions available: the quick_start_version and the hackable_version. 
The hackable_version requires readers to also install Processing (the integrated 
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development environment that will enable them to ‘hack’ into, or re-design the 
software). The hackable_version is also much larger than the quick_start_version. 
Information about installing the hackable_version is provided on the South download 
page and in the South Hacks section of the South book. As its name implies the 
quick_start_version is designed to be quickly and easily installed and used.  
 
Quick start 
Download the quick_start_version from the South download page listed above. 
Download it to C:\Program Files on your computer.  Unzip the file and then 
navigate through the files in this order > egg_Box > Evaluator4 > web_Gather. Once 
inside the web_Gather folder click on web_Gather.exe.  Very soon a grey window 
will open, after a few seconds you will see CCTV images of the South Bank area on 
your screen. After a few more seconds this program will close and the next program 
will automatically open. Be patient, the computer is working hard to gather data for 
you.  The second program that opens is called the South evaluation software. It will 
take you through a series of interesting and fun questions. These will help the system 
to generate tailor made content for you. The content is confidential and will stay on 
your system only. 
 
Once you have completed the evaluation software a third window will automatically 
open, this is the final program. This is the part of the software that generates unique 
content for you. A series of images will be very rapidly generated. You will know 
when the software has finished working because it will stop generating images.  
 
You can now access the content that has been generated for you. You will find it in a 
folder called your_Content. It is available at this location on your computer: 
C:\Program Files\egg_Box\Evaluator4\larger_egg_Content\your_Content 
Transfer the content to your egg (if you have one) or any other image carrying 
device – a mobile digital picture frame, or mobile phone. Alternatively you could 
print the images with the Windows Picture and Fax viewer. This will print the number 
of each image, aiding you in reading them in the correct order at the location chosen 
for you by the software.  
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When transferring the images it is advisable to select them all and drop them into 
your device in one go. Once you have transferred the images, destroy (or relocate) 
the previously generated images so that the ‘your_Content’ folder is empty for each 
new session.   
 
Please note:  the South software will not let you use it more than once a day, this is 
because the system wants to ensure that unique content is generated for you each 
time you use it. 
 
Uninstalling the software 
Navigate to C:\Program Files\egg_Box. Select the egg_Box folder, right click and 
choose ‘delete’. This will remove the South software from your system and all 
records generated by it. 
 
More detailed information and advice on how to hack the software is provided in the 
‘South Hacks’ section of the South book. 
 
The core Java classes 
 
Full, commented code as well as Java documentation for the three main programs 
that constitute the South software (web_Gather.java, Evaluator4.java and 
larger_egg_Content.java) is provided on the South site here:  
http://www.doc.gold.ac.uk/~ma501ed/south/south_Download.html 
 Two PHP scripts called by the main programs mentioned above (tideGather.php and 
secHalf.php) are also provided at the URL provided above. 
 
web_Gather.java 
 
Upon execution the South software invokes ‘web_Gather.java’; web_Gather.java 
retrieves situating data from the web, such as weather data, news headlines, current 
star signs and CCTV images of London. In tandem with the user-data obtained via 
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the Evaluator program, web_Gather.java enables the South software to situate itself 
each time it is run.  
 
 
 
Figure 66 1Below, excerpt from an algorithm in web_Gather.java, it pre-processes, or breaks 
down and prepares for use data about tide heights at London Bridge. 
 
String raw_dat[] = loadStrings("tidesraw.txt"); 
 
cleaner_dat = arrayToString2(raw_dat); 
//clean away tags to get at data I want: 
 
String ss2 = cleaner_dat.substring(24645, 25470);  
// the section 
// with all our tide data 
 
String sta = "-- tide chart stats open --"; 
String en = "tide chart stats close --"; 
int p1a = cleaner_dat.lastIndexOf(sta); 
int p2a = cleaner_dat.indexOf(en);// 
String asto = cleaner_dat.substring(p1a, p2a); 
 
String dat = cleaner_dat.substring(p1a, p2a); 
outputide1.println(asto); 
outputide1.flush(); 
outputide1.close(); 
 
 
String sta2 = "tidechart"; 
int p1 = dat.lastIndexOf(sta2); 
lastLowH = dat.substring(p1 + 11, p1 + 14); // last low tide 
 
 
 
Evaluator4.java.  
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This program takes readers through a range of ‘personality measuring’ processes. 
The software also asks the reader to react to a range of situating data sources, such 
as news images and headlines, weather information, CCTV images of the South Bank 
area and their star sign data for that day. 
 
larger_egg_Content.java 
 
The class larger_egg_Content.java (and its three inner classes, Logic, redDetect, and 
histogram_Agent) generates bespoke content for readers in the form of image files. 
The amount of content generated is defined by a comparison to my own ‘scores’ or 
weightings in relation to the system and to the assessment of readers.  The colours 
larger_egg_Content.java generates are defined by the height and colour of the Thames 
at London Bridge, where I was born. The system uses image analysing agents to 
generate a short narrative about the bus stop outside Borough tube station, and to 
decide what sort of day or night is unfolding on the South Bank.  
 
Detailed information and advice about how to hack all these programs is provided in 
the ‘South Hacks’ section of the South book. 
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Glossary 
Glossary 1 
Agency 
Agency influences events and processes and therefore acts within the world. It is 
important in the context of this thesis to dispense with the notion that agency is a 
‘thing’ or a linear force, or that it is restricted to human agents only.  
 
Agential realism 
‘Agential realism is a theory of knowledge and reality whose fundamental premise is 
that reality consists of phenomena that are reconstituted in intra-action with the 
interventions of knowers. ‘Intra-action’ signifies a dynamic involving the inseparability 
of the objects and agencies of intervention (as opposed to interactions which 
reinscribe the contested dichotomy). Agential realism accounts for both the 
contingency and efficacy of knowledge. It provides an understanding of the 
interactions between human and nonhuman, material and discursive, and natural and 
cultural factors in the production of knowledge. One of its basic aims is to move 
considerations of epistemic practices beyond the traditional realism versus social 
constructionism debates.’ 
(available at Feminist Encyclopaedia  http://www.bookrags.com/tandf/agential-realism-
tf/, Accessed 01/04/11) 
 
Agents 
A human agent makes things happen in the world.  A software agent is similarly able 
(within its own world) to effect changes. 
 
Chat Bots (also called Chatterbots and Chatbots) 
Chat Bots are conversational software agents that engage in conversation, they 
originate with Joseph Weizenbaum’s Eliza (1966), though the term ChatterBot was  
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first coined by Michael Mauldin in 1994, when he created the conversational program 
Julia. 
 
Computer Literature (includes Computational Literature and 
Computational Fiction) 
Computer Literature is a term used by Nick Montfort (2003), he uses it in a way 
that is interchangeable with the term ‘electronic literature’ and hence encompasses a 
wide range of forms from hypertext fiction to automatic poetry generators (such as 
William Chamberlain’s and Thomas Etter’s Ractor (1984)). The word ‘literature’ is 
not apparently a qualitative term in the context of digital works. 
 
 
Cybertexts 
A term originated by Espen Aarseth in 1997.  Cyber comes from the Greek word 
kybernetes -helmsman, and was used by Norbert Weiner (1948) to describe the 
concept of cybernetics, or control and regulation through feed-back loops of agency 
and action between machines and people.  A cybertext involves similarly distributed 
agencies.  A reader of cybertexts makes decisions which influence the outcome of 
the text. This does not pre-suppose a digital environment. The ancient I Ching also 
qualifies as a cybertext. 
 
Deliberative 
The word deliberative is used in this thesis in connection to the notion of a 
deliberative agent. A deliberative agent has beliefs, desires and intentions which it 
can act upon. 
 
Digital Fiction Systems 
Used in this thesis to encompass a range of digital-fiction forms and their underlying 
computation. The term is used in this thesis to include experimental works 
produced by scientists working in the field of artificial intelligence, and therefore not 
necessarily works of ‘literature’ in an orthodox sense. 
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Digital  Literature 
Unlike electronic literature, digital literature may also include digitised versions of 
analogue texts, such as those found on Project Gutenberg (which scans analogue 
texts and makes them available on the web). The term therefore does not 
necessarily imply any accommodation of the specific characteristics of computation. 
 
E-books 
Electronic books, often in Kindle format (for use on Kindle readers), but also .PDF 
files. Though they can have links like hypertexts, e-books are often unmodified 
facsimiles of analogue books. As such they should arguably fall under the term ‘digital 
literature’ rather than electronic literature, which is designed to exist within a 
computational context. 
 
Electronic Literature 
The Electronic Literature Organisation (ELO) defines electronic literature very 
broadly. By the ELO definition70 it encompasses chat-bots (conversational software 
agents), Interactive Fiction (IF) and computer art with literary aspects. All of these  
varied forms must be ‘born’ to digitality in order to meet the criteria for electronic 
literature, meaning that they must be specifically designed for the digital realm as 
opposed to analogue texts that have been inserted into a digital format with no 
accommodation for the specific affordances and characteristics of computation. 
 
ELO 
The Electronic Literature Organisation.  Since 1999 it has promoted electronic 
literature, see http://www.eliterature.org/ 
 
Enactivism 
In contrast to the mind-body split of the Cartesian Cogito as a model for human 
cognition. An enactivist approach posits "the enactment of a world and a mind on 
the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs" 
                                                 
70
  The ELO definition for electronic literature is available here: 
http://www.eliterature.org/about (accessed 30/03/11). 
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(Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). It is a theory of cognition that is inseparable 
from action and is therefore implicitly embodied. 
 
Entanglement 
The notion of entanglement is central to Karen Barad’s (2007) distinction between 
intra and interaction, and the distinction between objects that are separable, and 
phenomena, which are inherently more fluid.  
 
Ergodic 
Espen Aarseth describes ergodic texts as those in which the reader must work non-
trivially to find a path through them; this can include non-digital works such as the I 
Ching and Tarot readings. The word Ergodic comes from the Greek words for work 
and path. 
 
HCI 
Human-Computer-Interaction. 
 
Hypertext 
Hypertext is a digital form of text that contains links; it can also contain images and 
tables. Hypertext can be both factual and fictional. Dynamic hypertext can change 
continuously. Hyper is the Greek word for ‘over’ or ‘beyond’, hence the sense that 
hypertext goes beyond the linearity of analogue text. Hypertext is usually found in 
the context of the World Wide Web, but it can be viewed and kept locally, on a 
hard-drive. The term hypertext has no implication for its content; hypertext 
describes the process of linking texts. 
 
Hypertext Fiction 
Hypertext fiction deploys hypertext to create branching narratives. Ready-made 
hypertext fiction systems (to facilitate the writing of hypertext fictions) include 
Eastgate Systems and Storyspace. Shelley Jackson’s Patchwork Girl (1995) is a notable 
example of a hypertext fiction. 
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Hypermedia  
Hypermedia is described by Ted Nelson (1992) in contrast to ‘hypertext:’ 
‘By now the word "hypertext" has become generally accepted for branching and 
responding text, but the corresponding word "hypermedia", meaning complexes of 
branching and responding graphics, movies and sound – as well as text – is much less 
used. Instead they use the strange term "interactive multimedia": this is four syllables 
longer, and does not express the idea of extending hypertext.’ (Nelson, 1992). 
 
Interactivity 
In the context of this thesis interactivity refers to the linear relations between 
computers and humans. This thesis critiques dominant constructions of interactivity 
as a linear process of inputs and outputs, as opposed to the relational causality of 
intra-activity outlined by Karen Barad. 
 
Interactive Fiction (IF) 
IF (as it is often abbreviated to) describes a type of text-only electronic fiction that 
uses formal text commands to control events and characters in a story-world. IF 
systems (to facilitate writing interactive fictions) include Inform, Infocom and TADS.  
Text Adventures can also be included in this category.  A famous example of IF is the 
Zork series by Infocom (1979 onwards).  
 
Intra-activity 
According to Karen Barad (2007), intra-action, unlike interaction, does not 
presuppose ‘the prior existence of independent entities of relata’ (Barad, 2007:139). 
Barad does not take for granted atomistic or Cartesian separations between subject 
and object; instead she sees specific situations and actions as allowing 
phenomenological relata to emerge as specific causal intra- actions. 
 
Locative Media 
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Encompasses location based technologies such as GPS, surveillance and wireless 
technology. It is also a field in which artists use location aware computing devices as 
both a medium and a philosophical framework for their work. 
 
Mal-adaptation 
In evolutionary terms a mal-adaptation (or behaviour that makes survival in a 
particular environment less likely) is also an inevitable side effect of advantageous  
adaptation, for example, Dodos became fat to accommodate periods of famine, but 
this adaptation made them unfit to evade human predators. 
 
Narrative 
Toolan (2001) describes narrative as a sequence of non-randomly connected events, 
but he acknowledges the further difficulty of defining the term ‘events’. 
 
Performative/Performativity 
Performative understanding is Barad’s central challenge to the power we have placed 
in language as tantamount to reality, as the main agent in systems of representation.  
Barad’s agential realism specifically acknowledges and takes account of ‘matter’s 
dynamism’ (Barad, 2007:135). This approach is an opportunity to move away from 
the infinite regress of epistemological self-reflection and representation, to forms of 
knowing and knowledge generation that are rooted in practices, events and real-
world action. 
 
Situated/Situatedness 
In the context of artificial intelligence situated agents are embedded in an 
environment. In Donna Haraway’s terms (1988) situatedness is also an ethical 
recognition of the partiality and locatedness of knowledge, as opposed to an 
idealised notion of objective universality, neutrality and non-partiality. 
 
Real World Interaction (RWI) 
As technology becomes increasingly mobile and therefore not confined to the 
desktop, old paradigms such as WIMP (window, icon, menu, pointing device) become 
less suitable. RWI are interactions and systems designed for dynamic real-world  
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environments. These interactions may recognise a user’s voice and location while 
also responding to embodied actions such as gesture and facial expression. 
 
Subjectivity 
Subjectivity implies personal and individual thoughts, attitudes and perceptions. A 
common definition will characterise subjectivity as emanating from an individual 
rather than the external world, highlighting the ontological separations at play in the 
notion of the subjective, particularly those of the self and other, the individual and 
society, but also of mind and body. 
 
Text Adventures/Text Games 
See Interactive Fiction. Classic examples of Text Adventures include Adventure (Will 
Crowther, 1975), later re-modelled as Colossal Cave Adventure, and Adventureland 
(Scott Adams, 1978). 
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